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DefNP Definite Noun Phrase, i.e., definite NP with definite
determiner or no determiner (e.g. proper names)
DemNP Demonstrative Noun Phrase, i.e. definite NP with
demonstrative determiner
DezeNP Demonstrative Noun Phrase with determiner deze or
dit
DieNP Demonstrative Noun Phrase with determiner die or
dat
Defl~1A Definite Nominal Anaphor, i.e., NA with a definite
determiner or no determiner (e.g. proper names)
DemNA Demonstrative Nominal Anaphor, i.e., NA with a
demonstrative determiner
DaNA Definite Alternative Nominal Anaphor, i.e., alternative
NA with definite determiner
DezeNA Demonstrative Nominal Anaphor with determiner deze
or dit
DieNA Demonstrative Nominal Anaphor with determiner die
or dat
DREF Discourse Referent (Representation)
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Nominal anaphors in discourse
In producing and processing discourse people appear to be able to
simultaneously carry out many ingenious cognitive actions. The
ultimate goal of these cognitive actions is to understand or be
understood. Understanding and modelling these intentional
actions is the central concern of cognitive linguists studying
discourse. A well-established view on discourse production and
comprehension, agreed upon amongst cognitive linguists, is that
people build up coherent mental representations of discourse,
coherence being the teleological principle governing discourse
production and comprehension, and hence governing the study of
discourse.
One of the major assumptions underlying the coherence of
discourse is that speakers and writers behave intelligibly in the
way they indicate what they are talking about, and that
addressees are able to keep track of the things talked about. This
assumption motivates the importance of referential coherence as
a topic in discourse research.
Over the last decade a considerable number of studies have
emerged on the establishment and especially on the maintenance
of reference in discourse. They are mainly concerned with the
question how types (forms) of anaphoric expressions relate to
functional or processing aspects of establishing and maintaining
reference or - more generally - to identificational needs in
discourse. A dichotomy of anaphoric expressions that appears to
be relevant in analytical as well as in process studies of discourse
reference is that between pronominal (la) and nominal anaphors
( lb):
(1) George Bush; is trying to convince the European countries
to support the war in the Gulf.
a. He; is very determined to win the war.
b. fBush; ~ The president;) is very determined to win the
war.
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Two clear reasons for a dichotomy between pronominal and
nominal anaphors are, first of all, the simple formal difference
between pronominal and nominal anaphors, and, second, the
differences in identificational function between the two anaphoric
classes.
This study atarts from the dichotomy between pronominal and
nominal discourse anaphors, and concentrates upon the semantic
and pragmatic functions of nominal anaphors in discourse. The
purpose of the study is to develop a view on and an analysis of
nominal anaphors (henceforth NAs) in which their contribution to
the coherence of discourse is accounted for.
1.2 Two views on nominal anaphors
1.2.1 The identificational view on NAs
A promising way of looking at referential coherence, popular in
process-oriented studies on reference, is to regard referential
expressions as linguistic devices, accessing representations of
discourse referents, the form or type of referential expressions
being dependent on the degree of accessibility of the discourse
referent at that particular moment in the discourse. In different
proposals the idea of referential expressions accessing discourse
referent representations is defined and formalised in different
ways, such as Webber's 1979 inuoking descriptions, Bosch's 1988
focus representations, Seuren's 1985 discourse addresses, Heim's
1982 file cards, Cornish's 1986b discourse entities. The idea of the
accessibility of referents can be found behind theoretical notions
in many proposals, accounting for the choice of referential
expressions in discourse. Examples are accessibility (hierarchy),
auailability, mutual knowledge, common ground, giuen-new,
referential continuity, (explicit vs. implicit) focus, attentional state,
mutual acceptance, familiarity. The notion of referent accessibility
can be said to underlie dichotomic as well as multi-value
classifications of referential expressions, e.g. the distinction of
explicit and implicit focus in Garrod 8~ Sanford (1982:27), the
anaphorichierarchy in Lakoff (1976:295), the given-new taxonomy
in Prince (1981b:237), the accessibility marking scale in Ariel
(1990:73) etc.
An attractive characteristic of this accessibility view is that the
behaviour and function of anaphoric as well as non-anaphoric
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referential expressions can be predicted, two research areas
which for a long time received separate attention. In the case of
non-anaphoric referential expressions, accassibility predicts that
definite expressions presuppose a certain degree of accessibility of
the underlying referent; indefinite expressions indicate low
accessibility of the referent. With regard to anaphoric expressions
accessibility predicts that the lexical specificity or identificational
explicitness of anaphors is inversely proportional to the
accessibility of the underlying referent.
Referential coherence in terms of accessibility offers a first and
straightforward víew of nominal anaphors. Being explicit forms of
anaphoric reference, nominal anaphors should be used if the
accessibility of the referent involved is low, i.e., if lexically empty
pronominal forms would hardly or not at all enable the addressee
to identify the intended referent. I will call this the
identificational view of nominal anaphors.
Support for this functional value of nominal anaphors can be
found in discourse analytic studies of reference in which nominal
anaphors are associated with text conditions which can be
considered to decrease the accessibility of discourse referents.
Francik (1985:29), for example, shows that non-protagonists in
narrative discourse are more often and more easily referred to by
means of nominal anaphors than protagonists, i.e., that non-
protagonist referents are less accessible than protagonists (see
also Anderson et al. 1983, Karmiloff-Smith 1980:248). Marslen-
Wilson, Levy 8c Tyler 1982 associate NAs with (re-)establishing
(as opposed to merely maintaining) reference in narrative
discourse: (re-)establishment of reference implies a relatively low
degree of accessibility. Clancy 1980 demonstrates that nominal
anaphors often signal discourse boundaries, ch,anges in scenarios
and points of view. Fox (1984:211) looks upon nominal anaphors
as signals indicating the transition to new rhetorical units in
discourse. Anderson et al. 1983 reveal the association of nominal
anaphors with changes in scenarios (see also Sanford 8z Garrod
1981). In terms of accessibility: all these discourse circumstances
decrease the accessibility of referents. Givón (1983:11) shows
among other things that potential interference of competing
candidates increases the possibility of nominal-anaphor
occurrences. Finally, Ariel (1988:69-70) shows that nominal
anaphors occur more frequently as the distance between anaphor
and antecedent increases; in other words, interference and
distance decrease the accessibility of referents.
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Conversely, in these and other proposals pronouna are associated
with high accessibility in the broad sense, a view which is
identificational as well. Pronouns are associated with notions
such as explicit-focus referents (Garrod 8a Sanford 1982:27), high-
focus-leuel actors (fteichman 1978:311), giuen referents (Clark 8ti
Haviland 1977:27, Chafe 1976), maintenance of referents
(Marslen-Wilson, Levy 8~ Tyler 1982:351), current entities (Yule
1981:49), protagonists (Francik 1985:59, Anderson et al.
1983:433), thematic subjects (Karmiloff-Smith 1980:235), topical
referents (Linde 1979). Experimental results provide evidence for
a link between pronominal anaphors and accessible referents (e.g.
Purkiss 1978 in Sanford 8s Garrod 1981:137).
These proposals illustrate the major trend in the research on
nominal anaphors in discourse: nominal anaphors are associated
with a low degree of accessibility of discourse referents or with
discourse variables decreasing the accessibility of the referent. As
such, their contextual contribution can be described in two ways:
on the one hand, the use of an NA can be considered to be the
resultant of identificationally problematic discourse conditions,
and an NA can be looked upon as a device that the writer
necessarily has to use and that is expected selfevidently by the
reader in view of the contextual conditions encountered in the
discourae. On the other hand, NAs can be seen as a signal
predicting identificationally problematic context elements.'
Although these two perspectives can be neatly distinguished from
a conceptual point of view, it is hardly possible to distinguish
them in analysing or processing occurrences of NAs in discourse.
Anyway, in both modes of description the function of NAs can be
seen as reflecting the dynamic accessibility status of the referent,
which is afiected or determined by a series of context conditions.
The intuitive reasonableness of attributing an identificational
function to NAs emerges naturally from their nominal nature,
nominal information having in itaelf a stronger identificational
force than pronominal information.2 The identificational view of
NAs is further based on the empirical fact that NAs often take
the form of simple literal or partial repetitions of the antecedent.
The function of simple repetition only sporadically goes beyond
the identificational function just mentioned. The view finds its
justification in the fact that NAs, being anaphoric expressions,
are supposed to obey the principle of referential scarcity which
states that an anaphor is no more explicit than is needed in order
to enable the reader to establish the intended referent.
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This principle can be regarded as the instantiation of the
communicative principles of quantity and economy with regard to
the use of anaphoric expressions. With respect to the variation of
pronouns and NAs in discourse, it predicts that anaphors are
pronouns by default, unless discourse conditions require nominal
anaphors. This principle is congruent with the perspective on the
pronoun-NA variation in the studies on reference mentioned
earlier and with lots of principles regulating the pronoun-NA
variation in discourse (e.g. Chomsky 1981, Reinhart 1983,
Levinson 198?).3 It is the basis for an intuitively acceptable
predictive preference in anaphor resolution mechanisms (e.g.
Lockman 8z Klappholz 1980:57).
Thus, in this view the relevance of NAs as a research topic is its
'nominalness', as opposed to the non-nominal nature of pronouns.
The key question is when and why the pronominal default has to
be overruled by nominal anaphoric devices. Answers to that
question are predominantly formulated in terms of discourse
variables affecting the accessibility and hence the identification of
referents, i.e., sequential structure (distance, discourse
boundaries) and content structure (episode, point of view,
scenario, rhetorical units, protagonist, competing candidates).
1.2.2 The qualificational view of NAs
However sound and obvious the purely identificational
interpretation of nominal anaphors may be, it by no means
accounts for the functionality of all nominal anaphors. Important
classes of NAs cannot be captured merely on the basis of their
identificational function. The fact is that systematic classes of
NAs refer to highly accessible referents and they are not
associated with the discourse variables associated with low
accessibility. These NAs violate the principle of referential
scarcity. Although these classes can be characterised by their
high-accessibility status, the basic predictions of the acceasibility
view no longer work. Of course their identificational function
remains obvious, but their NA-format cannot be accounted for by
identificational needs alone: a pronoun would have done the
referential job perfectly well. This is stereotypically the case with
nominal anaphors which do not literally or partially repeat their
antecedent, and occur in a one-topic discourse context, a simple
example of which can be found in (2):
6
(2) Fortunately, Ceaucescu; is dead. (The ~ this) satanic
Roumanian dictator; is sentenced to death yesterday.
discourse in that they modify discourse referents seman 'cally orqír~--
pragm tically. I will call this view the qualificational uiew ~f,~ ' c
NAc ~ ~ ~ffl0.~-~V~
qualificational devices, which contribute to the coherence o
By default, occurrences of NAs as in (2) are used for other than




Résearch on the qualificational functions of NAs only receives
sporadic attention in the literature on reference. Firstly, there is
the discussion about so-called epithets, which are said to have
evaluative value (see e.g. Bolinger 1977:51-52; Bosch 1983:149;
Droste 1977:182; Hinds 1978; Seuren 1985:348 and also sections
2.2.1 and 3.4.5 below). Secondly, there is the analysis of non-
identificational functions of demonstrative NPs, especially in
Lakoff 1974 (see also section 4.2.1.2). Third, there is the
discussion of sentences in which literal repetitions occur in
structurally unusual positions as in (3) to (6).
(3) I was sorry to hear about Tom;. Yes, the doctor warned
him;, but Tom; [i.e., Tom who is being stubborn (A.M.)]
kept on. (Bolinger 1979:292)
(4) ~John~.. he; lied to me, and John; was my friend. (Bosch
1983:172)
(5) ~1Kary~.. She; was told that under no circumstances
would Mary; have to compromise herself. (Mc Cray
1980:334)
(6) Look fathead. If everyone loves Oscar;'s mother, then
certainly Oscar; must love Oscar;'s mother (Evans
1980:356)
Sentences like these can be considered to be ungrammatical
according to structural co-referentiality rules. For example, the
examples (3) and (4) violate the rule for co-referential NPs in
conjoined structures formulated by Langendoen (1969:167-8) and
Hinds 8s Okada (1975:332); and the examples (5) and (6) violate
co-reference rules like the ones in Reinhart (1983:43) or Lasnik
(1976:16).'
With regard to our discussion, the examples are relevant in that
nominal repetitions occur where pronouns would have been
perfect and even necessary according to the structural relations
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between antecedent and anaphor. A necessary condition
underlying these sentences (which, however, remains implicit in
the sentence-internal discussions) is that the referent in question
must be highly accessible. This means that these sentences only
occur naturally in contexts in which the referent has just been
mentioned or is topical.s The acceptability of these sentences can ~~
only be accounted for in qualificational terms. Explanations for
these peculiar sentences are given in semantic terms, such as, for
example, Mc Cray's (1980:335) notion of semantic peak, in
pragmatic terms, e.g. Evans' (1980:357) notion of conuersational
concern, or in terms of interactional relations between speaker,
hearer and referent, e.g. Maes' (1987:143) notion of perspectiue
focus. Intuitively it is clear that NAs in these examples are not
used merely to access the referent, but to evoke pragmatic
inferences about the referent involved.
Finally, with regard to accessibility-driven discourse analyses of
anaphoric expressions, Fox mentions the relevance of so-called
non-structural factors that account for occurrences of NAs in
discourse. As to written context, which is the most relevant for
our purposes, she states that "while hierarchical structure
relations are crucial in the patterning of anaphora in written
English texts, they are not responsible for euery use of all of the
anaphoric devices that are available to us in English; some of
these uses haue other communicative functions as their source.
These non-structural usés of various anaphoric devices have been
ignored in the recent discourse analysis, especially with regard to
written material, so it is important that they be recognised in a
full treatrnent of anaphora" (1984:240). This, together with a
functional explanation of some non-identificational occurrences of
NAs in her database is an important initial statement, but it does
not as yet offer a full treatment of non-identificational uses of
NAs.s
In the present study the qualificational use conditions of NAs are
taken to be central in accounting for the discourse functions of
nominal anaphors. Qualificational NAs turn out to occur
systematically in written context, especially in popular scientific
discourse, political commentaries, reviews, sport reports etc. This
study intends to account systematically for different uses of
qualificational NAs and to go beyond the level of ad hoc
explanations of peculiarities.
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1.3 The definition of nominal anaphors
At first glance, the definition of nominal anaphors is extremely
simple: NAs are NPs which are both nominal and anaphoric. NPs
are nominal if their head is a noun. Nominal NPs can be
preceded by a determiner or can be bare' (for example, in the
case of proper names).' Anaphoric NPs are NPs that are co-
referential with an antecedent in the preceding discourse.
However descriptively sound and straighforward this definition
may be, it will appear to be too shallow and insufficient for our
purposes. In order to determine the definition and extension of
NAs more accurately, I start from the following three levels
involved in the description of reference in language, each
addressing conceptually distinct reference objects:
level 1 the level of discourse;
level 2 the level of discourse representation;
level 3 the level of (real, presupposed, possible ..) world.
Given these three levels, the nominal anaphor the ex-president in
(7) can be said to refer to an antecedent NP (level 1), to an
underlying discourse referent (level 2) and to a world referent
(level 3 ):
(7) Yesterday, Reagan; celebrated his birthday. The ex-
president; was wearing a tiny crown for the occasion.
Although the words refer and reference could be used to express
all these relations between referential levels, as we did above, we
will establish the following clarifying terminological conventions,
summarised in figure (1) below:
Level 1
Reference objects on the linguistic or discourse level are
called NPs and anaphoricNPs.
Anaphoric NPs are said to be co-referential with their
antecedents.
A nominal anaphor is abbreviated as NA, its antecedent
is the NA's antecedent.
In the examples anaphoric NPs are italicized and co-
indexed with their antecedents.
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Level 2
Reference objects on the level of rPpresentation are called
discourse referents or discourse referent representations.
Discourse referents are parts of the representation of the
discourse unit in which the (anaphoric) NPs occur.
Discourse referents represent línguistic features of NPs
and descriptive features of world referents.
NPs and anaphoric NPs are said to access discourse
referents. Conversely, discourse referents are said to
underlie (anaphoric) NPa.
A discourse referent or discourse referent representation
is abbreviated as DREF.
Reference objects within discourse referent
representations are capitalised.
Level 3
Reference objects on the world level are called world
referents. World referents are part of real, presupposed,
possible worlds.
NPs and discourse referents are said to denote world
referents.
World referents are indicated by putting them between
quotes.
CHAPTER 1
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In this study the representational level is regarded as the central
level of description. Generally speaking this means that the
interpretative relationship between NAs and their antecedents
has to be described in terms of their representational effect, and
that relations between anaphoric NPs and world referents are
relevant only insofar as they are reflected on the representational
level.
Discourse representations are conceived of in this study as the
systematic description of what readers construct while processing
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language. The following two characteristics of discourse
representations are taken for granted:
(i) Discourse participants build successive representations of
successive discourse units. Successive discourse
representations are said to increment each other. This
means that each successive representation replaces,
changes and adds to the previous one. An application of
such a view on discourse representations is found in
Kamp 1981.
(ii) Discourse referents are the organising components of
discourse representations: all discourse information is
assumed to be stored with the referent it belongs to. The
representational design of attaching discourse
information 'under' discourse referents is founded
cognitively. It reflects the fact that the linking of
information with referents is a major task in discourse
comprehension, a view which can be found in
comprehension research, e.g. in Garrod íiz Sanford
(1977:88), Cloitre 8a Bever (1988:295) and Anderson c~
Hastie (1974:512). An application of this view on
discourse referents is found in Seuren 1985.
Given these distinctions with respect to reference objects and
discourse representations, in this study, an NA will be defined as
follows:
(8) An NA is a nominal anaphoric NP, accessing an
incremented discourse referent representation DREFn`.
The notion of incremented DREF is assumed to include
the following two characteristics of DREFs underlying
NAs:
(i) an incremented DREF contains the le~cical
material and hence represents the semantic
content of the accessing NP; and
(ii) an incremented DREF has the same
identification number (n) in the representation
as a DREF already included in the
representation of at least one previous discourse
unit.
At first sight, the definition gives rise to a paradoxical situation
concerning the status of an NA: on the one hand, the semantic
12 CHAPTER 1
content feature (i) of the definition can be seen as an indication
for the fact that an NA and its antecedent access different
DREFs, at least in cases in which the lexical content of the NA is
different from the lexical content of its antecedent; on the other
hand, feature (ii), applying to other anaphoric devices, such as
pronominal anaphors as well, indicates that one and the same
DREF is involved. In the following, it will be argued that the two
features are not contradictory, but that both features are
necessary components of a definition of NAs, touching upon
fundamental processing features of nominal anaphors in
discourse.
The first characteristic of the definition of NAs concerna the
semantic content of DREFs underlying NAs: the discourse
referent representation obligatorily includes the lexical content of
an NA, formalised in some way or the other. This characteristic
reflects the fact that nominal and pronominal anaphors differ
crucially with respect to the way they access their respective
discourse referents.
Pronominal anaphors are assumed to trigger a simple copy of a
DREF, included in the representation of a previous discourse
unit, into the representation of the discourse unit containing the
pronoun. This means that the semantic content of DREFs
underlying pronominal NPs is determined by the lexical content
of the antecedent NP. Nominal anaphors, on the other hand, are
assumed to trigger the incremented version of a DREF included
in the representation of a previous discourse unit, the increment
being determined by the lexical content of the nominal anaphor.
Differences between original DREF and incremented DREF are
especially obvious in the case of nominal anaphors the content of
which is different from the content of their antecedents. The
difference between representations underlying pronominal and
nominal anaphors is illustrated in the figures (2) and (3):
Figure (2): The representation of pronominal anaphors
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Figure (3): The representation of nominal anaphors
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It is important to note that the only representational difference
which is relevant to us here is the difference which is effected by
the anaphors themselves, hence the simplified DREFs in the
figures above. In fact, these DREFs should include linguistic
information about the NPs, knowledge information about the
world referent and, of course, the predicational information
contained in the discourse unit involved, as is made clear in the
second characteristic of discourse representations mentioned
above.
A cognitive reason for this representational difference between
DREFs underlying pronominal and nominal anaphors is the
assumption that different processing mechanisms underlie
pronominal and nominal anaphors respectively. It is assumed
that the processing of NAs always includes the recognition and
evaluation of the lexical content of the anaphoric NP, a crucial
processing step which is absent in the processing of pronominal
anaphors. Such processing differences are argued for in
experimental studies which exhibit differences in processing
effort between the pronominal and nominal anaphors. Cloitre 8a
Bever find a greater processing effort for repeated nouns than for
pronouns. They explain the difference by the fact that "pronouns
provide direct access to a conceptual repesentation of the
antecedent, whereas repeated noun anaphors do so indirectly,
priming a surface (lexical) level of representation as a preliminary
to accessing th.e conceptual representation" (1988:294). Chang
(1980:63) finds the opposite results but - paradoxically - assumes
a similar processing difference: the processing ease of noun-
anaphors as opposed to pronouns is explained by the fact that the
noun anaphor reinstates not only a meaning code, but an
additional surface code, which facilitates the recognition of the
antecedent. Consequently, however contradictory the results are,
both explanations assume the lexical level, and hence the lexical
content of the anaphor, as a relevant step in processing NAs.
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The second characteristic of NAs in definition (8) determines the
referential status of NAs: the decision as to whether a nominal
NP is an NA or not depends on whether or not the underlying
DREF has the same number as a previous DREF. This feature
reflects a necessary and sufficient processing condition for
determining NAs, a condition which can be formulated from two
processing perspectives. According to the perspective of the
writer, an NA must be the result of a writer's intention to access
a referent which is already present in the representation of at
least one previous discourse unit. According to the perspective of
the reader, the (coherent or intended) processing of an NA must
imply the establishment of a link with a referent which is already
present in some previous representation.
The same-number characteristic makes it possible to further
determine the exact extension of NAs. It makes clear that there
is a fundamental difference between the contextual or intended
reading of a nominal anaphor and its denotational extension. This
difference can be demonstrated easily by the following two
observations. Firstly, an NA need not have the same denoting
extension as its antecedent, as is clear from example (7), repeated
below, where the NP the ex-president potentially denotes more
world referents than the one which is meant.
(7) Yesterday, Reagan; celebrated his birthday. The ex-
president; was wearing a tiny crown for the occasion.
Conversely, two different NPs denoting the same world referent
do not have to be looked upon as NAs in every text setting, as is
clear from (9) and (10):
(9) ~In the village of Weert, the owner of a building, in
which a youth club is located, refuses to renew the
tenancy agreement of that building. The owner also
happens to be the muyor of Weert. The tenants of the
youth club haue written a protest letter to the village
council, part of which is represented below.~
...We demand that the mayor of Weert; should force the
owner~ by warrant to renew the tenancy agreement.
(10) ~An eyewitness tells his wife that he told the police officer
the story of the robbery he saw. Neither of them knows,
howeuer, that the uery same police officer has in fact
committed the robbery. The eyewitness says the following~
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I told the police o~cer; that the thief was masked.9
Although the underlined NPs in (9) and ( 10) denote the same
world referent - i.e., the relationship between them is accidentally
co-referential, as Evans (1980:360) calls it - the examples do not
contain NAs, because the two NPs are not meant to acces the
same discourse referent.
Finally, the same-number characteristic of DREFs underlying
NAs is not meant to express referential dependency between
nominal anaphor and antecedent. The notion of referential
dependency, found in Evans (1980:358), captures the intuition
that some anaphors, such as pronouns, do not enable the reader
to identify the referent on its own, i.e., without hinging on the
antecedent. A condition of referential dependency for NAs is
intuitively acceptable in the light of NAs as in (11), in which the
intended referent cannot be identified without contextual
information, among which the antecedent:
(11) For the first time this season KV Mechelen; played well
at home. The home team; gained an easy victory.
However, there are several reasons why referential dependency is
not considered to be a necessary feature of NAs. First, and most
obviously, NAs that literally repeat their antecedent cannot be
considered to be referentially dependent upon their antecedent.
Both antecedent and anaphor have to be considered to possess
the same referential potential. Second, NAs that do not literally
repeat their antecedent (so-called alternative NAs) are often
hardly explicable in terms of referential dependency, as will be
shown especially in chapter 2. To name only one striking fact,
they can belong to an anaphoric class which is regarded as
identificationally stronger than the anaphoric class of its
antecedent, as for example in (12):
(12) GRAFOLOGE: "DEMJANJUK VERVALSTE
HANDTEKENING"
Een Amerikaanse deskundige inzake schriftvervalsing;
verklaarde gisteren tegenover een Israëlische rechtbank
die de zaak van de oorlogsmisdadiger John Demjanjuk
behandelt dat een nazi-identiteitskaart op naam van de
beklaagde werd vervalst. Edna Robinson, een grafologe
en een deskundige inzake ontleding van dokumenten;, zei
dat de handtekening op de kaart van het Trwaniki
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oefenkamp niet van Demjanjuk was. (De Morgen, 7-08-
1988)
GRAPHOLOGER: "DEMJANJUK FORGED SIGNATI7RE"
Yesterday an American ezpert jor jorgery declared to an Israeli court
handling the case of war criminal John Demjanjuk that the nazi
identity-papers with the name oj the accused were jorged. Edna
Robinson, graphologer and expert analyser oj documents, said that the
signature on the card ojthe 75.waniki camp was not Demjanjuk's.
Third, and more importantly, the question as to whether or not
an NA is referentially dependent on its antecedent in its strict
sense is the wrong question. It presupposes a view on NAs which
is purely identificational. As to the co-referential nature of an
NA, the only thing which matters is not the question whether or
not an NA would be able on its own to identify the referent
involved, but the condition that an NA accesses an 'old' DREF.
1.4 The classification of nominal anaphors
Existing classifications of NAs in the literature are based upon
the relationship of NAs with their antecedents. So, classes of NAs
in fact mean classes of antecedent-NA pairs. There are various
classification criteria, yielding different classes of NAs. Firstly,
NAs can be classified according to their form.al relationship with
the antecedent: an NA can have a repeated or a non-
repeatedlalternative form. Repeated forms can be subdivided into
literal and partial repetitions. The relevance of the formal
criterion is self-evident and widely accepted (see e.g. Halliday 8s
Hasan 1976, Cornish 1986b, Hirst 1981). 5econdly, NAs can be
classified according to the type of knowledge relationship involved
in the antecedent-NA pair: the relationship can be semantic or
pragmatic. The first type represents relations between lexical
items in the lexicon (synonymy, hyperonymy), the second type
expresses relations involving encyclopaedic knowledge or
knowledge of the world. Although these knowledge-based classes
are conceptually clear, it is difficult to distinguish them in all
occurrences of NAs.
Thirdly, antecedent-NA pairs can be classified on the basis of
their anaphoric type. A nominal anaphor can have the same
anaphoric type as its antecedent, or a different one. The two
anaphoric types involved in NAs are proper names and definite
descriptions. The relevance of this criterion is suggested by
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Cornish in his critique of the distinction of co-reference and
anaphoricity made by Reinhart 1983. According to Cornish
(1986a:247-248) for an NA to be of a different anaphoric type
from its antecedent, it must be lower on the anaphora hierarchy
than its antecedent, a condition which is violated in an example
like (12) above.'o
An important characteristic of the three previous classifications is
that they yield classes of NAs which are neither necessarily
context-sensitive nor necessarily cognitively relevant: i.e., they
are not classified according to the way NAs contribute to the
discourse or to the way NAs establish coherence. The
classifications mentioned yield lexical classes of NAs, not
contextual classes of NAs.
In this study NAs are ultimately defined and classified according
to their contribution to the coherence of discourse: i.e., contextual
uses or classes of NAs are what ultimately matters. Lexical
classes of NAs are relevant only insofar as they represent
differences in contextual interpretation. Of course, the lexical
class of NAs often serves as an initial trigger in recovering the
contextual interpretation of NAs. Especially NAs repeating
literally and NAs not repeating literally the lexical material of
the antecedent are easy to differentiate analytically and they
constitute plausible candidates for relevant contextual classes of
NAs. .
Another characteristic of the given classifications is the fact that
they do not differentiate between NAs with a deftnite determiner
and with a demonstrative one: according to the three
classification criteria, all classes include NAs with both definite
and demonstrative determiners." In this study the difference
between NAs with definite and demonstrative determiners is
taken to be relevant: it will be argued that both forms signal
different ways in which NAs contribute to the coherence of
discourse. The key-intuition in differentiating between them is
the fact that both classes differ in markedness due to the
presence or absence of the demonstrative determiner. This focal
device can plausibly be related to different processing
mechanisms underlying NAs as will be shown in chapter 2 and 3.
Although NAs with definite and demonstrative determiners both
have to be defined as definíte NAs, we will henceforth term NAs
with a definite determiner (de 'the', het 'the') and 'bare' NAs as
definite NAs or defNAs, and NAs with a demonstrative
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determiner ( deze 'thislthese', dit 'this', die 'thadthose', dat 'that')
as demonstrative NAs or demNAs.
Thus, in this study two minimal formal criteria cross-classifying
NAs are taken as the organising principles, partitioning the field
of nominal anaphors and serving as an entrance, accessing
contextual classes of nominal anaphors:
(i) the formal relationship between antecedent and anaphor,
yielding literally repeated NAs and alternative NAs.
(ii) the nature of the determiner, yielding de~nite NAs and
demonstrative NAs.
1.5 Overview
This study contains the following chapters, based on the minimal
classification of NAs. In chapter 2 definite alternative NAs are
analysed; in chapter 3 the use of literally repeated and
alternative demonstrative nominal NAs as opposed to definite
ones is accounted for in accordance with the qualificational view
of NAs; in chapter 4 the variation between different classes of
demonstrative NPs is investigated. Finally, in chapter 5 the
qualificational view is supported by an analysis of repeated and
alternative NAs in a special discourse environment, i.e., in legal
discourse.
1.6 Research territory
As was already mentioned in section 1.2, NAs are investigated
especially in written context, the context where they occur most
naturally. This means that the analysis of contextual readings of
NAs starts from possibilities and restrictions imposed by the
written medium. The following three characteristics of written
communication are known as relevant for the interpretation of
referential expressions:
(i) the absence of explicit interaction and explicit
collaboration of discourse participants, resulting from
their physical separation;
(ii) the absence of a common situation, which can act as a
deictic field for the interpretation of referring
expressions;
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(iii) the absence of supra-segmental features (such as stress),
which can play a decisive role in interpreting referential
expressions (see e.g. Akmaijan 8a ~Tackendoff 1970).
The proposals made in this study are supported by an extensive
corpus of Dutch written material. Here I will only give a short
survey of the corpora that have been used. In the pertinent
chapters the function and use of these corpora are described more
precisely:
cor 1-2 a compilation of 9 informative (cor 1) and 9 instructive
(cor 2) leaflets
number of words 28.424
number of demonstrative NPs 222
cor 3 excerpts from political journals, from subcorpus 2 of
the so-called Eindhoven-corpus (see Uit den Boogaert
1975)
number of demonstrative NPs 665
cor 4 a compilation of 22 popular scientific texts (500 to
1000 words each)
number of words 15.000
number of demonstrative NPs 104
cor 5-8 a compilation of book reviews (cor 5), tv reviews (cor
6), autobiographical columns (cor 7) and personal
commentaries (cor 8) from the magazine ~7rij
Nederland'
number of words 28.961
number of demonstrative NPs 262
cor 9 excerpts from popular scientific texts, coming from
subcorpus 5 of the 'Eindhoven-corpus'
cor 10 a collection of 8 legal decisions of a lower Belgian civil
court
number of words: 4400
number of anaphoric elements: 231
cor 11 a collection of 30 opinion texts of Dutch and Flemish
newspapers and magazines
number of words: 17720
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In this study examples supporting the functional interpretation of
NAs are not exclusively based on the corpora mentioned.
Empirical linguistic evidence in favour of the interpretation
proposals is both corpus-driven and intuition-driven. That means
that support for the proposals presented is inspired by corpus
evidence as well as by the intuitive or argued acceptability of
constructed examples.
Corpus euid.ence is central to the chapters 4 and 5. The chapters
are based almost exclusively on the characteristics NAs exhibit in
the corpora in question. This method fits in with the methology
used in text-oriented analyses of referential expressions (see e.g.
Fox 1984, Ariel 1988)
In the intuition-based method evidence is based on judgments on
constructed examples, a method fitting in with traditional
linguistic theories which try to formulate syntactic, semantic and
pragmatic restrictions on the behaviour ofreferential expressions.
Quite a number of these theories only use constructed examples,
often representing peculiar structural, semantic or pragmatic
characteristics (see e.g. R.einhart 1983, Bosch 1983)
In principle, the proposals on nominal anaphors are restricted to
Dutch: they are developed using Dutch corpora and native Dutch
intuition ( especially mine). Although sporadically crosslinguistic
arguments and examples are given in favour of the proposals
presented, extensive evidence for the cross-linguistic validity falls
outside the scope of this study.
1.7 Presentational conventions
In this study judgments about constructed or real-life examples
play a crucial role in the introduction, the argumentation and the
corroboration of the proposals on NAs. Hence, it is important that
the reader should look upon these examples as they were




NAs and the NAs antecedents are italicised and co-indexed, with
';' if only one co-indexed anaphoric pair occurs in the example, ';'
and ~' for two co-indexed pairs. If relevant, non-anaphoric NPs
are marked by using ';' and ~' respectively.
Unacceptability
The acceptability of nominal anaphors is indicated - as it is
conventionally done in the literature on co-reference - by a
question mark (?) preceding the NA, the sentence or the discourse
unit involved. The question mark covers a broad range of
semantic, pragmatic and contextual adequacy judgments, the
exact nature of which will be explained on the spot.
Ungrammaticality
Asterisks (~`) preceding NAs, sentences or discourse units indicate
structural ungrammaticalities. However, asterisks are used only
occasionally because judgments rarely concern structural
impossibilities of nominal anaphors.
Different possibilities
If difierent anaphoric possibilities are presented in one example,
they are divided by slashes and put in curly brackets ({,,. ~.., ~
...}), In these cases acceptability question marks are located
immediately before the anaphoric possibility which is judged to
be unacceptable.
Discourse information
The acceptance by the reader of the judgments on NAs given in
this study is heavily dependent on knowledge of the conditions of
use of the examples presented. Therefore, information about
discourse mode ( in principle written communication), text type
and discourse position of the referent or sentence is made explicit,
either in the text itself or between 'triangular' brackets (~...~)
immediately preceding the examples.
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Examples
If Dutch examples are used, which is mostly the case, they are
always accompanied by English translations. Dutch examples are
presented if the Dutch language of the example is somehow
relevant in the frame of this study. 7wvo reasons for their
relevance are: (i) they stem from the corpora mentioned in section
1.6 and hence they are 'real-life' examples; (ii) there are
difierences in acceptability or contextual interpretation between
(constructed) Dutch and English examples.
English translations of Dutch examples are not provided with the
conventions concerning coreferentiality, acceptability and
grammaticality.
For the reader the guideline concerning examples should be: if an
example is presented in Dutch, all the arguments only apply to
the Dutch example and the English translation should be seen
merely as extra support for the reader.
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Notes to chapter 1
1. Fox (1984:59) names these two modes of description context
determines use and use accomplishes context respectively.
2. This view underlies, for example, the anaphoric hierarchy in
Lakoff (1976:295), the coding scale of topic accessibility of Givbn
(1983:17) and the classification of referential expressions
according to their lexical specificity in Marslen-Wilson, Levy 8L
Tyler (1982:344).
3. Chomsky (1981:227) states the following general discourse
principle regulating NA-occurrences (included in what he calls
R-expressions):
Avoid repetition of R-expressions, except when conditions
warrant.
Reinhart (1983:43):
A given NP must be interpreted as non-coreferential with
any distinct non-pronoun in its c-command-domain.
Levinson (1987:410):
The use of a marked form, a lexical NP where a pronoun
might have been used, or a pronoun where a zero might
haue occured, will Q~M-implicate a non-co-referential
interpretation.
4. Langendoen (1969:167-8):
NP' may not be used to pronominalize NPP if NP' and NPo
are elements of separnte conjoined structures and NPP
precedes NP'.
Hinds 8z Okada (1975:335):
NP' may not be used to pronominalize NP' ifNP' and NPD
are elements of separate conjoined structures, NP' precedes
NP', and NP' is stressed
Reinhart (1983:43):
A given NP must be interpreted as non-coreferential with
any distinct non-pronoun in its c-command-domain.
Lasnik ( 1976:16):
If NP7 precedes and kommands NP? and NPZ is not a
pmnoun, then NP~ and NP? are disjoint in reference.
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5. Although the condition of high accessibility is not mentioned in
these proposala as such, conditions with the same tendency can
be found, such as Evans' condition that the 'illegal' NAs in the
sentences are not referentially dependent upon their antecedent
(Evans 1980:358).
6. Although Fox doea not talk about the non-identificational use of
full NPs, her interpretation is the same as mine: i.e., "the use of
fullNP where we could have expected pronouns" (Fox 1984:240)
7. Pronominal NPs are thus clearly excluded as well as NPs which
are not pronominal, but not nominal either, such as iedereen
'anyonelevery one'. Determiners of NAs usually are definite or
demonstrative, although NAs can be introduced by indefinites
as well, as in (a):
(a) De konventie van New Orleans moest het toppunt
worden van de republikeinse campagne. Daar moest
het gebeuren. De zorgvuldig opgezette show werd
enigszins verstoord toen de kandidaat uice-president
Dan Quayle (Wie? Quayle?); het podium opsprong en
de stijve George Bush op de schouders sloeg onder het
slaken van de kreet: 'Go get'em!'. Dixit een man die
het bracht tot mogelijk vice-president uan de
machtigste natie uan de wereld;. (Knack, september
1988)
The New Orleans conuention was supposed to be the climax of
the republican campaign. That was where it was all going to
happen. There was a slight disturbance of the carefully
plannzd show when candidate vice-president (Dan Quayle)
(Who? Quayle?) jumped on the stage and hit rigid George
Bush on the shoulders, shouting: 'Go get'em!'. And this from a
man who actually managed to rise possibly to the vice-
presidency of the most powerful nation in the world.
8. It should be noted that in this study the words refierence and to
refer are not used in a technical sense. They are, however, used
in a general sense, i.e., when differences between reference
levels and reference objects do not matter.
9. More complicated is the following example:
(a) ~Same situation, but the example is part ofa detective
story~
I told the police officer; that the thiefj was masked.
The setting of the detective story makes this sentence
referentially more complicated. As regards the nominal NPs in
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this sentence two representations are possible: either the reader
of this sentence is not supposed to know the world identity of
'police officer' and 'thieP, in which case the two discourse
referents do not have the same DREF-number, since the world
identity is not reflected in the representation, or the reader is
supposed to know the world identity, in which case the
discourse referents have the same DREF-number, since the
identity of POLICE OFFICER and THIEF is intended by the
writer to be recognised by the reader.
10. Cornish defines the two classes of anaphors as follows:
(i) Coreference without anaphora
Sequences of two full NPs of the same type, of full NP and non-
R pronoun (in either order) in equatiue sentences, of two first- or
two second-person pronouns, of two third-person non-R
pronouns of the same type, or of non-R pronoun or full NP and
full NP in cases like (5a) and (5b):
(5a) Look, fathead. If eueryone loues Oscar;'s mother, then
certainly Oscar; must loue Oscar;'s mother
(5b) Eueryone has finally realised that Oscar; is
incompetent. Euen Oscar; has realised that Oscar; is
incompetent. (Euans 1980:357)
(ii) Coreference with anaphora
Non-'bound-variable' anaphora between a full NP as antecedent
and a non-R pronoun or defznite NP as anaphor, where the
anaphor is lower on the ánaphora hierarchy' than the
antecedent, cf. Lakoff (1968:18) Principle (134): (1) Proper
nouns; (2) Definite descriptions; (3) Pronominal epithets (e.g. the
fool, the bastard, etc.), and (4) (non-R) third person pronouns.
,(Cornish 1986a:247-248)
This classification implies a division in (i) referentially
independent and (ii) referentially dependent antecedent-NA
pairs on the basis of their anaphoric type.
It is clear, however, that NAs do not obey Lakoffs principle,
amongst others while definite descriptions can easily act as
antecedents of proper names, although the anaphoric hierarchy
would prescribe the opposite. Lakoffs anaphora hierarchy dces
not apply to the following examples either. The examples differ
clearly in acceptability, although antecedent and anaphor have
the same position on the anaphora hierarchy:
(a) Yesterday, the president of the US; left for his annual
holiday in Kennebunkport. By doing so, the fisherman
from Texas; makes clear that no one can upset his
holiday plans.
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(b) Yesterday, the fisherman from Texas; left for his
annual holiday in Kennebunkport. By doing so, the
president of the US; makes clear that no one can upset
his holiday plans.
These examples show that restrictions on NAs in terms of the
anaphoric type of NAs and their antecedent are unreliable.
11. Only demonstrative proper names are unusual, but not
excluded, as is clear in (a):
(a) Ook de politie weigerde deze moorden op het conto
van de Ripper te schrijven. Op 31 december immers
werd uit de Theems het lijk opgevist van ene
Montague John Druitt;, een jonge advocaat. Wat men
toen niet wist, maar wat later bleek uit de memoires
van politiemannen zoals in Days of my Years' van Sir
Melville Macnaghten, was dat deae Druitt; door New
Scotland Yard als de eerste verdachte van de
Rippermoorden werd beschouwd. (Knack)
The police too rejused to hold the Ripper responsible jor these
marders. The jact is that on 3] December the body oj one
Montague John Druitt, a young lawyer, was picked up jrom
the Thames. What one did not know then, but what later
appeared jrom the memoirs ojpolicemen such as Days oj my
Years' oj Sir Melville Macnaghten, was that New Scotland





2.1.1 Definite alternative NAs in discourse
In analysing discourse different types of anaphoric NPs can be
distinguished. The most obvious possibilities are illustrated in (1)
and (2): literal repetition and pronominal reference
(1) Yesterday Reagan; decided to retire from the White
House. Reagan; announced his decision during a show on
American television.
(2) Yesterday Reagan; decided to retire from the White
House. He; announced his decision during a show on
American television.
Anaphoric NPs can also take the form of NAs which do not repeat
their antecedent literally, i.e., by definite alternatiue NAs
(henceforth abbreviated as daNAs), as is illustrated in (3) and (4):
(3) Yesterday Reagan; decided to retire from the White
House. The president; announced his decision during a
show on American television.
(4) Yesterday Reagan; decided to retire from the White
House. The ex-mouie star; announced his decision during
a show on American television.
Definite alternative NAs in discourse can be characterised in
different ways:
(i) first of all, they can be said to be means of identification,
just like literally repeated and pronominal anaphors in
that they establish a link of co-referentiality with the
antecedent NP;
(ii) secondly, they can be characterised as lexical cohesive
elements in that they establish lexically based or
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knowledge-based relations between items in texts;
(iii) thirdly, they can be said to provide information about the
intended referent.2
2.1.2 Objectives
Definite alternative NAs are the subject of this chapter. The main
question is which interpretation and representation must be
attributed to the relationship between daNAs and their
antecedents if they are to justify the functions and the adequacy
of daNAs in texts.
It will be argued that the adequacy of daNAs cannot simply be
made dependent on either the status of the referents within the
reader's knowledge store, or on surface characteristics of
sentences or texts, such as the distance to or the structural
relationship with their antecedent. ftather, in this chapter the
adequacy is made dependent on the question whether adequate
implicit coherence relations can be attributed to them.
At the very heart of this chapter lies the notion of an adequate
daNA, meaning a daNA properly fulfilling its functions in a text.
This implies that a daNA must not just enable the reader to
establish a co-referential link. I do not consider each daNA
enabling the reader to access the intended discourse referent to
be adequate. There is, for instance, a clear distinction to be made
between the daNAs in (5); yet, in principle all these daNAs
enable the reader to make a link with the antecedent NP:
(5) In the Senate commission report on the Iran affair,
Reagan; was told that he, had left his collaborators too
much leeway. fThe president; ~ The head of the White
House; ~?Nancy's husband; ~?The owner of a ranch in
California;) had omitted to see to what was taking place
in the cellars of his own official residence.
In this chapter adequacy is based only on the intuitive evaluation
of the co-referential, cohesive and informative functions of the
daNAs in a given text environment. The intuitive evaluation can
be put to the test because the daNA-examples are provided with
the necessary contextual information.
This chapter deals with the behaviour of definite alternative NAs
in written texts. Especially in expository and opinionative texts,
the central discourse intention of which is the identification,
description, exposition and evaluation of referents, daNAs are
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quite frequent: sports reports, travel brochures, popular scientific
texts, political commentaries contain a striking number of
definite alternative NAs. The fact that daNAs occur
predominantly in written language or in 'prepared' spoken
language such as, for instance, that of newsreaders is a reason to
look upon them as the result of'time-consuming' reflexion, which
is not tolerated in spoken discourse.3 As a written phenomenon,
in this chapter daNAs are looked upon as an'autonomous'
identification act on the part of the writer or, in other words, as
an act of identification coming about without any form of explicit
'collaboration' between the communication partners.'
Finally, this chapter deliberately refrains from pursuing the
matter of the relationship between definite and dernonstratiue
NAs, which is the subject of chapter 3.
2.1.3 Overview
In section 2.2 various characteristics and interpretations of
daNAs are commented on and evaluated, the conclusion being
that all attempts to describe daNAs in terms of identification,
cohesiveness or familiarity are descriptively inadequate because
they do not result in an integrated picture of all the functions of
daNAs in texts. In section 2.3 a proposal is made with regard to
the interpretation and representation of daNAs, which takes as
its starting point the informational function of the antecedent
and anaphoric NPs in question, the relationship between which is
represented in terms of implicit coherence relations included in
the underlying discourse referent representations.
2.2 Characterisations of daNAs
2.2.1 The pronominal interpretation of daNAs
2.2.1.1 DaNAs as pragmatic, referential pronouns
A crucial processing characteristic of a daNA is that it aims at
accessing the same discourse referent as the discourse referent
underlying its antecedent (i.e., the same-number characteristic,
which was mentioned in section 1.3). Moreover, daNAs and their
antecedents are not always interchangeable. Given these two
characteristics, daNAs can be regarded as so-called denoting or
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referential pronouns - as opposed to bound pronouns. Referential
pronouns are assumed to have a relationship of intended co-
reference with their antecedent (Evans 1980:358-360).
In the research on co-reference and pronouns, no extensive
analysis has as yet been made of daNAs. As far as I know, the
only type of daNA which have been given some sporadic attention
are epithets, degree nouns and classifiers (e.g. Bolinger 1977:50;
Bosch 1983; Hinds 1978; Seuren 1985). It is important to note,
however, that the attention they receive only affects their useful-
ness with respect to the analysis of pronouns. For Bosch, for
instance, nominal anaphors play a crucial role in determining
which pronouns occur referentially, as is clear in the following
criterion:
The criterion for referential pronoun occurrence
A pronoun oocurrence P; in a te.~ or sentence S; that is
interpretable as being anaphorically related to a
particular antecedent NP; in S; is an RP-occurrence
(referential-pronoun occurrence (AM)J if there is a
non-pronoun NPk that may be substituted for P; in S;
without disrupting the anaphoric relation with NP;
(Bosch 1983:49)
Following Bosch, Seuren also formulates an epithet test for what
he calls denoting pronouns:
Moreover, only denoting pronouns may be represented,
salua ueritate, by an epithet. This fact, first noted by
Bosch (1983:49) is particularly interesting and
important because it can be used as a test: pronouns
which can be replaced, salua veritate, by an epithet
must be crucially different from pronouns that do not
allow for such a substitution. (Seuren 1985:350)
The epithet test could be an empirical reason to regard (at least
some) daNAs as referential or denoting pronouns. Such a test is
in keeping with the fact that, like referential pronouns, daNAs
are ungrammatical in a structural environment where they are
syntactically bound to their antecedent, as is clear in (6) and (7):
(6a) John; washes himself,
(6b) ~`John; washes the boy,.
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(7a) Reagan; says he; will continue supporting the contras.
(7b) ~`Reagan; says the president; will c~ntinue supporting the
contras.s
And yet, the test is misleading because it is used as a criterion to
distinguish classes of pronouns and, as such, cannot be
indiscriminately used to investigate daNAs. Even if all denoting
or referential pronouns could be replaced by epithets, this still
would not mean that all daNAs can be replaced by a(denoting or
referential) pronoun. Examples such as (8) -(10) appear to
confirm this view: the daNAs in these examples cannot be
indiscriminately replaced by a referential pronoun without
producing particularly awkward sentences (the b-versions). All
sentences are opening sequences of radio news items:
(8a) Bij de overname van de uitgeuerij;, heeft Kluwer; beloofd
dat er geen arbeidsplaatsen op de tocht zouden komen
staan.
In the takeover of the publishing company, Kluwer promised no jobs
would be lost.
(8b) ?Bij de overname (uan zichzelf I eruan;l, heeft Kluwer;
beloofd dat er geen arbeidsplaatsen op de tocht zouden
komen staan.
In its takeover, Kluwer promised no jobs would be lost.
(9a) In de strijd om de uerzekeringsmaatschapp~j; heeft
Assubel; een belangrijke stap gezet om niet in
buitenlandse handen te vallen.
In the baltle for the insurance company, Assubel has takPn an important
step in order not to jall into foreign hands.
(9b) ?In (zijn; strijd ~ de strijd om zichzelf~ heeft Assubel; een
belangrijke stap gezet om niet in buitenlandse handen te
vallen.
In (its battle ~ the battle for itseljJ, Assubel has taken an important step
in order not to fall into foreign hantls.
(l0a) Luc van de Vijver, die jarenlang de woordvoerder was
van de Generale Maatschappij uan België;, verliet de
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'oude dame;' op 1 april.
Luc van de Vijver who, jor years, was the spokesman oj the Compagnie
Cénérale de Belgique, lejt 'the Crand old Lady' on Ist April.
(lOb) ?Luc van de Vijver, die jarenlang de woordvoerder was
van de Generale MaatschappW van België;, verliet ze; op 1
april.
Luc van de Vijver, who jor years was the spokesman o( the Compagnie
Génkrale de Belgique, lejt her on lst April.
2.2.1.2 DaNAs and c-command
It follows from these considerations that daNAs cannot simply be
replaced by pronouns. But there is more: daNAs are not bound by
the same structural restrictions applicable to referential
pronouns, as is shown in the c-versions of (8) and (9):
(8c) Bij de overname van Kluwer;, heeft (de uitgeverij; I~ze)
beloofd dat er geen arbeidsplaatsen op de tocht zouden
komen staan.
In the takeouer oj HIuwer, (the publishing company ~ it) promised no
jobs would be lost.
(9c) In de strijd om Assubel; heeft (de
uerzekeringsmaatschappij; I~ze~ een belangrijke stap
gezet om niet in buitenlandse handen te vallen.
In the battle jor Assubel, fthe insurance company ~ it) has taken an
important step in order not to jall into joreign hands.
When regarded as referential, not-bound pronouns, the daNAs in
(8c) and (9c), i.e., de uitgeverij and de verzekeringsmaatschappij
do not obey the restrictions imposed by the so-called primacy
relationship between antecedent and pronoun s The core of this
relationship is that the pronoun must not c-command its
antecedent. Reinhart formulates this restriction as follows:
A given NP must be interpreted as non-coreferential
with any distinct non-pronoun in its c-command-
domain. (Reinhart 1983:43)
According to this rule, the NP Kluwer in (8c) or Assubel in (9c)
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cannot be co-referential with the publishing company I it or the
insurance company I it respectively, because they are distinct
non-pronouns within the c-command d~main of the NP the
enterprise I the insurance company I it. However, as the
grammaticality judgments show, this rule turns out to be
applicable only to the pronominal versions, and not to the daNAs
in the c-versions. A striking fact is that the 'illegal' daNAs in the
c-versions are far more acceptable than the ~egal' a-variants
above.
2.2.1.3 DaNAs and the precede-relationship
What does remain of the similarity between daNAs and
referential pronouns is that both have a relationship of intended
co-reference with the antecedent NP. In order to be recognised as
co-referential, it is selfevident that the antecedent must precede
the daNA. However, this weak precede-condition can be violated,
as in the case of pronouns:
(11) ~advertisement~
Morgen treedt in de Arenberg-schouwburg de meester van
het Franse chanson; op. Het is Gilbert Becaud;'s twaalfde
optreden in België.
Tomorrow, the master of the Freruh chanaon will play in the Arenburg
theatre. This will be Cilbert Becaud's twelfth Belgian appearance.
Apart from unusual cases like (11), it is clear however that a
daNA normally is inadequate if its underlying referent has not
yet been activated, as in ( 12), a variation on an example of Kuno
(1975:283):
(12) Who did you calm when you saw him getting mad?
?I calmed the idiot;, before Harry; did something rash.
Cases as (11) can be compared with backward anaphors. They
draw their effect and their function from the violation of the
precede-condition (see Maes 1987:136). They are different,
however, in that backward anaphoric pronouns, unlike definite
alternative NAs, obligatorily occur in the same sentential unit, as
is clear from examples like (13):




(13b) ?He lied to me. (And) John was my friend.
2.2.1.4 'Antecedentless' daNAs
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Although we are concerned here with definite NPs which are co-
referential with their antecedent, there are nominal NPs which
can be looked upon as being 'antecedentless'. Metaphorical
nominal NPs such as in (14) and (15) can serve as examples:
(14) ~advertisement with a picture of the Lada Samara 1300,
accompanied by the following text~
De meest verkochte 1300 verbreedt zijn gamma.
The best sold 1300 widens its scope.
(15) ~a review in the newspaper of a play in which L.
Vandervost plays the part of Hamlet in an adaptation by
theatre company 'De Tijd'~
Hamlet was tired after the performance in Volendam.
In these cases, it can be argued that the 'antecedents' (Lada
Samara 1300 and L. Vandervost) can be inferred on the basis of
available information (in the context, situation or knowledge
base). This means that in the representation a discourse referent
must be present which can be accessed and incremented by the
NPs de meest verkochte 1300 and Hamlet. On account of their
nominal nature such antecedentless daNAs are more powerful
than antecedentless pronominal anaphors when it comes to
accessing a discourse referent. They can appeal to lexical
knowledge and world knowledge shared by the communication
partners and need not be based on contextual or situational
knowledge only, as is the case with antecedentless pronominal
anaphors. On the other hand - unlike antecedentless pronouns -
antecedentless daNAs are subject to the pragmatic restrictions
outlined in section 2.3.3.4.
2.2.2 The topical interpretation of daNAs
Like a pronominal anaphor, a daNA does not only access a
discourse referent representation, but it is also an indicator of
topic, i.e., an indicator of what a sentence or text is about. The
literature on pronouns adopts different views on and proposals
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for this topical function. Bosch (1983:205) for one formulates the
aboutness-principle to which both pronominal and nominal
anaphors are subject, as follows:
An anaphorically used expression refers to an object
which the discourse at the releuant moment is about.
So, like a pronominal anaphor, a daNA is the reintroduction of
topical elements.'
If one accepts that the topical value of daNAs is sufficiently
determined by the condition that daNAs must refer to the topic of
the text, the following problems remain unsolved:
(i) The condition is applicable both to pronominal and
nominal anaphors, thus leaving difierences as in the
examples (8)-(10) unresolved.
(ii) Not all daNAs referring to the topic of the text are
adequate. In other words, the topic condition is indeed a
necessary condition for daNAs, but not a sufficient one.
See (16): ~
(16) On 18th March 1612, for the first time a human; set foot
on the island of Ebreo. He; started to build a hut right
away. ?The woman; lived there for twenty years.
When the woman occurs in (16), there is obviously only
one topic candidate. And yet, the daNA is not adequate.
An explanation of this inadequacy cannot be given on the
basis of the topical interpretation of alternative NAs
since it does not enable us to impose restrictions on the
informative load of daNAs.
2.2.3 The cohesiveness interpretation of daNAs
DaNAs can be characterised in terms of the lexical relationship
they have with their antecedent. In particular, the relationship of
synonymy or hyperonymy often applies to relations of daNAs
with their antecedents. As such, daNAs belong to the broad class
of lexical cohesive elements called reiteration in the dichotomy of
lexical cohesion as proposed by Halliday Rs Hasan (1976:274-292):
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Reiteration is a form of lexical cohesion which inuolues
the repetition of a lexical item at one end of a scale; the
use ofa general word to refer back to a lexical item, at
the other end of the scale; and a number of things in
between - the use of a synonym, near-synonym, or
superordinate. (1976:278)
According to Halliday 8~ Hasan the cohesive value of these lexical
items must be distinguished from the referential function:
Properly speaking, reference is irreleuant to lexical
cohesion. It is not by uirtue of any referential relation
that there is a cohesiue force set up between two
occurrences of a lexical item; rather the cohesion exists
as a direct relation between the forms themselues (and
thus is more like substitution than reference).
(1976:284)
The difference between cohesiveness and referentiality of daNAs
follows from the fact that cohesive NPs need not be co-referential,
as e.g. in (17):
(17) My car proved to be worth nothing. Any new car will
have to be a lot more reliable.
The distinction between referential and cohesive function has
been carried through by Stotsky (1983:441). In her dichotomy -
which is based on the Halliday 8~ Hasan dichotomy - co-referenti-
al and non-co-referential cohesive elements are not discriminated:
(i) semantically interrelated words (elements systematically
related to a preceding element via, for instance,
repetition, synonymy, opposition, inclusion, and so on);
(ii) collocationally related words (elements related to other
elements via frequent co-occurrence in similar contexts).
The question now is whether the characterisation of daNAs in
terms of cohesiveness tells us something about the interpretation
and the functions of daNAs in discourse. The characterisation of
cohesion given by Halliday 8a Hasan, viz. "the cohesion exists as a
direct relation between the forms themselues" and "reference is
irrelevant to lexical cohesion", is unclear with regard to the way
in which the cohesive function of daNAs contributes to their
interpretation. A better point of departure in determining the role
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of cohesiveness in interpreting NPs is provided by Garrod 8~
Sanford 1977. They proved there was no difference in processing
time between sentences like (18) and (19):
(18) A bus, came trundling down the hill. A pedestrian was
killed by the uehicle,.
(19) A bus came trundling down the hill. It nearly smashed
into a vehicle.
The lack of difference in processing time between (18) and (19) is
attributed by Sanford 8z Garrod to the fact that readers conduct a
similar semantic check on the sentences (18) and (19). Such a
semantic check is obvious in (18) because it is essential to the
correct interpretation of the referential identity between bus and
uehicle. The fact that the processing time of (19) is the same as
that of (18) proves, according to Sanford 8~ Garrod that a similar
check takes place when (19) is processed. In other words, readers
still construct a link between the semantically related elements
bus and uehicle although they are not co-referential in the text.
Although these findings touch upon the processing of cohesive
NPs, it remains unclear what exactly is the content of the
semantic check readers are claimed to conduct and hence, what is
the role of cohesion in interpreting daNAs. Moreover, the lack of
difierence in processing time observed by Sanford 8s Garrod does
not provide conclusive evidence for the semantic-check
interpretation, since the semantic check does not explain yet why
co-referential and non-co-referential cohesive NPs do not produce
any difference in processing time.
Simi]ar research concerning the processing of superordinate NPs
in discourse is reported in Sanford 8a Garrod 1981. They refer to
research (Sanford 8s Garrod 1975) that proves that the
verification time of superordinate daNAs is dependent on the
semantic relationship existing between anaphor and antecedent.
The processing time decreases as the degree of conjoint frequency
increases. This frequency is to be looked upon as a ';joint function
of the category and the exemplar" (1981:108).
However, with regard to our adequacy analysis, this finding is
incomplete and misleading. It is misleading because it would be
improper to interpret differences in processing or verification
time between different daNAs simply in terms of adequacy: the
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fact that daNAs with a high conjoint frequency are easier to
process only indicates that in the language user's practice they
probably occur more often than daNAs with a low conjoint
frequency, but it does not necessarily shed light on their
adequacy. It ia incomplete because the adequacy of daNAs is not
only determined by (text independent) semantic relations of the
co-referential NPs, but also by text dependent intentions, as will
be shown below.e
2.2.4 The familiarity condition on daNAs
A final characterisation of daNAs can be given in terms of
familiarity. It is plausible to assume that the adequacy of a daNA
can be made dependent on the condition that it contains infor-
mation which is familiar (see e.g. Bosch 1983:150). This means
that the processing of daNAs hinges crucially on the fact that the
information is part of the discourse participants' shared
knowledge or common ground.9 This condition seems justifiable
in the light of inadequate daNAs such as the one in (20):
(20) ~Starting point: few know that Anatoli Karpou is a keen
stamp collector~
?Anatoli Karpou; has been operated on. One day after the
operation, the stamp collector;'s medical condition is
satisfactory.
However obvious a familiarity condition on daNAs might be, both
from an intuitive and from a psychological viewpoint, it is
contestable from both a theoretical and an empirical viewpoint.
Firstly, in a discourse representation a familiarity condition can
hardly be formalised. Whatever can be introduced in a text as
familiar or new with regard to a certain referent will depend on
the question what can be regarded as being part of the presumed
knowledge-store of the reader. There is a high degree of
redundancy in what should be formalised in the representation as
familiar information about text referents: far more is familiar
than what is actually used in a concrete text setting. In addition,
the dividing line between what is familiar and what is new will
differ from reader to reader.'o
Secondly, daNAs which are not familiar can still be adequate in a
specific text environment. See for instance (21):
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(21) The first novel by the unknown director Frank
Vriesakker; deals with the themes of guilt and
responsibility. In his earlier film.~ the son of a caluinist
preacher; has already shown a predilection for those
themes.
The examples (22) and (23) are similar: if we assume that both
Schmidt's being an ez-Nazi and a drug dealer are equally novel,
the familiarity condition does not explain why the following texts
are both adequate:
(22) ~1Vewspaper item; J. Schmidt is unknown~
De Hamburgse polítie heeft gisteren Josef Schmidt;
gearresteerd. De ex-nazi; bleek een drugdealer te zijn.
The Hamburg police arrested Josej Schmidt yesterduy. The ex-nazi
turned out to be a drug dealer.
(23) ~1Vewspaper item; J. Schmidt is unknown~
De Hamburgse politie heeft gisteren Josef Schmidt;
gearresteerd. De drughandelaar; bleek een voormalig
Nazi te zijn.
The Hamburg police arrestedJosej Schmidt yesterday. The drug dealer
turned out to be a jormer Nazi.
As such, a familiarity condition cannot cope with the creatiue
function of daNAs, i.e., the possibility of providing new
information by means of daNAs.
Third, familiar daNAs do not have to be adequate in just any text
environment. Compare for instance (24a), (24b) and (24c):
(24) ~At a press conference Reagan introduces his new press
chief Donald Baker who, as is well-known, happens to be
the grandson of Jesse James. The fact that he was going
to be the new press chief, however, had been known for
some days throughout the whole world and was certainly
known to the press people. The press conference is to be
looked upon as a kind of 'inauguration'of the new press
chief~
(24a) This is Donald Baker;. He; is the new press chief. From
now on he will speak to you every Wednesday afternoon.
The new press chief, ....
(24b) ?This is Donald Baker;. From now on the new press chief,
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will speak to you every Wednesday afternoon.
(24c) ?This is Donald Baker,. The grandson of Jesse James, is
the new press chief ...
The daNAs in (24b) and (24c) are inadequate although the relati-
onship between the daNAs and their antecedents is knowledge
shared by speaker and listener.
Fourth, there are many discourse referents which can be accessed
by means of different NPs which clearly cannot be regarded as
equally available, familiar or well-known with regard to the
reader's knowledge-store. In accordance with the notion of
familiarity, we could expect that these referents have to be
mentioned first by means of the most familiar NP. However,
there are many discourse conditions in which the unfamiliar
variants are adequately used in first-mention position. This is
clear in the examples (25) and (26), which both provide us with
adequate discourses, fitting in the context of an encyclopaedia.
Although the italicised NPs are not anaphorically related, the
examples show that both sequences can occur.
(25) The aquila heliaca is a bird of prey.
It lives on hunting and fishing.
It has a wing span of 1 meter.
It is also called the imperial eagle.
(26) The imperial eagle is a bird of prey.
It lives on hunting and fishing.
It has a wing span of 1 meter.
It is also called the aquila heliaca.
Conversely, the familiarity condition does not explain why NPs
which with regard to the reader's knowledge-store are equally
familiar or nouel can have a preferential sequence in a concrete
text setting. Look at example (27). At least for Belgian readers, it
is plausible to assume that both W. Martens and our Prime
Minister are equally familiar, in view of the referent's extremely
long term of office. However, in a context in which the value-
indication (W. Martens) rather than the role-indication (Prime
Minister) prevails, as is the case in (27), the value-role sequence -
as in (27a) - is preferable to the role-value sequence - as in (27b):
(27a) ~Official press release~
On the occasion of the formation of his tenth cabinet in a
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row, W. Martens; will be received with pomp and circum-
stance in the royal palace. There, our Prime Minister; will
receive a golden cup.
(27b) ~Official press release~
On the occasion of the formation of his tenth subsequent
cabinet, our Prime Minister, will be received with pomp
and circumstance in the royal palace. There, W. Martens;
will receive a golden cup."
2.2.5 Conclusion
The following conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing:
(i) The referential behaviour of daNAs is not quite the same
as that of referential pronouns: daNAs cannot always be
replaced by referential pronouns and both anaphoric
expressions turn out to be subject to different structural
restrictions.
(ii) The characterisation of daNAs as topical, cohesive or
familiar NPs does not enable us to account for the
adequacy differences mentioned in the examples above.
2.3 DaNAs and implicit coherence relations
2.3.1 Introduction
From the above it appears that referential or cohesive daNA-
proposals do not provide us with a satisfactory treatment,
especially with regard to the informative function of daNAs.
Furthermore, from the examples in section 2.2.4 it appears that
the adequacy of daNAs is dependent on text specific intentions
rather than on the opposition familiar vs. new. In other words,
the function of daNAs is to be found in the role they play in the
specification of the intentions underlying the text involved. The
following section aims at implementing such an interpretation
(section 2.3.2) and at indicating how the interpretation manages
to integrate the various functions of daNAs, thus eliminating the
objections mentioned earlier (section 2.3.3).
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2.3.2 Intention-based discourse representation
Especially in research on computational linguistics, proposals
have recently been made to generate or represent a text in terms
of hierarchically ordered text (segment) intentions. Grosz 8c
Sidner 1986 for instance, take a text to be a whole of hierar-
chically constructed discourse segments - all of them containing
an aggregation of discourse utterances - with, at the basis, a
discourse segment purpose. Grosz 8~ Sidner take discourse
(segment) purposes (DPs~DSPs) to be intentions meant to be
recognised by the reader. They distinguish different types of
intentions that could serve as DPsIDSPs and two structural
relationships between them: the relationship of dominance and
the relationship of satisfaction-precedence. These structural
relationships between intentions are regarded as basic
ingredients in the recognition process:
Since the CPs [conversational participants (AM.)] can
neuer know the whole set of intentions that might serve
as DP~DSPs, what they must recognise is the releuant
structural relationships among intentions. Although
there is an in~xnite number of intentions, there are only
a small number of relations releuant to discourse
structure that can hold between them. (Grosz 8a Sidner
1986:179)
Although this 'minimal' apparatus may well be sufficient for
recognising relevant relationships between intentions underlying
discourse, it is clearly not sufficient for recognising - let alone for
fully determining or characterising - subtle interpretation aspects
in discourse, such as those demonstrated in the daNA-examples
in the preceding section. Nor is it meant to. Even a list of
possible intentions is not enough to recognise the informative
value of daNAs. At best, intentions or basic structural
relationships enable us to classify roughly utterances in a
discourse. But they are unable to fully characterise (relations
between) these utterances semantically, or to evaluate the
contribution of these utterances in the recognition process of text
intentions.
One way of 'enriching' the recognition process is the postulation
of an intermediate level of representation between intentions and
utterances. Such an intermediate level should be able to map
utterances on to intentions and to evaluate or characterise the
contribution of discourse utterances in the intention recognition
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process. A psychologically plausible formalisation of such an
intermediate level is not readily available. For the phenomena
under scrutiny here, however, we can confine ourselves to
assuming such an intermediate level, i.e., the level of the
determination or specification of text intentions. In order to
achieve this I indicate which coherence relations hold between the
propositions underlying the utterances of each text segment. Such
relationships are comparable to the rhetorical structure (RS)
schemes in the RS-theory of Thompson 8~ Mann 1987.12 In my
view, they are labels covering the propositions underlying the
utterances of a discourse and the inferences to be drawn by the
reader if he wants to be able to assign an interpretation to the
utterances, an interpretation of coherence relations which is
similar to that of Hobbs 1983 8~ 1985.
Coherence , relations representing the specification of text
intentions are empirically and theoretically highly problematic.
Firstly, the relationship between utterances and intentions is not
predictable: the same text intention can be realised in different
ways, i.e., by means oftotally different constellations of coherence
relations. Secondly, just as there is no definitive list of all
possible intentions underlying discourse (Grosz 8z Sidner
1986:179), there is no definitive list of all possible coherence
relations underlying discourse either. Moreover, there is no
consensus about the question whether such a list has to be open-
ended or finite. Thompson 8a Mann claim that such a list should
be finite. However, their 'fixed' set of RS-relations has grown in
the course of subsequent publications. Third - and more
important - there is the problem of the plausibility of postulating
coherence relations as devices at work during the processing of
language. It has not been proved that coherence relations
represent information which readers need during processing.
Grosz 8z Sidner even claim that "a discourse can be understood at
a basic level if the OCP [other conuersational participant (A.M.)]
neuer does or can construct, let alone name, such rhetorical
relationships" (1986:202).
However, we suggest that coherence relations operate at a level
that links utterances to intentions. The reason for this suggestion
is that we are concerned here with phenomena that go beyond
"basic level understanding", i.e., phenomena which can never be
accounted for if only Grosz 8i Sidner's minimal recognition
ingredients are postulated. We are concerned with the different
possible interpretation aspects of daNAs in written discourse.
4~ CHAP7'ER l
This requires an analytical position yielding a'maximal'
discourse representation in which even these possible inferences
underlying daNAs are accounted for. This does not mean, of
course, that readers need (and consequently compose) such a
maximal representation to establish a coherent interpretation. As
appears from for instance Noordman 8z Vonk 1987, readers act as
economically as possible when composing discourse
representations: they appear to make only those inferences that
are necessary to enable a minimal coherent interpretation of the
text.
In such a representation coherence relations are an adequate way
of expressing the possible inferences and semantic relations
underlying discourse utterances. They are meant as analytical
tools, as descriptive categories, characterising the relationship
between the propositions underlying the utterances. Not the
processing value of coherence relations, or their predictive value
in the recognition process is under discussion here, but their
analytical value. Note that at this point I use coherence relations
as a tool to explain the behaviour of daNAs in discourse, and that
it is not my objective to present a theory of coherence relations as
such.
To avoid terminological confusion, I will refer to the link between
intentions and coherence relations by means of the terms specify
and specification; the link between coherence relations and actual
utterances will be referred to by means of the terms actualise and
actualisation.
Apart from a component where the specification of discourse
(segment) purposes is represented in the form of coherence
relations (Cft-component), a component is necessary to verify
which referents, which characteristics of these referents and
which relations between these referents are active at which
precise moment of the discourse. Grosz 8~ Sidner 1986 call this
component the attentional state, which is the formalisation of the
focus of attention in a text. In the representation this attentional
state is represented by the so-called focus space. Grosz 8~ Sidner's
attentional state is to be regarded as a dynamic discourse
component, reflecting the accessibility of referents during
discourse.13
By way of a simplified illustration, within the proposed
framework a text such as (24a) might be represented as in figure
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(24a) (i) This is Donald Baker;
(ii) He; is the new press chief.
(iii) From now on he; will speak to you every
Wednesday afternoon.
Figure ( 1): Representation of (24a)
TEXT INTENTION
definelinstall D. BAKER as NEW PRESS CHIEF
COHERENCE RELATIONS FOCUS SPACE
(i) define D. BAKER D. BAKER
(ii) define BAKER as NEW D. BAKER, PRESS
PRESS CHIEF CHIEF
(iii) elaboration D. BAKER ....
BAKERrPRESS CHIEF
In the following I will not go into the representational format or
details of intention-based discourse representations, I only claim
that the three kinds of representational information, i.e., text
intentions, coherence relations and focus space, are necessary in
order to account adequately for the function of daNAs in
discourse.
2.3.3 Representing daNAs
2.3.3.1 DaNAs and implicit coherence relations
Two important characteristics of daNAs are (i) that they are co-
referential with their antecedents, and (ii) that the underlying
discourse referent is highly accessible. These characteristics are
reflected in the representation, (i) by the same-number feature (n)
of the underlying discourse referent representation, as is seen in
section 1.3, and (ii) by locating the DREF at the top of the focus
space of the representation.
These features only account for the 'minimal' interpretation of
daNAs, i.e., the establishment of a co-referential link in discourse.
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However, they are not able to evaluate which daNA is an
adequate lexical actualisation of the underlying referent. In
accordance with the definition of NAs in chapter 1, and with the
framework outlined in section 2.3.2, the evaluation of the lexical
load of daNAs can be reflected in the representation by accepting
an implicit coherence relation within the incremented discourse
referent representation in the focus space - as opposed to the
explicit coherence relations represented in the CR-component."
An example of such an implicit coherence relation is given for the






This is Donald Baker;
He; is the new press chief.
From now on he; will speak to you
Wednesday afternoon.
The new press chief ....
Representation of (24a), the NA included
TEXT INTENTION
define~install D. BAKER as NEW PRESS CHIEF
COHERENCE RELATIONS
(i) define D. BAKER













In the following section, I will show that the notion of implicit
coherence relations is able to integrate the different functions of
daNAs in texts.
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2.3.3.2 DaNAs, antecedents and the dominance relationship
A coherence relation can be conceived of a~ a characterisation of
the rhetorical interaction between a satellite and a nucleus
(Thompson 8i Mann 1987:89). This implies that each coherence
relation has to link two or more elements. These elements can be
referents, clauses, sentences or larger discourse units. This also
implies that there is a certain dominance relation between these
elements, which is expressed in the representation by an arrow
pointing to the left, reflecting the fact that the antecedent NP
dominates the anaphoric NP. As such, coherence relations are
capable of representing the dependency within alternative NAs.
2.3.3.3 The informative value of daNAs
By representing daNAs by means of implicit coherence relations,
the informative value of daNAs is characterised as the way in
which daNAs contribute to the coherence structure of a discourse.
In this respect informative does not refer to the fact that daNAs
add information to the knowledge-store of the reader but rather
to the fact that daNAs add relations to the coherence relations
structure of the ongoing text.
Most coherence relations underlying daNAs are of the identifying
type, i.e., equals (identify, definition, reformulation), is an element
of the class of (classify) or has the attribute (attribute). But
daNAs are not at all limited to this, as is shown by the following
examples. The a-versions of the examples represent the implicit
coherence relations underlying the daNAs. They have to be read
as 'exploded views' of a part of the discourse referent
representation in the focus space of the representation of the
discourse segment involved (see figure (2) above). The b-versions
give an explicitation of the propositions that can be taken to lie
at the basis of the implicit relations. That these implicit
propositions are indeed caused by the occurrence of a daNA
becomes clear when the daNA is replaced by a pronominal
anaphor: the given interpretations in the b-versions become
invalid. ~
(4) Yesterday Reagan; decided to retire from the White
House. The ex-movie star; announced his decision during
a show on American television.






(4b) a. Reagan is the ex-movie star in question. (identify)
b. Reagan used to be a movie star. (sequence)
c. Reagan - according to the author - is an ex-mouie star
(and that is all he has ever been). (evaluate)
d. Circumstances are such that Reagan, being an ex-
movie star, announced his retirement in a show on
television. (circumstance)
(21) The first novel by the unknown director Frank
Vriesakker;, deals with the themes of guilt and
responsibility. In his earlier films the son of a caluinist
preacher; has already shown a predilection for those
themes.
(21a) THE UNKNOWN DIRECTOR ~--- THE SON OF A




(21b) a. FV is the son of a protestant preacher. (identify)
b. FV deals with the themes of guilt and responsibility,
since FV is the son of a caluinist preacher.
(justification)
(28) It is said that Ronald Reagan; is not in control of his own
domestic staff. Often the most powerful man in the world;
is being shamelessly laughed at by his maids.




(28b) a. Reagan can be called the most powerful man in the
world. (identifyldefine)
b. Although Reagan is the most powerful man in the
world, he is still being bossed about in his own house.
(concession)
(29) In the match against Beerschot, Patrick Veruoort; was the
best player. The former left back of Beerschot; scored two
goals.
(29a) PATRICK VERVOORT" ~--- EX LEFT BACK





(29b) a. Patrick Veruoort is the (ex) left back (of Beerschot) in
question. (identify)
b. Patrick Veruoort used to be left back of Beerschot.
(sequence)
c. Circumstances are such that P.V., as a former left back
of Beerschot, scores two goals against his former team.
(circumstance)
(30) At the Berlin film festival the latest film by John Willey;
was awarded a prize. The busy director; could not attend
the prize award ceremony.




(30b) a. John Willey is the director of the film in question.
(identify)
b. John Willey is busy. (attribute)
c. Because John Willey is busy, he cannot attend the prize
award ceremony. (reason)
In principle, this kind of analysis is applicable to antecedentless
daNAs as well. The daNA in (14) the best sold 1300, for example,
can be interpreted by establishing an attribute~eualuate-relation
in the DREF underlying the daNA (LADA SAMARA 1300" ~--
BEST SOLD 1300"). A detailed description of this sort of
antecedentless daNAs (especially of the actor-role type) can be
found in Fauconnier 1985. He is particularly interested in the
formalisation of the mental distance which, in different text
environments, can exist between trigger (that which is written,
i.e., the best sold 1300) and target (that which is meant, i.e., Lada
Samara 1300). He considers the relationship as a pragmatic
function. However, it does not appear from his analysis which is
the function of such mental leaps in a concrete text, in other
words, which might be the difierent values of the pragmatic
function. In our approach this value can be expressed by means
of text intentions and coherence relations.
The idea of making explicit the relationship between a daNA and
its antecedent by means of underlying propositions, as is done in
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the b-versions of the examples above, is in essence similar to the
predicational nature some authors attribute to the noun in
definite and demonstrative NPs.'s
2.3.3.4 Pragmatic conditions on daNAs
In view of the inadequacy of the problematic daNAs in section
2.2.4 and in line with the characteristics of implicit coherence
relations, two pragmatic conditions can be formulated that are
applicable to implicit coherence relations underlying daNAs, i.e.,
th.e condition of releuance and the condition of centrality. These
conditions have to be regarded as conditions regulating the
adequacy of the informative load of daNAs. The first condition is
defined as follows:
The Condition of Releaance as applied to implicit
coherence relations underlying daNAs:
Implicit coherence relations should be related in a
relevant way to the intention of the text (segment)
concerned.
As a result of this condition, a daNA will only be adequate if it is
based on an implicit coherence relation which is relevant to the
text intention. In other words, a reader must be able to ground a
daNA on an implicit coherence relation or proposition which,
drawing on his knowledge of the kind of text, the text objective
and the preceding context, he conceives to be a relevant addition.
This does not explain how exactly the notion of relevance is to be
conceived of or how it should be formalised. All that is claimed is
that such a notion is more helpful in determining the adequacy of
daNAs than the notiona of shared knowledge or familiarity.
Examples such as (20) and (24c) infringe upon this condition of
relevance.
(20) ?Ana.toli Karpov; has been operated on. One day after the
operation, the stamp collector;'s medical condition is
satisfactory.
(24c) ?This is Donald Baker;. The grandson of Jesse James; is
the new press chief.
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If we look upon these sentences as being awkward, the reason is
that we cannot possibly reduce the anaphoric NPs to any implicit
coherence relation relevant to the intention of the text.
Relevance has to be understood as relevance at the moment of
occurrence in the discourse, i.e., relevance with regard to the
intention of the text segment obtaining at that particular moment
and to the explicit coherence relations as specified up to that
moment. This can be demonstrated by (31). In the unacceptable
b-version the implicit coherence relation is relevant, but not yet
at the moment the daNA occurs in the discourse:
(31a) A woman; was walking down the street. She; was shot
down. The victim; was quickly taken to hospital.
(31b) A woman; was walking down the street. ?The victim; was
shot down. She; was quickly taken to hospital.
Evidence for such a relevance condition can be found in Ortony 8s
Anderson 1977. By way of experiment, they put the difference
between names (values) and de~nite descriptions (roles) to the
test. They claim that both names and definite descriptions can be
used referentially as well as attributively. The referential use of
names (32a) and the attributive use of definite descriptions (32b)
is called direct; the attributive use of names (32c) and the
referential use of definite descriptions (32d), is termed indirect.
(32a) Alfred Nobel wore a fine beard.
(32b) The inventor of dynamite had a profound influence on
the nature of warfare.
(32c) Alfred Nobel had a profound influence on the nature of
warfare.
(32d) The inventor of dynamite wore a fine beard.
A recognition test enables Ortony 8z Anderson to find evidence for
the fact that while processing, test persons replace indirectly used
names and definite descriptions by their direct variants. This is
shown in the fact that cases such as (32c) and (32d) are less well
memorised.
Two aspects of this experiment are relevant as far as our analysis
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of daNAs is concerned. Firstly, the examples used in the
experiment show that the 'direct-ness' of NPs in a text is not the
same as referential force. In a concrete text setting a role-term,
being a definite description - as in (32b) -, can indeed be more
direct than a ualue-term, being a proper name - as in (32c) -,
although the latter has an intrinsically higher referential force.
With regard to our analysis this means that a ualue-term can
serve as antecedent for a role-daNA, and vice versa, as is shown
in (33a) and in (33b) respectively. The choice between role-value
or value-role sequence is ultimately made on the basis of
considerations concerning text intention and relevance:
(33a) ~Encyclopaedia entry entitled: the life of Alfred Nobel~
Alfred Nobel; was born just before the first World War.
The inventor of dynamite; had a profound influence on
the nature of warfare.
(33b) ~Encyclopaedia entry, entitled: the role of dynamite in
human warfare~
The inventor of dynamite; had a profound influence on
the nature of warfare. Alfred Nobel; ....
Secondly, NPs (names or definite descriptions) are characterised
as being direct on the basis of their relevance in the text
environment. Directness can consequently be regarded as
adequacy. The fact that indirect NPs are harder to memorise
than direct ones indicates that language users have an eye for
the adequacy of NPs in a sentence.
These findings justify a condition of relevance for the adequacy of
daNAs as expressed above. However, this does not mean that any
daNA which is relevant in a certain text environment also
produces an adequate daNA. This is shown in an example such
as (24b).
(24b) ?This is Donald Baker;. From now on the new press chief
will speak to you every Wednesday afternoon.
In these cases another pragmatic condition seems to be involved,
which I call the condition of centrality:
The Condition of Centrality as applied to implicit
coherence relations underlying daNAs:
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Implicit coherence relations should not be the
specification of central text (segment) intentions.
This condition states that daNAs cannot be the actualisation of
coherence relations which are part of the specification of the
central text (segment) intention. Put differently: propositions
underlying daNAs must not express central statements in the
discourse. This condition is illustrated in (34), the b-version of
which is awkward, at least if we consider it to be the variant of
(34a):
(34a) The president of Costa Rica; has postponed the elections
in his country, because he is seriously ill. He; has been
flown to the United States.
(34b) The president of Costa Rica; has postponed the elections
in his country. ?The suffering president; has been flown to
the United States.
The only way to arrive at a coherent interpretation of the two
sentences in (34b), is the assignment of an attribute-Ireason-
relatíon underlying the two sentences, induced by the attribute
suffering in the daNA. Thus the central relation in this text is
actualised in an implicit form, which causes the awkwardness of
the b-version.
Additional elements in favour of the acceptance of the condition
of centrality can further be found in the sentences (24a) and
(24b), repeated below.
(24a) This is Donald Baker;. He; is the new press chief. From
now on he will speak to you every Wednesday afternoon.
The new press chief, ....
(24b) ?This is Donald Baker;. From now on the new press chief
will speak to you every Wednesday afternoon.
As a result of the text intention (REAGAN introduces D.BAKER
as NEW PRESS CHIEF) the define-relation between D.BAKER
and NEW PRESS CHIEF is a necessary part of the explicit
coherence relation structure of (24), since it specifies the central
text intention. In the a-version this explicit relation has been
adequately actualised. In the b-version this is not the case: the
central text intention has been specified in an implicit coherence
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relation, which violates the centrality condition. It is only after
and as a consequence of the explicit define-relation, that the NPs
Donald Baker and the neru press chief will be available as co-
referential NPs.
The condition of centrality also explains the inadequacy of (25a)
and (26a), which have to be read as equivalents of (25) and (26):
(25) The aquila heliaca is a bird of prey.
It lives on hunt and fishing.
It has a wing span of 1 meter.
It is also called the imperial eagle.
(25a) ?The aquila heliaca; is a bird of prey. The imperial eagle;
lives on hunting and fishing.
(26) The imperial eagle is a bird of prey.
It lives on hunting and fishing.
It has a wing span of 1 meter.
It is also called the aquila heliaca.
(26a) ?The imperial eagle; is a bird of prey. The aquila heliaca,
lives on hunting and fishing.
In (25), the referent IMPERIAL EAGLE is part of an explicit
define-relation in which the referent AQUILA HELIACA is
defined. This define-rel ation realises the central text intention
define AQUILA HELIACA. Such a central text intention is most
plausibly conceivable in the context of an encyclopaedia. Only
after the explicit establishment of this define-relation, will
imperial eagle and aquila heliaca be available in the text as co-
referential NPs. The same reasoning is applicable to (26) but in a
converse relation of dominance.
The pragmatic conditions under discussion should be applicable
in principle to antecedentless daNAs as well, as is partly shown
by Ortony 8~ Anderson 1977. The adequacy of a metaphorical,
indirect, nominal NP - as in (14), (15), (32c) and (32d) - is not
only dependent on the question whether the reader is able to
identify the intended referent, but also on the relevance and the
centrality of the information conveyed by the daNA.
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2.3.3.5 Update-daNAs and surplus-daNAs
Implicit coherence relations between referents have to be looked
upon as text-specific. They 'live on' information concerning the
referent, information which at that moment is accessible and
relevant in the text. This can be information that has just been
mentioned in the text. This is particularly clear in (35), where the
relationship between WOMAN and VICTIM owes its existence to
the information given about WOMAN in between the daNA and
its antecedent:
(35) A woman, was shot in the street. The victim; was quickly
taken to hospital.
The informative value of the daNA in (35) will be said to be an
update of what has been said about the referent earlier in the
text.
Other implicit coherence relations depend on information about
the referent not mentioned in the context concerned but which
can be introduced into the context as relevant surplus
information. This is the case for instance in (36):
(36) A woman; was shot in the street. The young woman; was
quickly taken to hospital.
The difference between update and surplus can be described as
follows:'s
An update-daNA is a daNA the underlying DREF of
which contains an implicit coherence relation which is
dependent on one or more (implicit or explicit) coherence
relations in the representation.
A surplus-daNA is a daNA the underlying DREF of
which contains an implicit coherence relation which is
not dependent on another (implicit or explicit) coherence
relation in the representation.
On the basis of the above, (35) and (36) can be represented as in
figure (3) and (4), which includes only the representational
information which is relevant to us here:
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In figure (3) the reformulationl result-relation between WOMAN
and VICTIM in the FS of segment (ii) is dependent on the
percolation of the attribute-relation between WOMAN and DEAD
in (i) (symbolised by .~), which in its turn is the result of the
explicit situation-relation represented in the CR of segment (i).
Thus the daNA ín (35) can be said to update information
provided by the previous context. In figure (4), in contrast, the
attribute-relation between WOMAN and YOUNG WOMAN in the
FS of segment (ii) is not dependent on the information in the
previous context. The daNA in (36) offers surplus information vis-
à-vis the contextual information present.
The intuition that certain daNAs rely more heavily on
information in the linguistic context than others is thus
formalised in the representation in terms of implicit coherence
relations."
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2.3.3.6 Simple and complex coherence relations
Apart from the update-surplus dichotomy, ;et another distinction
can be made on the basis of the examples given, that between
simple and complex daNAs, i.e., daNAs based on simple and
complex coherence relations respectively.
A simple implicit coherence relation is a coherence
relation the explicitation of which is a simple proposition,
i.e., an is or has proposition with the antecedent in the
argument part and the daNA in the predicate part.
A simple daNA will be based on a relation of one of the following
types: identify, attribute, classify, define.
A complex implicit coherence relation is a coherence
relation the explicitation of which is a complex
proposition. A complex proposition is a combination of
propositions linked by a conjunction.
A complex daNA will not only be based on a simple implicit
coherence relation, but also on an implicit coherence relation, for
example of the type reason, concession, justification. In
propositions that make explicit complex relations the
propositional information of the whole sentence is involved.
The difierence between simple and complex is shown in the b-
versions of the examples (4), (21), (28), (29), (30) in section
2.3.3.3. For example, the first explicitation in (21b) - repeated
below - is a simple proposition, the second explicitation is a
complex proposition:
(21b) a. FV is the son of a protestant preacher. (identify)
b. FV deals with the themes of guilt and responsibility,
since F'V is the son of a caluinist preacher.
(justification)
A daNA must at least be based on a simple coherence relation.
This means that the inference of a simple proposition is a
minimal condition for the interpretation of daNAs. However, a
complex relation cannot or should not be attributed to each and
every daNA. When a complex coherence relation or proposition
underlies a daNA, there will undoubtedly also be a simple
relation or proposition underlying it. This means that a co~lex
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coherence relation can only be assigned whenlbecause a simple
relation is present. This characteristic of daNAs can be deduced
from the examples in section 2.3.3.3. In these examples the
simple proposition is an essential part of the complex
propositions.
With respect to the processing of discourse, this means that the
establishment of discourse coherence minimally requires the
inference of a simple implicit coherence relation underlying
daNAs. If one or more complex coherence relations can be
distinguished analytically, this does not necessarily mean that
these relations are actually inferred by readers during processing.
In view of the results of processing research of Noordman 8s Vonk
1987 for example, it can plausibly be assumed that readers
process daNAs by default at a superficial level; i.e., by default,
readers are satisfied with a minimal interpretation. In view of
the examples in this chapter, it is plausible to assume that, by
default, readers process the simple identify-relation underlying
daNAs. It is this assumption which will be corroborated in
chapter 3, where the variation between default definite and
marked demonstrative nominal anaphors is investigated.
2.4 DaNAs and Discourse Topic
On the basis of the given representation an empirically and
psychologically adequate topic interpretation can be developed in
which daNAs play a predominant part, the notion of topic being
interpreted from the dynamic-incremental viewpoint of the
ongoing discourse. From that viewpoint all discourse referents at
a given moment of the discourse are defined as potentially
topical, which are accessible as elements the rest of the text could
be dealing with. Such a conception of the notion of potential topic
fits in with a dynamic discourse representation such as the one
proposed by Grosz 8s Sidner 1986, and is in keeping with the
view of topic and focus taken in Cornish (1986b:155) and
Lockman 8z Klappholz (1980:37). In accordance with the above
mentioned interpretation of daNAs, the following heuristic for
Potential Discourse Topics (PDT) can be proposed:
Potential Discourse Topic (PDT)-heuristic
Only those NPs allowing at a particular text moment the
construction of a daNA satisfying the pragmatic
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conditions of relevance and centrality are the
actualisation of potential discourse topics at that given
moment of the discourse.
This heuristic requires some justification and comment:
Firstly, the PDT-heuristic is in keeping with the intuition that, at
a given text moment, different elements are potential topics. See
for example (37):
(37) John; arrived in Rome~ by bicyclek.
(37a) The poor boy; hadn't eaten in two weeks. He ...
(37b) The historical city~ was celebrating its two thousandth
anniversary. It ...
(37c) The wreckk had collapsed twice on the way. It ...
According to the PDT-heuristic there are three potential topic
candidates in (3?). Although JOHN is the most plausible topic
candidate, (37b) and (37c) clearly show that also ROME and
BICYCLE can easily act as topics for the continuation of the text.
Secondly, the PDT-heuristic does not exclude the possibility of
different referents being full-fledged topics at the same text
moment. See (37d):
(37d) The bikek had caused the poor boy; lots of troubles on the
way.
Thirdly, according to the heuristic all the referents are PDT-
candidates for which a daNA can be constructed that obeys the
conditions put forward in section 2.3.3.4. This leads to other topic
candidates than the ones produced by the heuristic that
stipulates that all pronominalisable NPs are topic: the fact is that
certain non-pronominalisable referents can be accepted as
plausible PDTs. This is shown in (38). Without supplementary
information, FUSS and KLUWER are equivalent PDT-candidates.
In (38a) and (38b) the daNA-heuristic shows that both do indeed
acquire a topic status. (38c) and (38d) show that the pronoun-
heuristic does predict FUSS but hardly predicts KLUWER as a
discourse topic.
(38) The fuss; about Kluwer~ continues.
(38a) The bickering; will most probably go on next week too.
(38b) The publishing company~ will still be in trouble next
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week.
(38c) It; will most probably go on next week too.
(38d) ?It~ will still be in trouble next week.
This difference in heuristic value also explains the acceptability
differences in examples (l0a) and (lOb), repeated below. The
inadequacy in the b-version has to be attributed to the fact that
pronouns are incapable of topicalising a second referent within
one and the same sentence, that is in this case the Compagnie
Générale de Belgique: although the pronoun 2e 'it' would not
cause any ambiguity in ( lOb), it is not acceptable here.
( l0a) Luc van de Vijver, die jarenlang de woordvoerder was
van de Generale Maatschappij van België;, verliet de
'oude dame;' op 1 april.
Luc oan de Vijuer who, for years, was the spokesman of the Compagnie
Générale de Belgique, le(i 'the Grand old Lady' on Ist April.
(lOb) ?Luc van de Vijver, die jarenlang de woordvoerder was
van de Generale Maatschappij uan België;, verliet ze; op 1
april.
?Luc uan de Vijuer who, (or yenrs, was the spokesman of the Compagnie
Générale de Belgiquei, left her on lst April.
Finally, with the topic-heuristic it is possible to unravel topically
complex or inadequate discourses, such as (16):
(16) On 18th March 1612, for the first time a human; set foot
on the island of Ebreo. He; started building a hut right
away. ?The woman; lived there for twenty years.
Example (16) does not satisfy the topic-heuristic: the daNA does
not satisfy the pragmatic conditions underlying daNAs. Either
the inadequacy is a consequence of a violation of the condition of
relevance in which case the fact that the first human to set foot
on Ebreo was a woman is irfelevant to the intentions underlying
the text, or the inadequacy is the consequence of a violation of
the condition of centrality, in which case the relation between
HUMAN and WOMAN is part of the CR-component and cannot
be actualised in a daNA. See (39) in which that relation is
actualised adequately:
(39) On 18th March 1612, for the first time a human; set foot
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on the island of Ebreo. He; stayed there till his death. In
1976 archeologists discovered it must have been a
woman;. She; lived on the island fo: twenty years.
2.5 Conclusion
The central question in this chapter was: what 'informative load'
are definite alternative nominal anaphors allowed to contain in
texts? The answer has been given in terms of coherence relations
and text intentions. I have also tried to propose a first
formalisation of the answer together with some classes of and
pragmatic conditions on definite alternative nominal anaphors
formulated in terms of that formalisation. It was contended that
the adequacy of daNAs cannot be simply made dependent on
either the status of the referents within the reader's knowledge
store, or on surface characteristics of sentences or texts, such as
the distance or the structural relationship between daNAs and
their antecedents. Rather, the adequacy is dependent on the
question whether, on the representational level, daNAs are
adequate actualisations of implicit coherence relations which, in
turn, have to be adequate specifications of the intentions under-
lying the text. Although formalisation is still premature, this
description of daNAs is to be conceived of as a test enabling us to
grasp subtle form-function relationships in texts and to justify
them in terms of coherence relations and text intentions.
Although this chapter only aims to evaluate daNAs, it is possible
to deduce from the given representation a claim regarding the
production of daNAs in texts. The representation starts from
three levels in the production of language: the level of text
intentions, the level of (implicit and explicit) coherence relations
and the level of the linguistic actualisation.18 This chapter
claims that daNAs do not result from planning strategies at the
linguistic actualisation level, but rather from strategies at the
level of coherence relations. As such they do not merely depend
on stylistic considerations of a suitable alternation between
pronominal and nominal anaphors.
In connection with the following chapters, a last point has to be
mentioned. In interpreting daNAs I made a clear distinction
between what can be assumed plausibly as being the maximal
inferencing related to the occurrence of a daNA on the one hand,
and the inferences readers are assumed to draw by default in
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processing a daNA on the other. I referred to this difference as a
difference between a maximal and a minimal representation
underlying daNAs. It is demonstrated that many coherence
relations and propositions can plausibly be attributed to daNAs
in discourse; on the other hand, I assumed that by default
readers process the simple identify-relation underlying daNAs,
according to the minimal effort they make in order to get a
coherent representation of discourse.
Although this difference is not accounted for in the form of
experimental evidence, and although it can be expected that the
interaction of the elements determining the depth of processing of
daNAs is to a large extent unpredictable, its postulation is
plausible, and even necessary. It captures the difference between
the real and rich interpretation possibilities of daNAs which can
be analytically displayed on the one hand, and the intuition that
daNAs in fact just require the simple identification of the
intended referent on the other. ~rthermore, differences in
processing depth and representational explicitness have to be
postulated in view of interpretation differences between definite
NAs and demonstrative NAs, a topic which is elaborated upon in
the following chapter.
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Notes to chapter 2
1. This chapter is a revised version of Maes 1990.
2. In terms of Donnellan's dichotomy of attributiue versus
referential definite descriptions, daNAs can be considered to be
used both attributively and referentially:
A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in
an assertion states something about whcever or whateuer
is the so-and-so. A speaker who uses a definite description
referentially in an assertion (.. ) uses the description to
enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is
talking about and states something about that person or
thing. (Donnellan 1971:102)
3. The use of epithets in conversational context is of course an
exception to this planned use of daNAs.
4. In contrast, the form of referring acts in spoken, interactive
communication - according to Clark r~ Wilkes-Gibbs 1986 for
example - is largely determined by a shared responsibility,
actions of and collaboration between speaker and hearer. The
possibility of being interrupted and of 'repairing' induces the
use of identification strategies which are totally different from
those used by the writer.
5. This sentence is obviously acceptable, except in the version in
which the daNA is intended to be referentially dependent on its
antecedent.
6. Such 'illegal' anaphoric NAs can have evaluative function, as is
shown in the following examples from Cornish (1987:236) and
Tasmowski 8z Verluyten (1985:355) respectively:
(a) Julius; father hates the poor chap;
(a') ?Julius; father hates the senator;
(b) Le comité; s'imagine que ce ramassis de uieux crabes;
restera au pouvoir.
(b') ?Le comité; a dit que ce ramassis de vieux crabes;
restera au pouvoir.
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7. Such a broad principle allows us to consider different referents
as being topical simultaneously. In other words, all the
referents that the text deals with, can be called topical, or all
the referents activated at a given moment in the discourse. In
this way topical is closely related to what Prince (1985:66) calls
"Chafe-given", i.e., "taken by the speaker to be currently in the
hearer's consciousness".
8. Sanford 8~ Garrod recognise that not every intelligible discourse
is automatically adequate discourse or, as they call it,
considerate discourse. Still, they reduce the difference between
considerate and inconsiderate discourae to a difference in
processing, or in other words, a difference in processing time :
It must be recognised that writers of inessages typically
attempt to match the format of these messages to the
processing constraints of the readers, and that although
'inconsiderate' discourse may be intelligible, it nonetheless
makes abnormally heauy processing demands upon
readers. (1981:198)
Even though a difference in processing between adequate and
inadequate daNAs could be determined, it would still be
necessary to measure the adequacy in other ways, for instance
via experiments of evaluation and rewriting.
9. With the familiarity-nouelty dichotomy I refer to the status of
discourse referents with regard to the (presumed) knowledge
store of the reader, independent of the concrete text setting. As
far as shared knowledge is concerned, I think of it as part of the
hearer's general knowledge-store or, as what Prince calls,
Clark-giuen (1985:66). Common ground is a conversationally
based notion which includes "the mutual knowledge, beliefs, and
assumptions shared by the speaker and addressees" (Clark,
Schreuder 8c Buttrick 1983:246-7, also Clark 8z Marshall 1981).
10. With respect to this Stotsky says that ".. the analysis of
collocational cohesion in an experienced writer's text by an
experienced reader may be very dif'ferent from the analysis of
collocational cohesion (..) 6y a rela.tiuely inexperienced reader of
texts on that topic (1983:439).
11. Most of the examples in this section are inconsistent with the
daNA-proposal in Steinitz 1980 too. The condition she imposes
on daNAs is that they always represent the Obermenge
'superordinate class' of their antecedent. This notion of
Obermenge is implemented in terms of semantic features of the
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lexical items contained in the NPs. The condition is formulated
as follows:
Ein neueingef'eihrtes Nomen A(bezeichnend ~~A~~) kann
durch ein Nomen B fortgef'uhrt everden, das aufgrund
seines geringeren Merkmalbestandes die Obermenge
~~B~~ zu ~~A~~ charakterisiert. (Steinitz 1980:250)
12. Thompson 8z Mann de facto recognise that the attribution of
rhetorical structure (RS) schemes depends on the intention
underlying the text. This appears for instance from the fact that
for each RS-analysis they indicate precisely the intention of the
text. And yet they - erroneously - do not go so far as to
recognise intentions as a level of representation. This is
necessary, however, because a text analysis in terms of RS-
schemes the representation of which does not immediately
reveal which text intentions are being actualised with those RS-
achemes, is meaningless. The recognition and representation of
both text intentions and coherence relations is not only
necessary for an adequate understanding of texts, but also for
the evaluation of text quality (see Maes 1988a).
13. Such a focussing mechanism is represented in difierent ways in
the literature. Grosz 8~ Sidner 1986 for instance, locate discour-
se referents per discourse segment in a focus space. These
spaces are arranged in a last-in-first-out focus stack reflecting
the availability of the referents. Heim 1982 gives a similar
representation. She looks upon referents as an ordered set of
file cards introduced at a given moment in the discourse
domain. On the basis of the moment of introduction as a file
card, the linguistic actualisation (definite vs. indefinite) of a
referent can be derived.
14. Obviously, implicit coherence relations underlying co-referential
NPs are not the only type of implicit coherence relation to be
represented in the focus space. The focus space contains at least
two more types of implicit relations. Firstly, there are implicit
coherence relations underlying non-co-referential NPs, in which
the accessibility of the second is dependent on the presence of
the first, such as in (a) where an implicit coherence relation can
be assumed underlying the NPs the car and the door, as is
shown in (a'):
(a) John tried to get in the car. The door turned out to be
locked.
(a') CAR ~--- DOOR
( whole-patt)
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Relations of this particular type are known in the literature as
relations between referents within the same scenario (Sanford
8z Garrod 1981:passim) or script (Schank 8z Abelson 1977:36).
As opposed to the notion of implicit coherence relation, the
notions of scenario and script are text-independent and
represent knowledge structures and not text structures. A
notion like scenario consequently allows us to predict which
referents, in a certain scenario, are in principle available or in
"implicit focus" (Sanford 1~ Garrod 1981:154), but not which
referents are introduced into which type of dominance relation
in the present text setting, thus actualising the current text
intention;
Secondly, there are coherence relations within discourse
referent representations which are the result of explicit
coherence relations in that particular text segment. Relations
between referents expressed in the CA-component of the
representation (which are explicitly realised in the utterances of
the discourse) are incremented in following representations as
coherence relations within the referent representations in the
FS, a view which is congruent with the discourse representation
characteristics given in section 1.3.
15. Kleiber 1984 analyses the semantic content of French
constructions of the type ce t N'thislthat t Noun' as ce t est t
N'thisJthat t is t Noun'. Ortony 1978 takes the viewpoint that
definite descriptions are based on predicates which can either
be derived from the preceding context or which are based on
shared knowledge. Droste (1977:184) derives epithet-anaphors
from underlying relative clauses, with which they are in a
paraphrase-relationship. And, finally, Bach 1968 proposes
reducing all NPs to underlying relative clauses.
16. The use of the notion of surplus is a little bit misleading, since
update-daNAs can be said to provide the context with some
kind of surplus too.
17. The difference between update and surplus can be compared to
the difference Ortony makes between defcnite descriptions of
entailment and definite descriptions of inference if we assume
that surplus-daNAs depend more on knowledge from outside the
text involved than do update-daNAs:
The important difference between a defïnite description of
entailment and a definite description of inference is that
the interpretation of the former dces not depend on the
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provision of suppressed premises drawn from the
comprehender's general world knowledge. (1978:74)
18. This triple division can also be found in Hobbs (1979:87-89),
who distinguishes three planning levels : message level,





3.1.1 DemNAs in discourse
In chapter 2 an attempt was made to explain the nature and
function of the informative content of nominal anaphors. This
proposal only applies to definite non-demonstrative alternative
nominal anaphors (daNAs) in written context. What remained in
that proposal is the variation between non-demonstrative definite
NAs (henceforth definite NAs or defNAs) and definite NAs with a
demonstrative determiner (henceforth demonstratiue NAs or
demNAs). The function and interpretation of both alternative and
literally repeated demNAs is the subject matter of this chapter.'
The demNA-proposal in this chapter starts from the following
empirical claims with respect to demNAs, which will be
accounted for later:
(i) As they access predominantly highly accessible discourse
referents, demNAs are referential expressions the
function and markedness of which is not primarily
identificationally inspired, that is, the demonstrative
determiner in demNAs cannot be considered to be simply
a strong marked device, being co-referential with the
antecedent NP and hence enabling the reader to access
the intended referent.
(ii) Almost every demNA-occurrence in discourse is
replaceable by its defNA-variant, without causing
referential ambiguity or obscurity. The demNA-
interpretation process, as well as the demNA-proposal, is
based on the permanent availability of the defNA-demNA
variation in interpreting demNAs.
(iii) The markedness of the demonstrative determiner is
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meant to signal the special status of the following NP,
the effect being that the underlying referent is
semantically modified, i.e., demNAs effect a change in
the semantic representation of the referent which has
been built up so far in the discourse. The modifications
are expressed in terms of the implicit coherence relations
classify, attribute, contextualise and evaluate.
(iv) The semantic modification caused by demNAs (as
opposed to defNAs) should be discriminated, theoretically
as well as empirically, from pragmatic effects caused by
the variation of dezeldit-NAs vs. dieldat-NAs. Thus, the
interpretation process of demNAs is claimed to involve
two separate components, based upon different
contextual cues, and theoretically located on different
levels of language description (semantics vs. pragmatics),
as will become clear in this chapter and the next.
The demNA-proposal is first of all based on a qualitative analysis
of demNAs occurring in various text corpora, described in section
1.6 and more accurately in section 4.1.2. Sporadically,
quantitative data taken from the corpora are used to support
empirical claims concerning demNAs. The examples in this
chapter are not always taken literally from the corpus, but are
often constructed on the basis of examples in my data. When the
examples are taken from the corpus literally, the references are
given.
In section 3.1.2 I shall examine the relevance of the defNA-
demNA dichotomy. In section 3.1.3 I shall define the three
interpretations of the defNA-demNA variation which are dealt
with: the minimal interpretation (section 3.2), the identificational
interpretation (section 3.3) and the maximal interpretation of the
defNA-demNA dichotomy (section 3.4). In section 3.5 conclusions
are drawn with regard to the processing of demNAs and with
regard to the theory of markedness of referential expressions.
3.1.2 The relevance of the defNA-demNA substitution
An important starting point in the demNA-analysis is the fact
that a demNA is first of all considered to be a variant of a defNA,
rather than of a(demonstrative) pronoun. This starting point is
prima facie obvious in view of the fact that both types of
anaphors share an important characteristic, i.e., their lexical
content. That is the reason why the linguistic tradition captures
both anaphoric types under the same heading, i.e., that of
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definite nominal anaphors.
A strong indication for the similarity between demNAs and
defNAs can be found in the fact that by far the most occurrences
of demNAs can be replaced by their corresponding defNA-variant
without causing serious referential problems.2
Further support for the similarity between demNAs and defNAs
is found in the fact that they are the only types of anaphoric
expressions the substitution of which never results in
ungrammaticality, given the fact that simple substitution of the
determiner can never result in structural changes, and hence in
violations of structural restrictions on anaphors.
Starting from a standard classification of anaphoric expressions
(zero-pronoun, reflexive pronoun, pronoun, demonstrative
pronoun, definite NP, demonstrative NP), the pair definite NP 8a
demonstratiue NP proves to be the only pair of anaphoric
expressions for which no example can be constructed in which the
replacement of one by the other leads to syntactic
ungrammaticality. For all other pairs, such an example can be
found, as can be seen in the examples (1) to (3), in which certain
anaphóric pairs are substituted each time.
In (1) the replacement of an NA by a pronoun or demonstrative
pronoun leads to ungrammaticality, whereas the replacement of
the defNA by a demNA leads to unacceptability at the most:





heeft de uitgeuerij Kluwer; beloofd dat er geen
arbeidsplaatsen op de tocht zouden komen staan.





the Kluwer publishing company promised no jobs would be lost.
Example (2) shows that ungrammaticality is caused by the
replacement of a zero pronoun by a pronoun, a demonstrative
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pronoun, a definite NA and a demonstrative NA respectively. In
(3) and (4), the same is done for all types replacing a reflexive
anaphor and a pronoun respectively. Note that the
ungrammaticality judgment in (4) is caused by a surface word
order phenomenon:










(3) Jan; kon (zich; niet meer herinneren wie










(4) Gisteren kocht Marie het pakje; voor Jan.




Yesterday, Mary bought the present jor John.




It is clear from these examples that the replacement of demNAs
by defNAs does not affect the syntactic environment, so that this
substitution can and will in fact be used as a reliable analytical
instrument for the evaluation of differences in function, effect and
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adequacy of demNAs vs. defNAs. A number of problems arising
with the substitution of other types of anaphors are excluded
(such as the difference in length bet~,~een for example a
pronominal and a nominal NP, which ofLen affects acceptability
judgments drastically.)
The privileged relationship I assume between demNAs and
defNAs does not mean that the relationship between defNAs and
demNAs on the one hand and other types of anaphoric
expressions on the other is abandoned in this study. In the
discussion of the various proposals in sections 3.2 and 3.3
relationships with other referential expressions are looked at as
well. But the variation between defNAs and demNAs will turn
out to provide the best perspective for a justification of the
functions of demNAs in written discourse.
3.1.3 Three interpretations of the defNA-demNA variation
For the justification of the defNA-demNA variation in written
texts I shall start from three views, each of which contains
different predictions on the function and the behaviour of defNAs
and demNAs in texts, i.e., the minimal, the identificational and
the maximal interpretation of the defNA-demNA variation. In the
minimal view demNAs are a kind of free, stylistic variation of
defNAs. This position implies that the alternation between
demNAs and defNAs in texts is theoretícally uninteresting, and
that functionally it is no more than the result of a superficial
preference.
In the second interpretation, a demNA is an anaphorically
stronger variant of a defNA, i.e., it is conceived of as an
identificational device motivating the reader to look harder, in a
different way or elsewhere for the referent concerned. The deictic
character of demNAs is responsible for this identificational
interpretation. In view of the restriction to written contexts, the
term deictic here is taken in its anaphoric sense. Following
Buhler, it refers to the occurrence in certain anaphoric elements
of "a deictic moment and, to be sure, a pointing to something
which is not to be sought for and encountered at places in the
space of perception but at places in the whole of discoursé' (Buhler
1982:20).
The maximal interpretation puts a systematic functional
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difference at the basis of the defNA-demNA variation: with
regard to the development of the text, defNA- and demNA-
occurrences function differently. This chapter will provide
evidence for a maximal interpretation of the defNA-demNA
variation. In general, the function of demNAs will be
characterised as a semantic modification of the discourse referent
accessed by the NP involved. This modification is caused by the
fact that the demonstrative determiner activates a non-default
interpretation of the NP concerned.
3.2 The minimal interpretation of defNA-demNA
The minimal interpretation of the defNA-demNA variation
regards demNAs in all cases as free - at the most as stylistically
marked - variants of defNAs. This explanation is also given to
other variations of anaphoric expressions. Cornish (1986b:26), for
instance, accounts for the variation between pronominal and
nominal anaphors in certain discourse circumstances as "typical
of a certain journalistic style used to create variety and hence
sustain the reader's interest (namely, so-called 'elegant
variation')".
The fact that the variation between demNAs and defNAs is rarely
looked upon as relevant in the literature on anaphors (with a few
exceptions, such as Hawkins 1978, Ariel 1988 and Corblin 1987)
can be seen as lending indirect support to this interpretation. In
many classifications of anaphors, both demNAs and defNAs are
simply classified as nominal anaphors, to which - as a whole -
certain functional, pragmatic or semantic differences with other
anaphoric types can be attributed, without mention of the
difference between demNAs and defNAs.
This minimal interpretation is applicable, for instance, to
Cornish's survey of semantically defined anaphoric relations
(1986b:19-31) and Halliday 8a Hasan's survey of reiteration
relations (1976:274-292), in which defNAs and demNAs are
introduced as examples, the difference between them however
never being paid any attention to.3 Nevertheless the replacement
oY the demNA by a defNA is free in none of the cases. Hirst
(1981:24-26) does not mention the defNA-demNA variation either.
Finally, in Lakoffs anaphoric hierarchy (1976:295) and in Givón's
coding scale of topic accessibility (1983:17), both types co-occur in
the class of def nite or full NPs.
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The interpretation of demNAs and defNAs as stylistic variants of
each other seems justified in the light of examples such as the
following, which often occur in discourse:
(5) In de Verenigde Staten is gisteren een kliniek; geopend
waar walvissen kunnen worden behandeld. (De ~ deze ~
die) kliniek; is een unicum in de wereld.
Yesterday, in the United States a hospilal was opened where whales can
be treated. (The ~ this ~ that) hoapital is unique in the world.
(6) De wereld is verdeeld in werelddelen;. (De I deze ~ die)
werelddelen; zijn verdeeld in landen.
The world is divided into continents. IThe ~ these ~ those) continents are
diuided into countries.
(7) Gisteren is de eerste informatie; over de ramp met de
PanAm Bceing~ vrijgegeven. (De ~ deze I die) informatie;
levert nog geen volledig beeld op van (de ) deze ) die)
rampJ.
Yesterday, the ~irst injormntion about the PanAm Boeing disaster was
released. (The ~ this ~ that) injormation does not yet give a complete
picture oj (the ~ this ~ that) disaster.
In these cases the substitution seems to be free; this means that
it does not lead to ungrammaticality, nor to unacceptability or to
another referential value. The difference seems to be based on a
preference dependent on the genre of text or on the author's
strategy or style.
The minimal interpretation however runs into two serious
problems. Firstly, it does not re~lly explain the facts: it says that
there is a free variation, which however is subject to a certain
preference. It does not explain how this preference can be
determined, what its theoretical status is and how it could be
integrated, for example, in the pragmatic component of language
description, if it is clear that language description has to cope
with this kind of little nuances and preferences as well.
In addition to this, the free variation interpretation involves an
empirical problem. It forces us to interpret all demNAs and
defNAs as free - or at the most as weak-pragmatic - variants of
each other. This however is untenable in the light of examples
such as the following:
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(8) When the washing machine; first came on the market,
(this ~?the} (my addition (A.M.)] fantastic and truly
reuolutionary aid for the housewife; was available only to
very few. (Bosch 1983:150)
(9) Bush; heeft besloten om de belasting dan toch te
verhogen. (De ~?deze) presirlent; deelde dat mee tijdens
zijn wekelijkse perspraatje.
Bush has decided to raise tazea ajter all. IThe ~ this) president
announced this during his weekly talk with the press.
(10) Bush; heeft besloten om de taxes dan toch te verhogen.
(De I dezel president, denkt daarmee het Amerikaanse
volk te redden.
Bush hns decided to raise ta~s after all. (The ! thisJ president thinks he
can save the American people that way.
(11) Bush; heeft besloten om de taxes dan toch te verhogen.
Het is de eerste keer dat (de I deze} president; een
verhoging aandurft.
Bush has decided to raise taxes ajter all. It is the Jirst time (the ~ this)
president has dared to do so.
(12) De Londense Times maakt vanochtend stukken bekend
uit het overheidsrapport ouer de salmonella-besmetting
uan de Britse eieren;. (Het I dit} vertrouwelijke rapport; ...
This morning, the London Times publiahes eztracts jrom the gooernment
report on the salmonella injection in British eggs. (The ~ thisJ
conj'idential report ...
(13) Jan rijdt graag met z{jn ftets;. (Het I dat I dit) voertuig;
ligt hem na aan het hart.
John likes to ride his bicycle. (The ~ that ~ this) uehicle is close to his
heart.
(14) Gewetensbezwaarden beroepen zich vaak op de Wet
Gewetensbezwaren Militaire Dienst;. Volgens (deze ~ de)
wet; hoeft niemand echt in militaire dienst.
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Conscientious objectors ojten appeal to the Conscientious Objectors to
Military Service Act. According to (this I theJ act nobody can be jorced to
do national service.
A position of free variation does not enable us to account for the
differences in adequacy and interpretation between the demNA-
as opposed to the defNA-versions. In these examples three types
can be distinguished:
Type 1 - examples (8), (9)
the replacement of a defNA by a demNA or vice versa
leads to a difference in adequacy
Type 2 - examples (10), (11) and (12)
the replacement of a defNA by a demNA effects semantic
nuances with regard to the discourse referent concerned.
Type 3 - examples (13) and (14)
the replacement leads to other referential possibilities for
the NP concerned.
. 3.3 The identificational interpretation of defNA-demNA
3.3.1 Introduction
In the literature on reference, the intuitive difference in
identificational value between defNAs and demNAs has been
treated in various - and often unclear - ways. I shall try to bring
some order into this matter by looking upon the identificational
value of defNAs and demNAs successively as a difference in
anaphoric value (section 3.3.2) and as a difj`erence in markedness
and focal value (section 3.3.3). The proposals in this section all
start from the same perspective on the difference between defNAs
and demNAs: a demNA has to be interpreted as a'stronger'
identificational device than a defNA.
3.3.2 The difference in anaphoric value
The difference between defNAs and demNAs in certain proposals
is conceived of as a difference in anaphoric value, the difference
being that the presence of a deictic element in demNAs is
responsible for a greater anaphoric strength, i.e., a stronger
stimulus to look for an antecedent in the given context.
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A detailed analysis of the anaphoric function of demNAs and
defNAs is given by Hawkins 1978. Hawkins does not confine
himself to anaphoric NPs, nor to written context. Consequently,
many uses of definite NPs which he distinguishes are irrelevant
for our variation. Hawkins considers the uses of demonstrative
NPs to be a reduction of the possible uses of definite NPs.
Demonstrative NPs can only occur in two of the seven uses of
definite NPs, i.e., in the uisible situation use and in the strict
anaphoric use (Hawkins 1978:149).
Hawkins clarifies the difference between the anaphoric function
of defNAs and that of demNAs by indicating for both types of
expressions what the speaker actually does when he uses such an
expression. By usíng a defNA, the speaker, among other things,
does the following:
He instructs the hearer .. to pick out an object
satisfying the descriptive predicate from within the set
of objects which he has talked about with the hearer.
He selects a descriptiue predicate which will achieue
uniqueness of the reference (with singular count nouns)
within the releuant set, i.e., there must exist no other
objects within this set of which the predicate holds.
(1978:110)
The definite article merely tells the hearer that the
object referred to is a member of one of these shared
sets, and instructs him to f~nd the right set and relate
the object to it. (1978:154)
Thus, the anaphoric use of a defNA is congruent with the general
quality of definite NPs, i.e., the quality to locate an object (or
more precisely: the inclusion of all relevant objects) within a so-
called shared set of objects.
By using a demNA the speaker does the following:
He (a) intraiuces a referent (or referents) to the hearer;
and (b) instructs the hearer to match this linguistic
referent with some identifiable object, where
identifiability means .. known on the basis of preuious
mention in discourse. (1978:152)
So, the difference between defNAs and demNAs can be found in
the difference between the location-constraint and the matching-
constraint. DemNAs cause a match between two linguistic
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expressions, on the basis of which an object can be identified. A
defNA is an expression that should create the possibility to
identify the object within the set of objects dealt with in the text.
This difference has to be seen as a difference in anaphoric value:
the matching quality of a demNA indicates that a demNA - much
more so than a defNA - is referentially dependent on another
linguistic expression, a quality which represents the strict
interpretation of anaphoricity (see the interpretation of NAs in
section 1.3).
A similar interpretation can be found in Corblin 1983. Corblin
looks for an explanation for the difference in acceptability
between le and ce in la reprise immédiate, i.e., the direct re-
mention of an indefinite NP, as in (15) and (16):
(15) Tu verras un gar~on et une fille. Tu dois donner une
poupée à la (?cette) fille et une voiture au (?à ce) gargon.
(Corblin 1983:125)
You are going to see a boy and a girl. You have to give a doll to the
(?this) girl and a car to the (?this) boy.
(16) Une femme entra dans la pièce. J'avais vu cette (?la)
femme chez un ami. (1983:125)
In the play a woman arme on. I had seen this (?the) woman at a jriend's
place.
To Corblin, these examples illustrate the so-called "paradoxe de
la reprise immédiate". The essence of this paradox is that in (15)
the demNA is not natural although there is a reason for using a
stronger identificational device: in the preceding sentence two
NPs were introduced. In (16) a demNA is acceptable but a defNA
is not, even though only one NP is introduced in the first
sentence. Corblin explains this paradox by putting different
search procedures at the basis of defNAs and demNAs:
Un sujet ne dira 'le' impassible dans la reprise
immédiate dindéfcni que sil se trouve mis dans
l incapacité de trouuer dans le contexte (antérieur,
interposé ou immédiatement postérieur) un SN oj94ant
matière à contraste de domaine à domaines. (Corblin
1983:131)
A subject can only have the determiner 'le', used after
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an indefenite antecedent, if in the context it can find an
NP which makes a contrast between domains possible.
Pour que (le démonstrati~ paraisse natwel, il est
nécessaire que le contexte postérieur maintienne
explicitement à'ce N' sa ualeur de contraste interne au
domaine lexical N. (Corblin 1983:133)
In order for a demonstratiue to be natural, it is
necessary for the subsequent context to assign to 'that
N' its quality of internal contrast within the lexiccel
domain of N.
What is essential in this difference is that the acceptability of
defNAs depends on the presence in the text (or, as Corblin puts it
"dans la mémoire du tezte") of at least one other NP, which has
installed a lexical domain with which defNAs can be contrasted
("contraste de domaine à domaine"). This is the case in (15). A
demNA, on the other hand, only has to do with a contrast that is
domain-internal, i.e., a contrast within the domain of one
introduced lexical element. Applied to (16), the domain-internal
contrast is the contrast between the woman in question and other
elements denoted by the lexical item woman. Just as in Hawkins'
location-constraint, the contrast between different domains
implies a choice between various objects; on the other hand, the
"contraste interne au domaine lexical N' implies the limitation of
the interpretation of demNAs to one contextually present object.
So far the account of Corblin, like that of Hawkins, implies an
anaphoric difference between defNAs and demNAs. Corblin,
however, adds an important element: he makes it clear that a
demNA implies more than simple matching. The demNA-
characterisation in terms of a contrast within the domain of a
lexical item fits in with the interpretation underlying one class of
use of demNAs that I distinguish, i.e., the classify-interpretation
(see section 3.4.2). The problem, however, is that this
interpretation can by no means be assigned to all demNAs.
Finally, an anaphoric characterisation of the difference between
definite and demonstrative NPs can also be found in Hartmann
1982. He formulates a difference between definite and
demonstrative NPs in terms of deictic space and basic reference
point. He discerns this difierence in a systematic variation
between two uses and phonetic realisation forms of the definite
determiner in the German dialect of Mánchengladbach, a definite
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use and a demonstrative one. He puts it as follows: demonstrative
der 'the' necessarily requires an interpretation within the deictic
space of the text, definite der 'the' does not. Put differently:
demonstrative and definite der'the' have different basic reference
points. In the case of demonstrative der 'the', this necessarily is
the non-verbal or verbal context, in the case of definite der 'the'
that is not necessarily the case: there, the basic reference point
can be provided by presupposed contexts, differing from text to
text, in which the definite identifying NP has an unambiguous or
uniquely identifying value that can be distinguished by reader
and writer.
Although anaphorically inspired concepts like matching domain,
internal contrast or basic reference point of the text no doubt
tend to capture important and sound intuitions with regard to
defNAs and demNAs, not all the differences in adequacy in (9)-
(14) nor the various demNA-interpretations in section 3.4 can be
characterised by means of these concepts.
3.3.3 The difference in markedness and focal value
In the literature demonstratives are regarded as typical
representatives of marked referential expressions. These are
expressions which are used - generally speaking - to identify
elements which in the given discourse circumstances are difficult
to identify. On the basis of the demonstrative determiner,
demNAs rather than defNAs can be looked upon as marked
expressions.
An important question is under which conditions marked
referential expressions have to be used. To this question, answers
of different import are given in the literature on anaphors.
Firstly, answers are given merely in descriptive terms, i.e., by
describing the referentially problematic text circumstances in
which marked referential expressions are necessary to guarantee
the identification. Secondly, answers can be given in more
technical terms in terms of a focus component functioning in a
certain way when texts are being processed, on the basis of which
the markedness of referential expressions can be explained and
predicted. In the following, I shall discuss the following three
an swers:
(i) marked referential expressions are used to access a
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discourse referent which is a member of so-called
'competing candidates' (section 3.3.3.1)
(ii) marked referential expressions are used to access a
discourse referent which has a low degree of accessibility
(section 3.3.3.2)
(iii) marked referential expressions are used to access a
discourse referent with a low focal value or position or
which is out of focus (section 3.3.3.3).
3.3.3.1 DefNA-demNA and competing candidates
Marked referential expressions can be used to access the intended
referent in situations in which referents are contrasted, i.e.,
among members of competing candidates. This is certainly true
for various marked pronominal anaphors, like demonstratives or
stressed personal pronouns. In Linde 1979, for example, in which
the use of it and that is investigated in appartment descriptions,
it appears that in contrast situations the deictic that is used,
rather than it, for example, when the appartment is contrasted
with another appartment (1979:351).
This is clearly not the case with demNAs. In contrast situations a
demNA is inadequate or redundant, which can be seen as
paradoxical, at least from an identificational point of view. It is
impossible to think of any written discourse context in which
demNAs - better than other marked anaphoric NPs - can occur in
contrast situation. In each case the contrast situation can be
handled better by one of the following marked anaphoric devices:
either by a pronominal anaphor, as in (17)
(17) a. The man; had a row with his girlfriend~, because SHE~
wanted to go on to another pub and HE; didn't feel like
it any more. (Bosch 1988:224)
b. The man; had a row with his girl friend~, because ?this
girl friend~ wanted to go on to another pub and ?that
man; didn't feel like it any more.
or by a demonstrative pronoun, as in (18)
(18) a. Ik heb eerst met Vanslagmulders gebeld en daarna
met Vanderueiren,. Deze; vertelde me dat hij .....
b. Ik heb eerst met Vanslagmulders gebeld en daarna
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met Vanderueiren;. ?Deze man, vertelde me dat hij .....
First 1gave Vanslagmulders a rtng and tht.~ Vnnderveiren. IThis ( this
man) told me that he .....
or by an alternative definite nominal anaphor, as in (19)
(19) a.Ik zag gisteren mijn vriend Jozef inet zijn
dwergpoedel;. De hond; bleek uitstekend in vorm te
zijn.
b.Ik zag gisteren mijn vriend Jozef inet zijn
dwergpoedel;. ?Deze hond; bleek uitstekend in vorm te
zijn.
Yesterdny, I saw my j'riend Joze(ruith his pygmy poodle. (The I thisl dog
turned out to be in great shape.
or by a repeated definite NA, as in (20)
(20) a. Het gerecht houdt er over de verdwijning van Van den
Boeynants twee hypotheses; op na: ontvoering of
georchestreerde vlucht. De ene hypothese; is
waarschijnlijker dan de andere (hypothese)~.
b. Het gerecht houdt er over de verdwijning van Van den
Boeynants twee hypotheses; op na: ontvoering of
georchestreerde vlucht. (?Die ~ ?deze) ene (hypothese);
is waarschijnlijker dan (?die ~?deze) andere
(hypothese)~.
The court have two hypotheses about the disappearance of Van den
Boeynants: kidnapping or orchestrated ~light. The one hypothesis is more
probable than the other (hypothesis).
Of course the b-examples are not necessarily inadequate. Still,
they are less adequate than the a-versions, provided we take
them as identificationally stronger variants of the a-versions,
which are already identificationally marked.'
Finally, the fact that demNAs are not typical selecting devices in
contrast situations certainly does not mean that they never occur
in such situations. In (21), for example, the demNA clearly has a
selecting function. Crucial for the adequacy of the demNA in this
context is the inanimate character of the discourse referent
concerned, a feature we shall encounter below as a factor
favouring demNAs.
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(21) De meeste vluchtelingen uit Boeroendi komen in T~jaad;
terecht. Dat land; kan ze lang niet allemaal aan.
Moat ojthe re~ugees (rom Burundi end up in Chad. That country cannot
cope with all these people.
3.3.3.2 DefNA-demNA and accessibility
As was mentioned in section 1.2.1, the notion of accessibility of
discourse referents is often used in recent research on reference
to explain the form of referential expressions in texts. Based on
the notion of accessibility it can be predicted that demNAs - as
marked referential expressions - are used to access referents with
a low degree of accessibility. Low accessibility can be due to
various discourse factors. A factor taken as a major criterion for
the accessibility of referents is the distance between antecedent
and anaphor.
The analysis in Linde (1979:351) shows, for instance, that the
marked demonstrative pronoun that is more distant from its
antecedent than the unmarked definite pronoun it. More
antecedents of that-forms than of it-forms are located in previous
"discourse nodes".
For the defNA-demNA variation this correlation does not hold,
however. In my own corpus, it appears that in the majority of the
demNA-occurrences, the antecedent is one sentence back and
within the same text segment (see table (3) in chapter 4). Given
the fact that intrasentential NAs are infrequent, one sentence
back is the smallest referential distance possible.
The inapplicability of the correlation between defNA-demNA and
high-low accessibility becomes obvious from the analyses in Arie]
1988 as well. In a corpus of four texts - each containing 2200
words - she reveals that on average a demNA stands closer to its
antecedent than a defNA In her scheme in which anaphoric
expressions are classified as high-, mid- or low-accessibility
markers, the difference between defNAs and demNAs is
expressed as follows:
(i) DemNAs are mid-accessibility markers. Evidence for this
is provided by the observation that most demNAs find
their antecedents in the preceding sentence; in other
words, demNAs rarely access discourse referents which
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have already been mentioned in the same sentence or
discourse referents whích are remote.
(ii) DefNAs are low-accessibility mark~rs. Within the class of
low-accessibility markers, two subclasses have to be
distinguished, i.e., proper names and definite
descriptions: definite descriptions occur significantly
more frequently with their antecedents in previous-
sentence position, while proper names occur more often
with their antecedents in the most distant position,
namely in the previous paragraph.
Linking the defNA-demNA variation to different degrees of
accessibility - as Ariel does - is problematic from our point of
view. A major problem is that the descriptive difference between
defNAs and demNAs is restricted to a difference in distance
between antecedent and anaphor. The fact that such a criterion is
too rough to determine the accessibility was already observed by
Ariel herself (1988:69); yet, distance is the only criterion in her
classification. Such a criterion is not meant to nor appropriate to
distinguish between various contextual types of definite and
demonstrative NAs. A qualitative typology of possible differences
between defNAs and demNAs can never result from such an
analysis, it can only yield tendencies or central uses (1988:76) of
the types of referential expressions.
Furthermore, Ariel's characterisation of the notion of mid-
accessibility indicates the inconvenience with which demNAs are
interpreted identificationally. For Ariel, mid-accessibility is a
characteristic of discourse referents which can be accessed by
demNAs. DemNAs are expressions which are generally co-
referential with an antecedent in the preceding sentence. This is
the only characterisation which can be found of the notion of mid-
accessibility. Low and high accessibility, on the other hand, are
accounted for in a better way: Ariel (1988:80) indicates a
plausible relationship between referents with a low degree of
accessibility and long term memory on the one hand and highly
accessible referents and short term memory on the other, which
makes the dichotomy psychologically plausible and which at the
same time weakens the psychological plausibility of the
intermediary notion of mid-accessibility.
The final problem with the accessibility-view of defNAs and
demNAs is that it does not apply to the many highly focal
nominal anaphors in written discourse which not only access a
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discourse referent but which also provide information on that
referent (see chapter 2).
3.3.3.3 DefNA-demNA and focus
In various proposals marked referential expressions are
characterised in terms of focal value, which in fact differs
terminologically rather than conceptually from the accessibility
view above. Focal value can be seen as a functional notion
indicating the efforts a writer expects or a reader makes to access
a certain referent. Focal value can be translated theoretically in
terms of a focus component defined and functioning in a certain
way in the representation a reader builds up of a text (Garrod 8~
Sanford 1982, Bosch 1988, Sidner 1983, Grosz 8z Sidner 1986,
Pinkal 1986). In this section I discuss different focus conceptions
in which the defNA-demNA dichotomy is linked to differences in
focal value.
The notion focal value is the basis for the distinction between the
anaphoric and the deictic procedure which Ehlich (1979; 1982;
1983) attributes to anaphoric and deictic expressions respectively,
i.e., also to defNAs and demNAs respectively. These procedures
are to be looked upon as unmarked and marked linguistic devices
respectively, directing the attention of the listener. The
fundamental difference is that the first procedure should be
conceived of as an instruction to sustain the focus of attention,
whereas the second should be conceived of as an instruction to
alter his focus of attention (Ehlich 1982:331) - for a similar vision
see also Linde (1979:347), Cornish (1986b:153) and Lyons
(1977:673). The distinction between the two procedures is not
further elaborated upon; Ehlich gives no indication of how the
procedures can be predicted on the basis of characteristics of the
context in which the referential expressions occur.
A plausible relationship between markedness of referential
expressions and differences in focus representation can be found
in Garrod 8a Sanford 1982. They distinguish between two focus
components: explicit focus and implicit focus. These two focus
representations, can be regarded as collections of discourse
referents which change during text processing. The implicit and
explicit focus are presented as two registers within the focussed
memory, which gives the distinction a psychological basis.
Intuitively, the difference is justified on the basis of the
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observation that, at a given moment in the discourse, certain
referents are very easily accessible and others are less easily
accessible. Empirically the dichotomy between implicit and
explicit focus can be found in the distinction between marked and
unmarked referential expressions. Garrod 8z Sanford link the
distinction between marked and unmarked expressions to types
of forms of referential expressions, i.e., the difference between
pronouns (which can only access discourse referents that are in
explicit focus) and full NPs (which can access referents that are
in implicit focus as well), a correlation which is further refined in
Bosch 1988:
..we shall concentrnte on the distinction between
Explicit and Implicit Focus, and shall begin with the
contention that full definite noun phrases (FDNP) and
pronouns can be viewed as triggers to implement
searches of inemory, and that they differ in the
partitions they address. (Garrod 8c Sanford 1982:27)
The question now is whether the defNA-demNA variation can be
based on a difference in focal value or representation, as is
expressed above. The most plausible application consists in
correlating defNAs with unmarkedness and demNAs with
markedness. A correspondence like this, however, is based on an
absolute correspondence between types of use (marked vs.
unmarked) and types of form (pronouns vs. full NP, defNAs vs.
demNAs etc.).5 Yet, such a correspondence is untenable. With
regard to anaphors vs. deixis in general the untenability is stated
by Fillmore:
A reason for needing to be clear about the distinction
between the forms and the uses to which they can be
put is the need to recognise cases in which elements
which are prototypically deictic may also have non-
deictic uses as well as cases in which basically non-
deictically functioning elements can be used deictically.
(1982:35-6)
In Linde 1979 the untenability of such a strong or absolute
correspondence appears from the fact that it and that are mainly,
but not exclusively used in their typically unmarked and marked
functions respectively. Against Ehlich's identity relation between
anaphoric and deictic procedures (types of use) and anaphoric and
deictic expressions (types of form) many examples of deictically
used personal (not-demonstrative) pronouns can be put forward
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(see Bosch 1983, Akmaijan 8s Jackendoff 1970). A strong
correspondence between implicit-focus referents and full NPs on
the one hand, and between explicit-focus referents and pronouns
on the other is untenable in the light of the following two facts.
Firstly, many full NPs (especially daNAs) access discourse
referents which are in explicit focus. Secondly, there is the fact
that pronouns can occasionally access implicit focus referents, as
is shown in the following example:
(22) Mark just got married. She's in the office next door.
(Bosch 1988:210-212).
So, between demNA-defNA and marked-unmarked an absolute or
strong correspondence between types of form and types of use is
untenable. Nevertheless, a weak correspondence between marked
and demNAs and between unmarked and defNAs can be justified
since it is reasonable to assert that every demNA is marked, if
only by the presence of a demonstrative element combined with
the presence of a lexical content. A weak correspondence like this
is also justifiable with regard to other types of referential
expressions, such as accentuated and demonstrative pronouns for
example.
The question then is whether this markedness can be interpreted
in terms of focal value. I restrict this question to the question
whether the markedness of a demNA corresponds to the meaning
attached to focality by Ehlich and Garrod íi~ Sanford. An answer
to this can only be given if we go more deeply into the
interpretation of Ehlich's and Garrod 8~ Sanford's dichotomies.
Although Garrod 8~ Sanford's and Ehlich's interpretations of the
notion of focus differ from one another, they both look upon it in
relation with referents which have to be accessed in locations
indicating a certain degree of accessibility. The focal location (i.e.,
inside the focus of attention or the explicit focus) contains
elements which have recently been mentioned in the discourse
and which are accessible by a pronoun (though Ehlich also shows
other ways to bring elements into focus). Ehlich's non-focal
location (i.e., outside the focus of attention) contains elements
which need the 'pointing force' of deictic expressions to get them
back into focus, to (re)introduce them into focus. Garrod 8z
Sanford's non-focal location (i.e., implicit focus) contains scenario-
bound referents, representations of elements that are not
explicitly mentioned in the text, as in (23):
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(23) Mary packed the picnic supplies. The beer was warm.
Applying Ehlich's and Garrod 8a Sanfor~'s dichotomies to the
defNA-demNA variation causes problems. Firstly, the defNA-
demNA dichotomy cannot be reconciled with Garrod 8z Sanford's
interpretation of explicit-implicit focus (referents). The difference
between anaphoric NPs and scenario-related NPs is not
analogous to the difference between defNAs and demNAs.
DemNAs are unable to access typical scenario-related referents,
no matter how much contextual help is ofiered:
(24) I entered the restaurant. (The I?this) waiter came up to
me.s
(25) John read a book about Schubert and wrote to (the )
?this) author. (Heim 1982:371)
Moreover, demNAs often occur when discourse referents are
accessed which are not explicitly mentioned, but which are
contextually predictable, as in (26) and (27):
(26) In 1989 zijn twee keer zoueel AIDS gevallen gesignaleerd
als in 1988;. (Dit feit; ) Deze toename;l is verontrustend.
In 1989 twice as mnny AIDS-cases were signalled than in 1988. (This
fact ~ this increaseJ is alarming.
(27) Het gerecht denkt Van den Boeynants nooit meer terug te
zien;. Dit vermoeden; wordt elke dag sterker.
The court think Van den Boeynants will never be seen again. This
supposition is getting stronger every day.
Secondly, the application of the defNA-demNA variation to
Ehlich's dichotomy leads to the following remarkable conclusion:
if demNAs possessed the quality to access referents outside the
focus of attention, then they would have the same value as that
which is regularly assigned to defNAs in the literature: it is well
known that full-NP anaphors, especially literally repeated
anaphors, are often used to access remote referents. This is
proved by analyses of the distance between full NPs and their
antecedents, see e.g. Ariel 1988, Givón 1983, Clancy (1980:174),
Fox (1984:200). Also for Garrod 8z Sanford 1982 full NP is the
ma.rked referential expression, as opposed to pronouns.
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If defNAs already possess this marked identificational function,
why then would demNAs fulfill that function as well; it would be
against the principle of markedness if demNAs were the marked
variant in similar circumstances as defNAs.
3.4 The maximal interpretation of defNA-demNA
3.4.1 The MOD-Proposal
We are inclined to think of demNAs as being referential
expressions which are marked by default. However,
identificationally inspired views on markedness prove unable to
give an explanation for the behaviour of demNAs. The decisive
factor here is the empirical evidence that demNAs generally are
realisations of discourse referents which are highly focal,
whatever definition is given to focus. This can be seen in the
examples (5)-(7) and (8)-(14). With the identificational
interpretation it is impossible for us to account for the role of the
lexical content of demNAs with regard to the development of the
text. Just like daNAs in chapter 2, demNAs do not just access
established discourse referents, they also produce a kind of
progress in the text. Accordingly, accounting for the function of
demNAs primarily means accounting for their text developmental
function. In order to do so, I put forward a proposal in which the
markedness of a demNA with respect to the underlying discourse
referent is interpreted as follows:
The Markedness of Dem1VA (MOD)-Proposal
The markedness of a demNA in written context effects a
modification in the semantic representation of a highly
accessible discourse referent by activating a non-default
interpretation of the NP involved.
In this proposal, a demNA no longer exclusively enables us to
access a'same-number' DREF, it is also a signal to modify the
representation of the referent in a certain way. This proposal is
first of all based on the observation that demNAs predominantly
find their antecedent in the immediate context.' Secondly, the
proposal is supported by the observation that the co-referential
link between anaphor and antecedent is self-evident, due to a
combination of discourse position, contextual and factual
information (see the analyses in chapter 4).
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In the proposal the demonstrative is regarded as a signal not to
assign a default interpretation to the anaphoric NP, i.e., - as we
will see below - generally a purely identi~,~-interpretation of the
NP, but to activate a non-default interpretation based on the
nature of the lexical content of the anaphoric NP. This activation
then is a signal to modify the semantic representation of the
referent concerned. The claim underlying the MOD-proposal,
which states that the lexical content of demNAs is essential in
the interpretation of the markedness of demNAs, in fact fits in
with Bosch 1988, where this claim is made for marked NPs in
general (see further section 3.5.2).
In the following sections different modificational types of demNAs
are distinguished. Each of these modificational types will be
described in terms of a coherence relation contained within an
incremented discourse referent representation, i.e., the coherence
relations classify, attribute, contextualise and eualuate. In the
analysis of the different demNA-types I shall focus the larger
part of my attention on the detection and interaction of
contextual factors which determine (non-)default interpretations
of demNAs.
3.4.2 Classifying the referent
3.4.2.1 Classify-demNAs
A first class of demNA-occurrences causes an activation of the
class of elements which the referent is a member of. Examples
are (11) and (28):
(11) Bush; heeft besloten om de taxes dan toch te verhogen.
Het is de eerste keer dat (de I deze) president; een
verhoging aandurft.
Bush has decided to raise taxes ajter all. It is the j'irst time (the ~ this)
president has dared to do so.
(28) De mus; komt in onze lage landen in groten getale voor.
(De I deze) vogel, behoeft geen speciale bescherming.
The sparrow is uery common in o~r low countries. (The ~ thisJ bird
dcesn't need specia! protection.
In terms of the MOD-proposal we can descríbe the function of the
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demNA in this example as follows. The default interpretation of
the defNA (the president; the bird) is the simple anaphoric
reading with the antecedent NP. The link between them is
structurally as well as semantically or pragmatically simple. In
terms of chapter 2, first of all an implicit coherence relation of
the type identify can be attributed to the underlying referent
representation, as is expressed in the a-versions:
( l la) defNA-representation
BUSH" ~--- PRESIDENT"
(identify)




(the sparrocu is the bird in question)
The demonstrative determiner overrules the simple identify-
reading of the corresponding defNA. The semantic modification of
the referent can be expressed by a classify-relation contained
within the discourse referent representation underlying the
demNA, as is expressed in the b-versions:
( l lb) demNA-representation
BUSH" ~--- PRESIDENT"
(classify)




(the sparrow is a member of the set of birds)
The demNA-version implies interpretation possibilities in which
that class interpretation is crucial or relevant, such as other
presidents might haue increased taxes (more than once) or I'm not
talking about other presidents in (11) and other birds might haue
needed protection in (28).
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The difference between the demNA and the defNA also manifests
itself in a different distribution of stress: in the defNA-version
both determiner and noun are unstresse~, while in the demNA-
version at least the demonstrative determiner is stressed.
The modificational effect of classify-demNAs stem from one
identificational characteristic of discourse referents, i.e., the
identification as an indiuidual element vs. a class element, in
these examples the classes of birds and (US)-presidents. This
however does not mean that the demonstrative causes a change
in the identification number of the underlying DREF. It only
means that a particular semantic class (i.e., presidents of the US
or birds) is activated or linked to the representation of the
referent. Thus, the modification can be looked upon as a
modification of the semantic representation of the discourse
referent involved.
This demNA-interpretation prototypically applies to a large class
of NAs, consisting of pragmatic or factual superordinates as in
(11) and semantic superordinates as in (28). The difference
between these anaphors is based on the kind of knowledge that is
required to make the connection with the antecedent NP. With
the factual anaphors, pragmatic or factual knowledge is required:
the relationship between Bush and president appeals to
generalised factual knowledge (Seuren 1985:287). Semantic
anaphors are identified on the basis of the systematic relations
between items ín the lexicon. They appeal to generalised
categorical knowledge (Seuren 1985:285).
In view of our analysis, the difference between semantic and
pragmatic superordinates is considered to be irrelevant.
Analytically, it is not that difficult to make a text-independent
distinction between semantic and pragmatic superordinates.
Typical examples of both classes can easily be given. For
instance, the class of birds simply produces semantic-
superordinate NAs, the class of US-presidents produces
pragmatic-superordinate NAs. With regard to the reader's
processing and the knowledge status, however, such a
classification is not very interesting for our purposes. The
subdivision of birds may well be generalised categorical
knowledge and the subdivision of US-presidents may well
represent factual knowledge. However, in a particular context
which contains the superordinate NA bird - co-referential with
yellow warbler - or the NA president - co-referential with Andrew
y4 cxaPT~x ~t
Jackson - the knowledge that a yellow warbler is one element of
the class of birds, or that Andrew Jackson is one of the US-
presidents ( 1829-1837), a reader will have to deduce from the
same information sources, i.e., from his experience as an amateur
ornithologist or a historian and from cues in the context in which
the superordinates occur, the most important of which is the
high-accessibility status of the DREFs YELLOW WARBLER or
ANDREW JACKSON.
The conclusion is that dividing superordinates into a pragmatic
and a semantic subtype does not necessarily have to be
interesting for the processing, the functioning and the contextual
value of superordinate demNAs. However valid these two types
are from an analytical point of view, the relevance of the
distinction (supposing it could be made in all cases) for the
processing of demNAs is at least unclear.
3.4.2.2 Other 'identificational' modifications
Apart from classify-demNAs, which are based on the
identificational characteristic indiuidual vs. class element,
occasionally, demNPs can be found which are based on the
modification of other identificational dichotomies, such as generic
- non-generic, specific - non-specif'ic and quantif'ied - instantiated.
Not all of these demNP-occurrences can be said to be co-
referential in the strict sense of the word. It is clear, however,
that they modify an identificational value of a discourse referent,
as classify-demNAs do. The following modifications can be
distinguished.
Generic us. non-generic
This type of identificational modification can be found in (13):
(13) Jan rijdt graag met z(jn fiets;. (Het ~ dat ~ dit) uoertuig;
ligt hem na aan het hart.
John likes to ride his bicycle. IThe ~ that ~ thisJ uehicle is close to his
heart.
The same interpretation as in (11) and (28) can be attributed to
this example. However, a more complicated view is possible as
well. In the demonstrative version of (13) not only the
interpretation element from the class of uehicles can be assigned
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to the DREF BICYCLE, the demNA can also convert the
individual referent (JOHN's BICYCLE) into a generic one (THE
BICYCLE; THE PHENOMENON BICYCL), as appears from the
following continuatíon of (13) in which only the demNAs remain
fairly adequate:
(13a) Jan rijdt graag met zWn fiets;. (Dat ~ dit I?het) voertuig;
ligt hem na aan het hart. Hij heeft er dan ook een tiental
in zijn bezit.
John likes to ride his bicycle. JThe ~ that ~ this) uehicle is close to his
heart. He owns about ten oj them.
In this case the demNA signals the DREF's transition from
uniquely identified individual referent (JAN's BICYCLE) to
generic referent (THE BICYCLE AS VEHICLE).
A similar modification can be found in (29):
(29) Visitation in October; [October 1988 (A.M.)] was the
highest for that month; in park history. (National
Geographic, vo1.175, nr 2, p. 273)
In the following two examples, the shift from individual element
to generic element is still more striking: it is marked by a shift
from singular to plural; in fact, it is not a definite NP, but a bare
plural (acrobats and boys) that in these examples offers the most
adequate substitution variant of the demonstrative version.
(30) Een trapezist uan het circus uan Moskou; heeft gisteren
voor het eerst een driedubbele salto op 12 meter boven de
begane grond uitgevoerd. Dat bewijst nog maar eens dat
(deZe )?de) acrobaten; met hun leven spelen. (See for a
similar example Corblin 1987:7).
Yesterday, a trapeze artist oj the Moscow circus perjormed jor the ftrst
tème a triple somersault 12 meters aboue the ground. This proues once
again that (these ~ the) acrobats are playing with their lives.
(31) There is a boy; climbing that tree. Those boys; are always
getting into mischief (Halliday 8a Hasan 1976:283)e
According to my NA-defnition, the NPs in these examples can be
regarded as NPs accessing a DREF with the same identification
number. This means that in fact the same referent or topic is
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continued in the text, although the semantic content of the
discourse referent changes drastically. The demonstrative
determiner is then used as a device to consider the NP involved
as a continuation of a previous referent. The demonstrative
activates a generic NP-interpretation and as such modifies the
semantic extension of the discourse referent from individual
element to generic element. The peculiarity of these examples,
however, lies in the fact that the modification in fact results in a
different extension of the world referents denoted by the NPs: not
one element or individual is addressed, but a whole class.
Speci~c vs. non-specif'ic
In the following examples the identificational modification is even
more subtle:
(32) De rijkste zakenman van Amerika; heeft een privé jet. (De
~ deze ~ die} man; hoeft zich om de dagelijkse dingen des
levens geen zorgen te maken.
The richest business man in America owns a priuate jet. fThe ~ this ~
thatJ man dcesn't haue to worry about the daily things of life.
(33) De moordenaar van Smit; moet wel gek zijn. (De I deze I
diel man; heeft al meer moorden gepleegd.
Smit's murderer must be insane. (The ( this ( that) man has committed
more murders.
These examples - variations on well known examples that
illustrate the distinction between specific and non-specific NP-
interpretation - have two possible readings. These readings differ
depending on whether the co-referential NPs are interpreted
specifically or non-specifically. In the former case the writer has
the intention of referring to a specific and existing man. In the
latter case he uses the NPs in their attributive reading
(Donnellan 1971). Even though both defNA and demNA are
possible in these two readings, there are slight differences
between the different readings.
Without further contextual information the defNA-variants of the
examples suggest by default an actual existing interpretation of
the NPs concerned. The simple co-referential reading of defNAs,
together with the nature of the predicative information on the
referent, causes an interpretation of specific and existing referent.
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DemNA-substitution can be seen as a signal to overrule this
default and to activate an attributive whoever-fits-the-description
interpretation. More so than the defNA the demNA counters the
suggestion of a specific referent, created in the first sentence.
This intuition is supported by (32a) and (33a): if the continuation
of the context excludes a specific interpretation, then the demNA
is the most adequate variant:
(32a) De ri.jkste zakenman van Amerika; heeft een privé jet.
(Deze ~ die ~?de) mani hoeft zich om de dagelijkse
dingen des levens geen zorgen te maken. Als Fortune
morgen met zijn lijst anno 1991 komt, zullen we eindelijk
weten wie het is.
The richest business man in America owna a private jet. (The ~ thia ~
that) man dcesn't have to worry about the daily things of life. If
Fortune's list (or 1991 is published tomorrow, we will know who he is.
(33a) De moordenaar van Smit; moet wel gek zijn. (Die ) deze ~
?de) man; heeft al meer moorden gepleegd. Toch heeft de
politie nog geen enkel spoor van hem;.
Smit's murderer must 6e insane. (The ( this ~ thatJ man has committed
more murders. Still, lhe pa~lice haue (ound no trace ojhim yet.
If on the other hand the context confirms an 'existing'
interpretation, then a defNA is preferred:
(32b) De rijkste zakenman uan Amerika; heeft een privé jet. (De
)?deze I?die) man; hoeft zich om de dagelijkse dingen
des levens geen zorgen te maken. In z~jn; riante vílla in
Dallas heeft hij; gisteren een exorbitant feest gegeven.
The richest business man in America owns a private jet. (The ~ this I
thatJ man doesn't have to worry about the daily things of li(e. In his
spacious uilla in Dallas, he threw an exorbitant party yesterday.
(33b) De moordenaar van Smit; moet wel gek zijn. (De ~?deze
I?die) man; heeft a1 meer moorden gepleegd. Dat heeft
hij; gisteren voor de televisie toegegeven.
Smit's murderer must be insane. (The ~ this ( thatJ man has committed
more murders. He admitted that yeaterday on televísion.
Nevertheless, the demonstrative determiner is a weak signal in
these c.ases. Although no conclusive evidence can be provided by
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means of such examples, the tendency is obvious: demNAs -
because of their signal function - turn out to be in a better
position than defNAs to overrule a contextually preferent NP-
interpretation. In any case, it has become clear from examples
like the preceding ones that the behaviour of demNAs is more
complicated than is claimed by Maclaran (1980:812):
Used anaphorically, though, a demonstrative
description can either be speciftc or non-specific,
depending on the antecedent.
Quantif'ted us. instantiated
DemNAs often have quantified antecedents. In that case
demonstratives can signal a transition from universally or
existentially quantified referent to instantiated referent, as in
(34), (35) and (36):
(34) In mei van ieder jaar ontvangt u een vakantie-uitkering
over de toeslag en over de loondervingsuitkering. Eindigt
uw uitkering eerder, dan ontvangt u bij de laatste
uitbetaling ook de vakantie-uitkering over de toeslag in
dat jaar(2:0155)
In May each year you receive a holiday bene~it on the extra allowance
and on the compensation for loss of wages. Ijyour unemployment beneFt
ends earlier, then with the last payment, you also receive the holiday
allowance on the extra allowance in that year.
(35) Heeft u recht op een toeslag;? Hoeveel bedraagt dan deze
toeslag;? (2:0129)
Are you entitled to an extra allowance? Ij so, what will this extra
allownnce amount to?
(36) We can therefore associate with each point; near the
earth a vector g which is the acceleration that a body
would experience if it where released at this point;.
(5idner 1983:325)
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3.4.2.3 Conclusion
The effect of the classifying demNAs descr~bed in this section can
be summarised as follows. The demonstrative determiner
activates a non-default interpretation of the NP: a class
interpretation of the head noun is activated, and this
interpretation effects a modification in the semantic
representation of the referent involved, i.e., the class involved is
linked to the referent representation. In the other cases other
identificational values of the referent are modified.
Although the classifying value of demNAs turns out to be typical
of superordinate demNAs, this does not mean that all
superordinate demNAs necessarily and automatically bring about
a classifying modification. If this were so, it would mean that
lexical, text-independent types of nominal anaphors (i.e., in this
case superordinates) and contextual types of use (i.e., in this case
classify-NAs) would coincide, which is not at all predicted nor
prescribed by the MOD-proposal.
Empirical evidence for the distinction between superordinates
and classify-NAs can be found first of all in the fact that not all
demNAs containing a superordinate noun automatically yield a
classify-interpretation, as is clear from (37) for example, where
such an interpretation is neither relevant nor appropriate.
(37) Yesterday, Bush; delivered his second State of the Union.
(The ~?this) president; repeated he would not increase
tases.
Further evidence is provided by the fact that demNAs with no
superordinate relation with their antecedents can get a
classifying interpretation. Corblin (1983:125) gives the following
example in which a literal repetition gets a classify-reading:
(38) Un prince; s'ennuyait dans son chateau; ni la chasse ni la
pêche ni la danse ne pouvaient le; distraire. Le prince;
était triste et s'ennuyait de plus belle. Il; alla voir ses
conseillers. Ce prince; n'avait confiance en personne, et
voilà comment il s'y prit pour avoir leur avis.
There was a prince who was bored in his castle; neither hunting nor
Fishing amused him. The prince was sad and got bored even more. He
went to see his aduisors. This prince didn't trust anyone. And thats why
he was eager to hear their advice.
~ UU CHAP7'ER 3
Although the antecedent-demNA type suggests a so-called
contextualising interpretation (see section 3.4.4), the most
plausible interpretation is the classify-interpretation, inducing
inferences such as although you wouldn't expect it from a prince
or unlike other princes.
Thus, although superordinate nouns are typical in this first
modificational demNA-type, there is no automatic identity
between contextual modificational types and lexical types of NAs
(see the discussion in section 1.4).
3.4.3 Attributing information to the referent
Many nominal anaphors add attributive information concerning
the referent, which was not yet contained in the antecedent. In
fact this was already the case in the examples of the previous
section. However, there is still a difference in informative load
between the preceding examples and the following ones:
(8) When the washing machine; first came on the market,
(this I?the) [my addition (A.M.)J fantastic and truly
reuolutionary aid for the housewife; was available only to
very few. (Bosch 1983:150)
(39a) Gisteren kwam een man; om het leven tijdens
werkzaamheden aan de Kanaaltunnel. (De ~?deze I?die)
36 jarige man; werd verpletterd door een betonnen
segment van de tunnel.
Yesterday, a man died while working on the Chunnel. (The I this ~ that)
36-year-old man was smashed by a concrete segment oj the tunnel.
(39b) Gisteren kwam een man; om het leven tijdens werkzaam-
heden aan de Kanaaltunnel. (Deze ~?de) 36jarige
uroegere eigenaar uan de gronden die nu uoor de tunnel
z~jn onteigend; werd verpletterd door een betonnen
segment van de tunnel.
Yesterday, a man died while working on the Chunnel. (This ~ the) 36-
year-old former owner oj the grounds which were expropriated jor the
Chunnel was smashed by a concrete segment oj the tunnel.
(40) Warme Auonden; kan rustig het beginpunt van een nieuw
toneelgenre in Vlaanderen genoemd worden. Het NTG-
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stuk; is spetterend. Komt daar nog bij dat (deze ~?de)
dolle kornedie; helemaal in Belgische handen is.
Warme Auonden can be considered to be the starting point o( a new
genre in Flanders. The NTG-play is (abulous. Add to this the (act that
(this ~ the) roaring comedy is a Belgian production.
(41) Een Belgisch uliegtuig met hulpgcederen voor de Afgaanse
hoofdstad Kaboel, is vanochtend niet kunnen vertrekken.
(De I?Deze) Boeing 747; moest aan de grond blijven
omdat de toestand in Kaboel te gespannen is.
A Belgian aeroplnne with relie(goods (or the A(ghan capital o(Kabul
couldn't leaue this morning. (The ~ thisJ Bceing 747 had to stay on the
ground because the situation in Kabul is too tense.
(42) Minister Elens; heeft een pleidooi gehouden om alle
Zairese leiders op te knopen. Van (deze ~?de)
uredelieuende man; kan ik moeilijk aannemen dat hij
dergelijke dingen meent.
Minister Elens made a plea to string up all Zai're leaders. 1 can hardly
accept lhat (this ~ theJ peace-louing marz means what he says.
(43) Yesterday, a Scuiss banker; was arrested at Heathrow
Airport. (The I ?this) [my addition (A.M.)J 53-year-old
bachelor; declared that he had come to Britain to kidnap
the queen. (Seuren 1985:33)
A proposal for the defNA-demNA variation in this type of
nominal anaphors which deserves to be mentioned here is that by
Bosch (1983:147-150). By way of a reasonable guess Bosch puts
the necessary though not sufficient condition at the basis of
defNAs that they must not ascribe any properties to their
referent that are not already regarded as familiar. DemNAs on
the other hand can - but not necessarily have to - ascribe new
properties to their referents. Example (8) is introduced as an
illustration of that condition.
If we can label the content of each nominal anaphor as either
familiar or non-familiar information ( and that is what such
dichotomies were invented for, after all), this would mean that
every defNA could be replaced by a demNA Indeed, a demNA
can contain either familiar or non-familiar information; a defNA
can contain only familiar information.
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There are three reasons why such a familiarity-view is not
tenable. 1"irstly, there are examples - such as (39a), (41) and (43)
- where the demonstrative variant is not acceptable although the
NP contains information which may not be considered familiar.
Secondly, there are examples - such as (8), (39b) and (40) - where
the definite version is not acceptable. In these cases, however, the
NP-information cannot just be designated as new. In (39b), the
NP-information represents a remarkable coincidence in the given
context. In (8) and (40) the information concerned can be
characterised as evaluative information, expressing a viewpoint of
the writer. This can be deduced, for instance from the fact that
the demNA concerned can be followed by a parenthetic sentence
in which this evaluative quality is made explicit:
(8a) When the washing machine; first came on the market,
this fantastic and truly reuolutionary aid for the
housewife; - as it surely is - was available only to very
few.
(40a) Warme Avonden; kan rustig het beginpunt van een nieuw
toneelgenre in Vlaanderen genoemd worden. Het NTG-
stuk; is spetterend. Komt daar nog bij dat deze dolle
komedie; - want zo zou je het toch kunnen noemen -
helemaal in Belgische handen is.
~Varme Auonden' can 6e considered to be the starting point oj a new
genre in Flanders. The NTG-play is jabulous. Add to this the jact that
this rarring comedy - jor that is what you might call it - is a Belgian
production.
Thirdly, the dichotomy between familiar and new information
does not shed light on examples in which both defNA and demNA
are possible, as in (12):
(12) De Londense Times maakt vanochtend stukken bekend
uit het ouerheidsrapport ouer de salmonella-besmetting
uan de Britse eieren;. (Het ~ dit) vertrouwelijke rapport; ...
This morning, the London Times publishes eztracts jrom the gouernment
report on the salmonella injection in British eggs. (The ~ This)
conhdential report ...
Both defNA- and demNA-versions are quite appropriate
irrespective of the question whether the confidentiality of the
report has to be regarded as known or as unknown.
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Thus, the defNA-demNA distinction does not coincide with the
familiar-new distinction. Rather, the difference between defNAs
and demNAs intuitively has to be tal:~n as a difference in
prominence of the lexical content of the anaphoric NP, i.e., the
importance the writer attaches to the information concerned. In
the examples (39a), (41) and (43) the information has to be
interpreted as non-prominent information or as information
which cannot be related directly to the state of affairs expressed
in the main proposition. In these cases demNAs would suggest
prominence which could not be reconciled with the intention
structure underlying the text: the anaphoric-NP information in
these examples cannot but have marginal, non-central
importance. In (12) the information - in view of the context - can
be given both prominence and non-prominence status.
The prominence of the information can be expressed linguistically
as a difference in predicative value: demNA-occurrences have a
predicative reading; defNA-occurrences only have a referential
reading. The difference can also be described in terms of the
dichotomy between the referential and the attributive use of
definite descriptions (Donnellan 1971). At first sight both defNAs
and demNAs are used in the referential mode - since an essential
condition of demNAs and defNAs is the same-number
characteristic of their underlying referent. Still, they are not fully
and exclusively referential by nature: given the high-accessibility
status of the DREF concerned, the attributive information about
the referent concerned is not necessary for an unambiguous
identification of the referent. This information can even be
extremely unsuitable when it is looked upon as information
meant for an unambiguous identification of the referent, as in (8)
for example, where the attributive information could equally well
apply to irons, kitchen robots, etc. Thus, given the nature of the
lexical content, defNAs and demNAs can also be interpreted as
attributive. In view of this ambiguity, the difference between
defNAs and demNAs can be regarded as a difference in
accentuation between the two uses: the defNA-version
accentuates the referential use; the demNA-version the
attributive one.
Finally, in my framework, the difference between defNAs and
demNAs can be expressed in terms of implicit coherence relations,
i.e., as a difference between an identify-relation for defNAs and
an attrióute-relation for demNAs. For (12), for example, (12a)




REPORT" ~--- CONFIDENTIAL REPORT"
(identify)
(the confwlential report is the report in question.)
(12b) demNA-representation
REPORI"' ~--- CONFIDENTIAL REPORT"
(attribute)
(the report is confidential. )
There is enough empirical evidence for an attribute-interpretation
of these demNAs:
(i) In the first place there is the fact that the demNA-
occurrences - but not or hardly the defNA-occurrences -
can be paraphrased as in (42a) - see also (8a) and (40a):
(42a) Minister Elens; heeft een vurig pleidooi gehouden om alle
Zaïrese leiders op te knopen. Van deze uredelievende man;
- want dat is hij toch - kan ik moeilijk aannemen dat hij
dergelijke dingen meent.
Minister Elens made a plea to string up all ZaYre leaders. 1 can hardly
accept that this peace-loving man - jor surely that's what he is - means
what he says.
Just like the demonstrative, such an addition emphasises
the predicate underlying these NPs (Minister Elens is a
peace-loving man).
(ii) The fact that in uniquely identifying descriptions only a
defNA is acceptable provides further evidence for the
attribute-character of demNAs. See (44) and (45), in
which epithetical anaphoric NPs occur, the title the
attorney from Flémalle and the nickname the little one
respectively. In both examples an identificational be-
sentence lies behind the anaphor (Cools is the attorney of
Flémalle; Eddy Planckaert is the little one), not a
predicative be-sentence (Cools is an attorney of Flémalle;
Eddy Planckaert is a little one). In (45), the nickname
interpretation is stressed by the use of quotes:
(44) In de Waalse regering heeft Cools; gisteren de strijd
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aangebonden met zijn politieke tegenstanders. (De ~
?deze) meester van Flémalle„ zoals hij in het Luikse
wordt genoemd, had duidelijk gozworen eens en voor
altijd met de Happartisten in zijn federatie af te rekenen.
(Knack)
In the Walloon government, Cools took issue with his political enemies
yesterday. (The ~ this) nttorney (rom Flémalle, as he is called in the
region of Liege, had obviously sworn to get rid oj Happart'scompanions
once and (or all.
(45) ~Title: Eddy Planckaert wint Parijs-Roubaix 1990~
Je kon zo zien dat de brede glimlach die Eddy Planckaert;
op zijn gezicht probeerde te toveren niet echt was. Hij
was bang. "Bauer of ik? Ik weet het niet. Ik heb gespurt
met mijn ogen toe." Broer-ploegleider Walter probeert
met een washandje het gezicht van "(de ~?deze ~?die)
kleine", weer wat menselijker te maken. ( De Morgen 9-4-
1990)
~Title: Eddy Planckaert wins Paris-Roubaiz 1990~
You muld see that the bright smile on Eddy Plnnckaert's jace wasn't
real. He was afraid. "Bauer or me? I don't know. 1 sprinted with my eyes
closed." His brother and team manager Walter tried to make the face o`
"(the I this ~ thatJ little one" a[ittle bit more human.
(iii) Attributive demNAs can only contain non-restrictive
relative sentences, never restrictive ones, cf. (46):
(46) Gisteren is er in de Antwerpse diamantwijk weer een
man; vermoord. (Deze man, die uorige week
politiebescherming had gevraagd; (?deze man die vorige
week politiebescherming had gevraagdj werd opgewacht
in zijn garage.
Yesterday, a man was killed in the Antwerp diamond district. This
man(,) who had asked (or police protection last week was ahot in his
garage.
(iv) Further evidence for the attribute-character of demNAs
comes from the fact that demNAs are not adequate in
identificational be-sentences such as (47), and that they
cannot occur in identificational appositions, like the one
in (48).
(47) Jan is (de ( ?dezel moordenaar
í0b CHAPI'ER ~
John is (the 1 this) murderer
(48) We brengen als eerste een gedeelte van het dagboek van
Inti Peredo, (de I?deze) man die het guerilla-werk van
Che Gueuara ouernam. (3:0505)
We are the j'crst to bring you a jragment jrom the diary oj Inti Peredo,
(the ) this) man who took over the guerrilla-slruggle jrvm Che Gueuarn.
However, this argument has to be handled with caution
because structurally the NPs concerned are not
anaphoric. It remains remarkable, though, that demNAs
in these positions become much more acceptable when
more than just identificational information is involved, as
in (49), (50) and (51):
(49) Jan is nog altijd die onverbeterlijke leugenaar uan
vroeger.
John is still that hopeless liarhe alwaya was.
(50) Wij brengen u het integrale werk van de onlangs
overleden zanger Roy Orbison, deze onovertroffen meester
uan het melancholische lied.
We present you the complete work ojRoy Orbison, this absolute master oj
melancholy.
(51) Nasser is dood, die bevrijder en vader des vaderlands die
ondanks alles toch 'links' dacht. (3:1502)
Nasser is dead, that liberator and pater patriae who in spite oj
everything had lejt-wing views.
(v) A final indication for the attribute-character of this
demNA-type can be found in example (52) and in the
following variants of (8) and (40):
(52) Nadat in 1970 het non-proliferatieverdrag (ouer de
verspreiding van kernwapens); is ontworpen, hebben 141
landen dit belangrijkste wapenbeheersingsverdrag;
ondertekend. (Knack, 29-8-1990)
Ajter the non-prolijeration treaty (concerning the distribution oj nuclear
weapons) was drawn up in 1970, 141 countrées have signed this most
important arms control Lrealy.
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(8b) When the washing machine; first came on the market,
this most fantastic and reuolutionary aid for the
housewife euer since; was available only to very few.
(40b) Warme Auonden; kan rustig het beginpunt van een nieuw
toneelgenre in Vlaanderen genoemd worden. Het NTG-
stuk; is spetterend. Komt daar nog bij dat dit eerste
vijfrollenstuk dat het NTG ooit op het programma heeft
gezet; helemaal in Belgische handen is.
Warme Avonden can be considered to be the starting point of a new
genre in Flanders. The NTG-play is fabulous. Add to this the jact that
this frst five character ploy that the NTG has ever staged is a Belgian
production.
In an identificational interpretation of these demNAs
there would be a clear reason for predicting
unacceptability, since the demNAs combine a matching
determiner and a unique NP content, caused by the
superlative - a combination which is ruled out, for
example, in Maclaran (1980:809), Lyons 1977 and
Hawkins 1978. In Maclaran's point of view (1980:813) an
example like (40b) must be unacceptable, because the
demNA involved is what she calls semantically specific:
this means that the intrinsic meaning of the demNA is
able to determine one specific referent. Examples such as
(52) and (40b) also prove that not every demNA needs to
be intrinsically ambiguous, as I.ábner claims. He assumes
that the use of a demonstrative in demNAs evokes
alternatives of the same kind (1985:322), an assumption
which cannot be upheld if the NP contains a superlative.
The attribute-character of these demNAs fits in with the MOD-
proposal, in that the demonstrative determiner is a signal to
interpret the lexical content of the NP not in the referential
default, but in the attributing non-default. The question then
arises under what conditions an attributive NP is by default
identifying (and thus appears as a defNA), and under what
conditions an attributing non-default is or can be activated by
means of a demNA. The first question is answered in section
2.3.3.4, where the adequacy of the lexical load of defNAs is
subjected to two pragmatic conditions, the condition of centrality
and the condition of releuance respectively, which are repeated
here. These conditions are applicable to the implicit coherence
relations within the incremented DREF, underlying demNAs.
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The Condition of Centrality as applied to implicit
coherence relations underlying daNAs:
Implicit coherence relations should not be the
specification of central text (segment) intentions.
The Condition of Releuance as applied to implicit
coherence relations underlying daNAs:
Implicit coherence relations should be related in a
relevant way to the intention of the text (segment)
concerned.
In view of the defNA-demNA variation and the MOD-proposal,
these conditions can be interpreted as follows: by default, a
defNA has a simple identify-interpretation when its lexical
content fulfills the two conditions. The effect of a demNA is that
it activates a non-default interpretation. This means that
demNA-replacement can have two effects. In the first place it can
assign a more central place in the text to the NP-information
concerned because of the relaxation of the centrality condition. In
these cases, the demNA increases the prominence of the
information. Note that demNAs of this type remain unacceptable
when in the given text setting the NP-information concerned does
not allow a central position, as is the case in (39a), (41) and (43).
In the second place, it can smuggle less relevant information into
the text, because of the relaxation of the relevance condition (see
also Bosch 1983:150). This is the case for instance in (53), in
which the demonstrative variant is not perfect but at any rate
better than the definite version. The demNA produces a kind of
'aside', the equivalent of a parenthetic sentence:
(53) Anatoli Karpou; has been operated on. One day after the
operation, ((?)This I?the) stamp collector;'s medical
condition is satisfactory.
Furthermore, it goes for all 'informational' demNAs that they are
often represented more elegantly in an explicit form. Although
the demNA is more adequate in (39b) than in (39a), (39b) is
clearly a stylistically less succesful version than (39c) in which
the information concerned is realised explicitly, (for the stilistics
of nominal anaphors see Maes 1988b):
(39a) Gisteren kwam een man, om het leven tijdens
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werkzaamheden aan de Kanaaltunnel. (De ~?deze ~?die)
36jarige man; werd verpletterd door een betonnen
segment van de tunnel.
Yesterday, a man died while working on the Chunnel. (The ~ this ~ that)
36-year-old man was smashed by a concrete segment of the tunnel.
(39b) Gisteren kwam een man; om het leven tijdens werkzaam-
heden aan de Kanaaltunnel. (Deze I?de) 3ó;jarige
uroegere eigenaar uan de gronden die nu uoor de tunnel
z~jn onteigend; werd verpletterd door een betonnen
segment van de tunnel.
Yesterdny, a man died while working on the Chunnel. (This ~ the) 36-
year-old former owner of the grounds which were expropriated for the
Chunnel was srnashed by a concrete segment of the tunnel.
(39c) Gisteren kwam een man; om het leven tijdens werkzaam-
heden aan de Kanaaltunnel. De 36jarige man; werd
verpletterd door een betonnen segment van de tunnel.
Het toeval wil dat de man de vroegere eigenaar was van
de gronden die voor de tunnel werden onteigend.
Yesterday, a man died while working on the Chunnel. The 36-year-old
man was smashed by a concrete segment of the tunnel. The man
happened to be the former owner oj the grounds which were expropriated
for the Chunnel.
In sum, attributive demNAs fit in with the MOD-proposal: the
demonstrative determiner overrules a simple identify-reading of
the NP involved and activates an attributive non-default. This
activation results in a modifcation of the underlying
representation of the referent: the demonstrative is a signal to
complement the DREF with the attributive information contained
in the demonstrative NP.
The attribute-interpretation is predominantly applicable to
nominal anaphors with attributive pre- or postmodifiers, i.e.,
demNAs which contain an informational surplus compared to the
antecedent NP.
110
3.4.4 Contextualising the referent
CHAPTER 3
The most important test for the modificational character of
demonstrative anaphoric NPs and for the MOD-proposal is
constituted by the great many nominal anaphors which are a
literal or partial repetition of their antecedents:
(5) In de Verenigde Staten is gisteren een kliniek geopend
waar waluissen kunnen worden uerpleegd;. (De I deze ~
die) kliniek; is een unicum in de wereld.
Yesterday, a hospital was opened in the United States where whales can
6e treated. fThe ~ this I thatJ hospital is unique in the world.
(6) De wereld is verdeeld in werelddelen;. (De I deze I die)
werelddelen; zijn verdeeld in landen.
The world is divided into continznts. fThe I these ~ thoseJ rnntinents are
divided into countries.
(7) Gisteren is de eerste informatie ouer de ramp met de
PanAm Boeing; vrijgegeven. (De ~ deze ~ die) informatie;
levert nog geen volledig beeld op van (de ~ deze ~ die}
ramp
Yesterday, the frst injormation about the PanAm Bceing disaster was
released. (The ~ this I that) injormation dces not yet give a complete
picture on (the I this ~ that) disaster.
(14) Gewetensbezwaarden beroepen zich vaak op de Wet
Gewetensbezwaren Militaire Dienst;. Volgens (deze I de)
wet; hoeft niemand echt in militaire dienst.
Conscientious objectors ojten appeal to the Conscientious Objectors to
Military Service Act. According to (this ~ thel act nobody can be jorced to
do national service.
(54) In de grote steden neemt de luchtueruuiling; toe. (Die ~
deze ~ de) (lucht)ueruuiling; is het gevolg van wanbeleid.
In the big cities, air pollution is increasing. (This ~ that ~ theJ (air)
pollution is a result oj bad policy.
(55) MEVRA organiseerde vorige week een cursus uoor
professionele zeilers;. (De ~ die I deze) cursus; duurde 5
dagen.
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Last week, MEVRA organised a course jor projessional sailers. (This l
that ~ the) course took 5 days.
At first sight, only 'weak' substitution pairs are involved here: the
replacement of demNAs by defNAs seems to make little
difference. The difference between defNAs and demNAs can be
described intuitively as a suggestion of referential autonomy
connected with the defNA-versions. This suggestion corresponds
to the well-known quality of definite NPs in texts to refer
autonomously to referents i.e., without the intervention of an
antecedent. This is obvious in so-called scenario-related referents,
as in (24) and (25). This autonomy-characteristic can be found in
various forms in the literature on reference. Hawkins 1978 8a
1984 and Corblin 1983 attribute the following characteristic to a
definite NP: it must offer the possibility to make a choice within
a relevant set of objects. A demonstrative NP, on the other hand,
unambiguously indicates that an element doesn't have to be
identified within a set of elements, but that it has to be matched
with one particular element.
In Seuren (1985:31) definite NPs are said to have the possibility
of post hoc or backward suppletion. This is the possibility for a
definite NP to create a new referent, after it has been checked
whether the NP cannot land on the address of another referent.
This - again - means that definite NPs and also defNAs
intrinsically have the quality of autonomous reference.
At first sight a characterisation in terms of referential autonomy
seems naturally applicable to (partially) repeated demNAs and
this characterisation seems to imply a purely identificational
interpretation of the defNA-demNA variation, the demNA being
regarded as a means to eliminate the non-co-referential
interpretation of the defNA-version. However, in these examples,
there are sufficient indications for the applicability of the crucial
elements of the MOD-proposal, i.e., non-default activation and
DREF-modification.
An important condition for the acceptability of (partially)
repeated demNA-cases is - expressed intuitively - that there is a
difference between the intrinsic meaning of the lexical item in
demNAs and their contextual interpretation. The intrinsic lexical
meaning of the NP is the (text-independent) representation
readers have available in their mental lexicon of the items
involved. The context ir.terpretation is the semantic
representation a reader builds up of the referent in the course of
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the text. This difference can be inferred in a text from the
presence of two kinds of contextual information. Firstly, there is
the contextual information linked to the 'antecedent' N, i.e., the
pre- and postmodifiers in the antecedent NPs - as in (5), (7), (14)
and (55). In these cases, demNAs of the type partial repetition are
involved. Secondly there is contextual information not contained
in the antecedent NP, as the italicized part of (54), in which case
demNAs of the type literal repetitions are involved:
(54) In de grote steden neemt de luchtvervuiling toe. (Die I
deze 1 de} (lucht)vervuiling is het gevolg van wanbeleid.
In the big cities, air pollution is increasing. (This ~ that ~ theJ (air)
pollution is a result ojbad policy.
Thus, what is typical of these demNAs is the contextualising
value, which - in terms of the MOD-proposal - can be described as
a difference between the intrinsic meaning of the lexical item in
the demNA and the contextually defined non-default
interpretation of the anaphoric NP, activated by the
demonstrative. This contextualising value is essential for the
adequacy of this type of demNA, as appears from the examples
(54a) and (54b):
(54a) In de grote steden neemt de luchtueruuiling; toe. (?Deze I
de) toenemende luchtuervuiling in de grote steden; is het
gevolg van wanbeleid.
In the big cities, air pollutèon is increasing. (This ( theJ increasing (air)
pollution in the big cities is a result oj bad policy.
(54b) ~title: De luchtvervuiling~
In de grote steden neemt (de I?deze) luchtvervuiling; toe.
~title: Air pollution~
In the big cities, (the ~ this) airpollution is increasing.
In (54a) the anaphoric NP contains the contextual information
contained in the proposition of the antecedent sentence. In this
example there is no difference between the intrinsic meaning and
the contextual interpretation of the demonstrative NP since the
lexical content of the demonstrative NP contains all the
ingredients the DREF concerned contains in the representation.
Thus, the demonstrative cannot signal a contextual modification
of the underlying DREF. Hence the demonstrative version is
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unacceptable.
In (54b) the demonstrative version is un~~ceptable as well. This
is partially due to the fact that demNAs are always difficult to
link to text titles. Still, the demNA in (54b) in my opinion is less
acceptable than in (54c):
(54c) ~title: De luchtuervuiling in de grote steden~
(?) Deze luchtuervuiling; is de laatste tijd een belangrijk
aandachtspunt van de Vlaamse overheid.
~title: Air pollution in the óig cities~
This air pollution is an important issue jor the Flemish gooernment
these days.
The reason for the absolute unacceptability of (54b) is that the
demNA there accesses a DR.EF which at that point of the text
does not allow contextual modification yet, as the context has not
yet provided any information about the referent. Therefore the
effect of contextualisation cannot occur.
The difference between intrinsic meaning and context
interpretation is a necessary condition for the acceptability of this
type of demNA, but it is not a sufficient one. This is evident from
an example like (54d):
(54d) In de grote steden neemt de luchtveruuiling; toe. Die
luchtuervuiling; is het gevolg van gemeentelijk wanbeleid.
?Die luchtveruuiling; vereist dringende maatregelen.
??Die luchtueruuiling; ...
In the big cities, air pollution is increasing. This air pollution is a result
o( óad policy. This air pollution calls jor urgent measurea. This air
pollution ...
In each of the successive sentences contextual information on air
pollution is given. The contextualising function of demNAs, as we
have described it so far, would predict that in each of these
successive sentences the demonstrative could have a
contextualising effect. In (54d) gradually more contextual
information is given on air pollution which leads to a gradual
extension of the distance between the intrinsic semantic meaning
of the lexical items concerned (air pollution) and the context
interpretation as is represented in the underlying DREF.
Evidently the prediction is not confirmed, however. As (54d)
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progresses, the demonstrative becomes less acceptable.
~HA!'7'ER :i
An explanation for this phenomenon can be found in the fact that
in the preceding examples only one specific type of information is
contextualised, i.e., the information that is necessary for a
satisfactory identification of the referent in the given text setting.
Mostly this is antecedent-NP information, but it can also be other
context information, such as the locative PP in (54). And in all
these cases the contextualising value of the demNA coincides
with the installation of a referent as highest focal element or
topic in the text. This is evident from the following empirical
characteristics of these demNAs.
(i) They turn out to occur preferably in post-first-rnention
position, i.e., the second time the referent is mentioned in
the discourse, as is apparent in my own demNA-data (see
chapter 4).9
(ii) They are preferably used with so-called non-animate
referents. Such referents - in contrast to proper nouns for
instance - are harder to conceptualise and install as a
referent in one referential expression. With animate
referents a contextualising demNA is only adequate after
an indefinite first mention, as appears from (56) and (57):
( 56) Yesterday, I saw a man; at the station. (That ~ this ~
the) man; looked ill.
(57) De paus; heeft gisteren drie bisschoppen onslagen. ?Deze
paus; (i.e., de gisteren drie bisschoppen ontslagen
hebbende paus) heeft dat vanochtend in een
perscommiqué meegedeeld.
Yesterday, the pope dismissed three bishops. Thia pope (i.e., the
'yesterday three bishops dismissed having' pope) announced this this
morning in a press release.
The inadequacy of the contextualising reading of the
demNA in (57) results from the fact that the contextual
information in the antecedent sentence does not form
part of relevant identificational information concerning
the referent.
These descriptive features indicate that the contextualising value
in these cases serves the installation of a referent, which often
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may be hard to conceptualise, as highest focal referent.'o This
does not imply, however, that contextualisation and referent
installation are identical or that they necessarily coincide. For a
clear distinction between them, an indication can be found in the
demNA-occurrences in which contextualisation does not co-occur
with referent installation. Examples are (58), (59), (60) and (61):
(58) PSV; is de laatste weken in zeer slechte doen. (PSV, ~ Dit
PSV; (i.e., het PSV-in-slechte-doen~) is voor KV.Mechelen
dan ook geen partij.
PSV has been playing uery badly these last jew weeks. As a result (PSV
I this PSV (i.e., the PSV playing badly)) is no match jor KV.Mechelen.
(59) Ronald Reagan; heeft duidelijk last van
geheugenstoornis. (Reagan; ~ Deze Reagan; (i.e., de
Reagan-met-geheugenstoornis;J) zou geen belangrijke
beslissingen meer mogen nemen.
Ronald Reagan is clearly sujjering jrom memory disturbance. (Reagan ~
this Reagan (i.e., the Iieagan sujjering jrom memory disturbance))
should no longer be allowed to take important decisions.
(60) De WD; is vorige week zwaar uit de bocht gegaan. Als
lid vraag ik me op zo'n moment af of ik wel goed zit bij
die VVD;.
Last week, the WD put their jooi in it. As a member oj this party I ask
myseljat moments like that whether that VVD really is my party.
(61) De trainer van Anderlecht; heeft geen verstand van
voetbaltechniek. De spelers van Anderlecht~ hebben
nauwelijks conditie. Het is onwaarschijnlijk dat (deze ~
die) traineri met (deze I die) spelers; in de eerste klasse
overeind kan blijven.
The coach ojAnderlecht doesn't know anything about the technical side
ojjootball. The Anderlecht players are in bad shape. It is unlikely that
Ithis ~ thatl carch with (this ~ that) team will be able to remain in the
frst league.
In all these demNA-cases the contextualising MOD-interpretation
is forced: the only reading applicable here is the one in which the
demNA refers to the referent as it is presented in the preceding
context, and not in its default interpretation. In the examples
(58), (59) and (60) the anaphor is a repetition of a proper noun,
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i.e., a referential type, which guarantees referential autonomy
and unique identification, and which does not allow any
demonstrative determiners (and no definite ones either). Still, the
demonstrative version is acceptable, at least in its contextualising
interpretation.
Moreover, the anaphoric NPs in these examples do not
necessarily have to be in post-first-mention position. The
examples can be preceded by many sentences in which NPs
access the same referent, without the contextualising effect
disappearing. Furthermore, (61) shows that the demNA can
contextualise different referents in a sentence, exactly because
the installation of the highest focal referent is not at issue here.
With this characterisation of contextualising demNAs Corblin's
paradoxe de la reprise immédiate (see section 3.3.2), expressed in
(15) and (16), disappears.
(15) Tu verras un gar~on et une fille. Tu dois donner une
poupée à la (?cette) fille et une voiture au (?à ce) gargon.
(Corblin 1983:125)
You are going to see a boy and a girl. You have to give a doll to the
(this~that)girl aruta carto the (thislthat) boy.
(16) Une femme entra dans la pièce. J'avais vu cette (?la)
femme chez un ami. (1983:125)
In the play a woman came on. I had seen this I that (the) woman at a
Friend'splace.
Both cases have to be situated in the context of referent
introduction, given the indefinite first mention (cf. also Corblin
1983:131). The demNA in (16) fits in perfectly with the
contextualising interpretation of demNAs. The contextual
interpretation la femme-qui-entra-dans-la-pièce lies at the basis of
the demNA. This contextualising value serves the installation of
this discourse referent. Such an interpretation is not possible in
(15). Firstly, two referents are involved here and they cannot
possibly both be installed as highest focal referent. Besides, other
referents than these two are potential candidates for highest focal
referent, i.e., DOLL, CAR. Furthermore, contextualisation
without referent installation, as in (61), is not under discussion in
this context, given the indefinite first mentions. Hence the
demonstrative version of (15) is inadequate.
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The examples (58), (59) and (60) show that the default
interpretation of a particular anaphoric NP need not necessarily
be determined by the intrinsic meaning ~f the noun, as is the
case in the other examples in this section, but can also be
imposed by the type of referential expression (in this case the
proper name character) of the anaphoric NP.
Other examples illustrate that the default interpretation of an
NP can be based upon the interpretation an NP has in nearly all
text settings - as in the examples (62) and (14) - or upon the
interpretation a noun has in a certain scenario - as in (63):
(62) Het dochter~je van Jan, het zonnetje in zijn leven;, is
overleden. (Dit I?het) zonnetje; scheen van 's ochtends tot
's avonds.
John's daughter, the sun ojhis [ife, has died. (This ~ the) sun shone all
day.
(14) Gewetensbezwaarden beroepen zich vaak op de Wet
Gewetensbezwaren Militaire Dienst;. Volgens (deze I?de)
wet; hoeft niemand echt in militaire dienst.
Conscientious objectors o(ten appeal to ihe Conscientious Objectors to
Military Seruice Act. According to fthis ~ theJ act nobody can be (orced to
do nntional seruice.
( 63) Maria was verliefd geworden op een dokter;. (Deze ~?de)
dokter (van Maria), was een charmante man. (For a
similar example, see Corblin 1987:153)
Mary had fnllen in loue with a doctor. ~This ~ the) doctor was a
charming man.
Here, the contextualising effect can be described as the activation
of a context specific interpretation in contrast to the default role
these NPs play in the large majority of contexts.
In summary, contextualising demNAs activate a non-default
interpretation of the anaphoric NP: the demonstrative is a signal
not to assign a default interpretation to the anaphoric NP (based
on intrinsic semantic meaning of the noun, referential type or
default context interpretation) but to activate a non-default
interpretation provided by certain contextual information in the
antecedent-sentence.
í 1 ts c;HAPTER ~i
As in the previous demNA-types, the non-default activation also
causes a semantic modification of the referent representation.
The demonstrative explicitly induces the assimilation of certain
representational information of the discourse representation of
the antecedent sentence into the DREF underlying the demNA,
i.e., it induces a contexualising modification of the underlying
DREF. The effect of the demNA in (54), for example, is as follows:
the representational information IN THE BIG CITIES in the
discourse representation of the antecedent sentence is explicitly
linked to the DREF underlying the demNA, i.e., AIR
POLLUTION, as identificationally relevant information, and thus
modifies the representation of the referent. Congruent with the
other demNA-types, this modification is looked upon as an
implicit coherence relation within the DREF, underlying the
demNA, yielding the following for (54):
(54) In de grote steden neemt de luchtvervuiling; toe. (Die ~
deze I de) (lucht)vervuiling; is het gevolg van wanbeleid.
In the óig cities, air pollution is increasing. (This ~ that ~ the) (airl
pollution is a resu[t o~bad policy.
(54e) defNA-representation
AIR POLLUTION" ~--- AIR POLLUTION"
(identify)
(the air pollution is the air pollution in question)
(54fl demNA-representation
AIR POLLUTION" ~--- AIR POLLUTION IN THE
BIG CITIES"
(contextualise)
(the air pollution is the air pollution in the big cities just
mentioned)
For an example like (6) the contextualise-modification means that
representational information included in the DREF WORLD in
the representation of sentence 1, is included as identificationally
relevant information in the DREF CONTINENTS in the
representation of sentence 2:
(6) De wereld is verdeeld in werelddelen;. (Deze I die)
werelddelen (waarin de wereld is verdeeld), zijn verdeeld
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in landen.
The world is divided into continents. IThesc ! thosel continents (in which
the world is divided) are divided into countries.
3.4.5 Evaluating the referent
The three preceding demNA-types find their stereotypical form in
three formal-lexical classes of nominal anaphors, i.e.,
superordinate NAs (section 3.4.2), attributive alternative NAs
(section 3.4.3) and (partial-)repetition NAs (section 3.4.4). Apart
from that, demNA-substitution can also signal an evaluation of
the referent concerned. Such an evaluation can be illustrated in
(10):
(10) Bush; heeft besloten om de taxes dan toch te verhogen.
(De I deze I die) president; denkt daarmee het
Amerikaanse volk te redden.
Bush has decided to raise taxes after all. (The ~ this I that) president
thinks he can save the American people that way.
The normal interpretation of the defNA-variant is the simple
identify-relation. The demonstrative version causes a classify-
interpretation. Moreover, the demonstrative can lead to an
evaluation of the referent, as can be seen in the following explicit
version:
(l0a) Bush; heeft besloten om de taxes dan toch te verhogen.
(Deze I die) zogenaamde 'president; denkt daarmee het
Amerikaanse volk te redden.
Bush has decided to raise ta~s a(ter all. (This ~ thatJ so-called president
thinks he can save the American people that way.









BUSH" ~--- NOT A PRESIDENT"
(classify --~ evaluate)
(Bush is the 'so-called' president; Bush doesn't deserue to
be rated among the presidents. )
A similar effect can be found in (64), as is shown in the difference
between defNA-representation (64a) and demNA-representation
(64b):
(64) ~Pamflet Liberale parttj (PW) Zandhoven~
Het hoofdthema van het CVP-programma bij de
afgelopen verkiezingen was de sanering van de
gemeentefinanciën;. (Deze I de) sanering; heeft dit jaar
een meerschuld opgeleverd van 45 miljoen. Bedankt CVP.
~Pamphlet liberal party (PV~ Zandhouen~
The main theme o`the CVP-programme (i.e., the oatholic party (AM.)J in
the la.st elections was the reorganisation o( the village Fcnances. (This ~
the) reorganisation has saddled us ruith a debt o( 45 million this year.
Thank you CVP!
(64a) defNA-representation
REORG. VILL. FIN." ~-- REORGANISATION"
(identify)
(the reorganisation is the reorganisation of the village
finances. )
(64b) demNA-representation
REORG. VILL. FIN." ~--- NOT A REORG."
(contextualise --~ evaluate)
(the reorganisation is the so-called reorganisation, i.e., no
reorganisation at all. )
The demonstratives in these examples effect a negative
evaluation of the referent by the activation of a non-default
interpretation, based on the negation of the lexical items used to
access the referent (this is not a president ~ reorganisation).
Two context conditions are necessary for an eualuate-reading."
Firstly, as with the other demNA-types, the default reading of the
definite NP has to be the simple co-referential identify-reading.
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Secondly, there has to be some kind of conformity between
semantic features of the anaphoric NP and descriptive features of
the referent. It concerns here character;~tics such as animate,
human, male and other relations such as the classify-relation
underlying the conformity between Bush and president in (10).
Evidence for the significance of the second condition can be found
in the behaviour of the class of epithets, which are typically
characterised by their evaluative value (cf: e.g. Seuren 1985:348;
Bosch 1983:149; Bolinger 1977:51-52; Droste 1977:182).
Although the intuítions are not always clear, evaluative epithets
are more likely to be accompanied by a definite than by a
demonstrative determiner, as is shown in (65).
(65) When Jones; returned they ignored (the I ?this) (idiot; I
bastard; ~ old goat, I pig~.
This does not mean that demNAs are absolutely unacceptable in
these cases; it does mean, however, that demNAs are relatively
less acceptable than defNAs, and at any rate that the
demonstrative is not as necessary as an evaluative device as in
cases like (10) and (64). This judgment is congruent with the fact
that not only demonstrative epithets, but also accented epithets
are unacceptable, as is shown by the accented counterpart of (65),
given in Bosch (1988:213):
(65) When Jones; returned they ignored ?(HIM; ~ the IDiot; ~
the BAStard, ~ the old GOAT; ~ the PIG;I. [the capitalised
syllables are accentuated (A.M.)]
This relative unacceptability of epithetic demNAs can be
explained as follows. The lexical content of epithets has two
characteristics: firstly, the features of the lexical items concerned
are not congruent with descriptive features of the referent. For
instance, the writer of (65) does not want to identify Jones with
the semantic features of old goat (cf. also Bosch 1988:215). That
is why the lexica] content of the anaphoric NPs does not allow a
simple co-referential link with the antecedent NP. Secondly, the
lexical items belong to a text-independent class of semi-
stereotypical lexical items with evaluative value with respect to
human referents.
Both characteristics of epithetic NPs provide a default
interpretation which is already evaluative in itself. This means
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that there is no more need for a demonstrative to trigger an
evaluate-interpretation.
Semantic conformity and simple identify-default are essential but
by no means sufficient as conditions for the use of evaluative
demNAs. Whether a demonstrative nominal anaphor has
evaluative value in a certain context not only depends on this
kind of textual factors, but also on the attitudes underlying a text,
which are rather hard to formalise in the representation. They
determine what lexicalisations of referents in what texts can be
introduced as simple or as evaluative anaphors. I try to make
this clear by means of (66):
(66a) ~Press release of the human rights committee Nicaragua~
De Nicaraguaanse contra's; hebben aangekondigd dat zij
een wapenstilstand van twee maanden in acht zullen
nemen. (Deze I?de) vr~jheidsstrijders; zullen daarna
echter doorgaan met de strijd.
(66b) ~Press release of the contra leaders~
De Nicaraguaanse contra's; hebben aangekondigd dat zij
een wapenstilstand van twee maanden in acht zullen
nemen. (De ) deze) urijheidsstr~jders; zullen daarna
echter doorgaan met de strijd.
(66c) ~article in a newspaper~
De Nicaraguaanse contra's; hebben aangekondigd dat zij
een wapenstilstand van twee maanden in acht zullen te
nemen. (Deze ( de) urijheidsstr~jders; zullen daarna
echter doorgaan met de strijd.
The Nicaraguan contra rebels have announced that they will observe a
suspension o~ hostilities (or a period o( two months. After this, however,
Ithese I the) (reedom fghters will continue their atruggle.
Given the source of (66a), the definite version, which implies a
simple identify-relation (i.e., the Nicaraguan contra rebels are the
freedom ftghters in question) is unlikely. In (66a), the
demonstrative version is selfevident, implying a negative
evaluative modification of the referent concerned (the Nicaraguan
contra rebels are 'so-called' freedom f'tghters, i.e., no freedom
fighters at all). The demonstrative is a signal of the writer that
he does not commit himself to the given qualification.
In (66b) - given the source again - a simple identify-interpretation
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yields a natural interpretation, hence the acceptability of the
defNA. DemNA-substitution is also acceptable, but its value then
has to be found in its attributive func~ion, (we present the
Nicaraguan contra rebels as freedom fighters), or it implies a
positive evaluation (the Nicaraguan contra rebels are real freedom
fighters).
In a newspaper article, subsequently, both variants would be
possible. If a newspaper opts for a demNA, this could be
congruent with its progressive tendency (the Nicaraguan contra
rebels are 'so-called' freedom fighters, i.e., no freedom fighters at
all). In a so-called 'quality paper' which prefers a neutral position
on this subject, a demNA can present a neutral position taken up
by some other party (in the press release I in certain circles... the
Nicaraguan contra rebels are looked upon as freedom fighters).
So far, no complete description of the relationship between the
defNA-demNA variation and evaluation has been given.12 The
only thing that has been discussed is that the evaluative demNAs
in the examples above fit in with the basic mechanism of the
MOD-proposal, in that the representational effect of these
demNAs is congruent with the other demNA-types. As I will
demonstrate in the following chapter, this semantically defined
evaluate-modification, empirically based on the defNA-demNA
variation, has to be distinguished from pragmatic evaluative
effects, empirically based on the dezeNP-dieNP variation.
Although the evaluate-demNAs include non-default interpretation
and DREF-modification, they are subordinated to the other
demNA-types in that the evaluate-relation necessarily implies one
of the other three coherence relations, as is shown in the
representations of (10) and (64).
So, in the processing of the demNA in an example like (10), it is
reasonable to assume a roundabout via the self-evident classify-
reading of the NP. The eualuate-reading can be said to 'come on
top' of the classifying interpretation. The same relation can be
seen between the attribute- and evaluate-reading in (8) and the
contextualise- and eualuate-reading in (64)
The intuitions concerning the subordinate character of these
evaluate-demNAs provide good reasons for assuming the following
system of the semantic processing of demNAs (see further chapter
6).
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Figure (1): The relational hierarchy in the semantic
processing of demNAs
~ classify -~ evaluate
identify ~ attribute ~ evaluate
-~ contextualise -~ eualuate
3.5 Conclusion
3.5.1 MOD and the processing of demNAs
In the preceding sections, I have proposed one interpretative
mechanism for demNAs in written texts: demNAs activate a non-
default interpretation of the NP concerned and thus modify the
underlying DREF. Demonstratives induce the reactivation of a
referent in a representation format which differs from the DREF
in preceding discourse representations. I have distinguished four
modificational types of demNAs, i.e., classify (section 3.4.2),
attribute (section 3.4.3), contextualise (section 3.4.4) and evaluate
(section 3.4.5).
In order to account for the MOD-Proposal in general and for the
four modificational types in particular, we discovered the
essential contextual clues and the use conditions of demonstrative
anaphoric NPs in written discourse. These clues and conditions
enable us to formulate a number of plausible heuristics which
play a role in the processing of demNAs. The empirical evidence
in this chapter strongly suggests the following processing
heuristics of demNAs:
(i) While processing a dem1VA, the reader by default assumes
that the underlying referent is highly accessible.
This heuristic is in accordance with the analysis in this (and the
following) chapter, in which the referents accessed by demNAs
are always in explicit focus or - in the case of contextualising
post-first-mention demNAs - install the referent in explicit focus.
This does not imply that demNAs will never occur in discourse
contexts in which selection or search is under discussion. This
does mean, however, that the genuine function of demNAs does
not consist in searching or selecting.
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(ii) While processing a demNA, the reader considers the
demNA to be the non-default variant of the corresponding
defNA-uersion.
- While processing a defNA, the reader by default assigns
an identify-reading.
- While processing a demNA, the reader by default
assigns more than just an identify-reading.
The availability of the defNA-demNA variation has been the
major factor determining demNA-interpretations in the previous
sections. It implies both a strong resemblance and a clear
distinction between defNA- and demNA-processing. The
processing of both defNAs and demNAs always implies an
incremented DREF with a same number as a referent in a
previous discourse representation. DREFs underlying both
defNAs and demNAs contain implicit coherence relations
expressing the contribution of the anaphors in the development of
discourse. The difference between the processing of defNAs and
demNAs has to be interpreted as a difference in default and non-
default or potential coherence relations: by default, defNAs favour
a simple identify-reading, demNAs favour the processing of other
coherence relations underlying NAs.
This means that with the processing of defNAs the lexical content
concerned is available in a different way than with the processing
of demNAs. If a reader, for example, wants to be able to put a
classify-interpretation at the basis of a demNA, then he has to
activate the category concerned. Such an activation is not
necessary in processing the defNA-version.
(iii) In determining the modif'l.cational type of a demNA, the
reader depends on the formal-lexical relationship between
antecedent and anaphoric NP as an initial and crucial
trigger.
The lexical relationship provides the reader with the information
given in figure (2):
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Figure (2): Formal-lexical triggers in processing demNAs
superordinate demNA -~ classify-inferencing
attributive demNA ~ attribute-inferencing
(lit.) repeated demNA ~ contextualise-inferencing
Although it is clearly stated that the MOD-Proposal does not
predict a one-to-one relationship between modificational, i.e.,
contextual types of demNAs and lexical, i.e., text-independent
types of nominal anaphors, the lexical type of the antecedent-
anaphor relation cannot be but an important initial trigger in the
processing of demNAs. The fact is that the information about the
relationship between antecedent and demNA is always available
while processing a demNA and that the given correspondence of
lexical and modificational types mostly comes out.
(iv) Other contextual clues can add supplementary eualuate-
inferences to the classify-, attribute- and contextualise-
inferences.
This processing heuristic states that evaluate-inferences are
based on one of the three other modificational types. This,
however, dces not necessarily mean that, while processing,
evaluate-inferences come after the other inferences in real
processing time.
So far, the processing heuristics can be pictured as in figure (3).
In view of the results in the next chapter, these processing
heuristics will be repeated and complemented in the concluding
chapter.
Figure (3): Processing hierarchy of NAs
defNA dem1VA
superordinate demNA classify eualuate
identify attrib. mod. demNA attribute evaluate
(lit.) repeated demNA contextualise evaluate
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3.5.2 MOD and the theory of markedness
The given demNA-interpretation can h~ considered as an
instantiation of the interpretation of demNAs as marked
referential expressions. Not only is the MOD-interpretation
problematic for all exclusively identifcational interpretations of
referential expressions, it is also problematic for all theories of
markedness which regard markedness exclusively as functioning
for the identification of referents. In process-oriented discourse
representation theories marked referential expressions are seen
as identificational devices used to search or select referents which
are identificationally problematic. A plausible way in which
marked referential expressions fulfill their search function can be
found in the Descriptiue Content Hypothesis of Bosch 1988.
Wheneuer the interpretation of a definite referentia!
expression requires search or selection, i.e., when there
is currently no unique prominent referent, then
markedness of the referential expression indicates that
the descriptive content of the expression is used literally
as a criterion for determining the intended referent.
(Bosch 1988:214)
Applied to the descriptive content of pronouns, this hypothesis
claims that "wheneuer search or selection of referents is at issue,
the gender of marked pronouns is descriptive of their referents,
whereas the same is not necessarily true of unmarked pronouns"
(Bosch 1988:218), a claim that becomes acceptable in the light of
examples such as (67):
(67) Das M~dchen kam noch einmal zuruck. {Sie l es I SIE ~
~`ES) hatte den R.egenschirm vergessen. (Bosch 1988:217)
The girl came back again. She had jorgotten the umbrella.
Thus, marked pronouns 'search' and identify by means of object
properties of referents (such as gender). This notion is linked to a
hypothesis on the format of the representations to which marked
vs. unmarked referential devices give access. That is the so-called
Form-of-R.epresentation hypothesis, part of which is given here:
Representations that are typically accessed by marked
referential deuices either do not contain linguistic
expressions for the referents represented, or at least are
not indexed - and hence cannot naturally be accessed -
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according to formal properties of such expressions, but
only according to a classification of the objects
represented. (Bosch 1988:219)
Bosch, however, recognises that marked pronouns not only imply
the search or the selection of a referent, an idea which becomes
highly relevant in the light of our MOD-proposal. His crucial
example is (68):
(68) Fred can't complain. It's HE who was late. (Bosch
1988:224)
Marked pronouns like in (68) annihilate any view in which search
or selection is a necessary and satisfactory condition for the
occurrence of marked referential expressions. According to Bosch,
this is indeed a satisfactory condition, but not a necessary one:
Although deuiation from referential continuity implies
markedness, the conuerse is not true. (1988:213-214)
Bosch's explanation of marked pronouns which does not imply
search or selection is the following:
An identificatory construction [as in (68) (AM)]
excludes search or selection and thus, despite the
markedness of its referential expression, does not make
use of the descriptiue content of that expression. Bosch
1988:227)
So, according to Bosch, the descriptive content hypothesis is not
applicable to marked cases like these. However, Bosch puts cases
like (68) in line with the identificational function of marked
referential expressions: at the basis of the marked pronoun in
(68) - as in all other marked referential expressions - lies a
contrast with possible alternatives, in this case with any
potential competitors in implicit focus, i.e., type b from the
following list:
a. Marked reference to óne of seueral objects in explicit
focus' contrasts the intended referent to its actual
competitors in explicit focus
b. Marked reference to á unique referent in explicit
focus' contrasts the intended referent to ány'
potential competitors, that is, to anything in implicit
focus.
c. Marked reference to án object in implicit focus'
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contrasts the intended referent to a more expectable
and currently more prominent referent in explicit
focus. (Bosch 1988:227)
The question is whether or not this characterisation of marked
pronouns, not implying search or selection, can be applied to
demNAs, for which I defended a basic function including both
markedness and the absence of search and selection. There are
striking parallels between Bosch's interpretation of marked
pronouns and my interpretation of demNAs. Let us compare the
interpretation of HE in (68) with the interpretation of demNAs in
my examples (11), (12) and (54):
(68) Fred can't complain. It's HE who was late. (Bosch
1988:224)
(11) Bush; heeft besloten om de taxes dan toch te verhogen.
Het is de eerste keer dat (de I dezel president; een
verhoging aandurft.
Bush has decided to raise tazes after all. It is the hrst time (the ~ thisJ
president has dared to do so.
(12) De Londense Times maakt vanochtend stukken bekend
uit het overheidsrapport over de salmonella-besmetting
uan de Britse eieren;. (Het ~ dit) vertrouwelijke rapport; ...
This morning, the London Times publishes extracts jrom the gouernment
report on the salmonella injection in British eggs. (The 1 thisl
confdential report ...
(54) In de grote steden neemt de luchtveruuiling; toe. (Die ~
deze I del (lucht)vervuiling; is het gevolg van wanbeleid.
In the big cities, air pollution is increasing. lThis ~ that ~ theJ (air)
pollution is a result oj bad policy.
In all cases the referent can be said to be contrasted to a set of
potential competitors. In (68), this set most plausibly includes all
referents that could have been too late. In the other examples the
set is constituted by all relevant presidents (most plausibly the
set of presidents of the US), the set of all confidential reports and
the set of events or situations which can be indicated by air
pollution. In none of the cases, the activation of the descriptive
content of this set is required in order to identify the intended
I ~iU CHAPTER 3
referent.
As was said, the Descriptive Content Hypothesis does not claim
that markedness is always used to search or select the referent
(Bosch 1988:213-214). But neither does the DC-hypothesis
prohibit that markedness of referential expressions may fulfill
other functions (1988:225}. The DC-hypothesis is not even in
conflict with the fact that the descriptive content of marked
referential expressions can be regarded as performing other
markedness-functions than the search and selection function. As
such, the interpretation of the markedness of demNAs ín terms of
the modification of DREFs can be seen as an implementation and
a corroboration of Bosch's DC-hypothesis and - more generally - of
a theory of markedness which does not hinge ultimately on the
identificational function of marked referential expressions.
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Notes to chapter 3
1. Strictly speaking, literally repeated demNAs can hardly be
found in discourse, since the large majority of demNAs
repeating their antecedent literally differ from their antecedent
at least in that they have a demonstrative determiner.
Although the analysis of demNAs will be mainly restricted in
the first place to anaphoric demonstrative NPs with NP-
antecedent (demNAs), other demonstrative nominal NPs
(demNPs) are paid some attention to as well.
NPs with the determiners zo'n, zulke, dergelijke 'similar', as in
(a), are not taken into consideration:
(a) Carlo de Benedetti heeft zich een weg gebaand in de
Belgische zakenwereld. fDergelijke ~ zulkeJ
industriëlen zullen we met het oog op 1992 vaker op
bezoek krijgen.
Carlo de Benedetti has pushed his way into the Belgian
business community. Industrialists like him will be visiting
us more often wilh 1992 coming up.
2. In a sample of 154 demNAs with NP-antecedent (from corpora
1, 2 8L 4), the replacement of the demonstrative by the definite
determiner results in referential ambiguity or obscurity in only
18 cases (12qfo). Of course, this proportion of incoherence would
be higher if non-anaphoric demonstrative NPs or demNAs with
sentential antecedents had been taken into account. A lot of
these demonstrative NPs do not tolerate defNA-replacement.
This is especially clear in examples which have to be regarded
almost as fixed expressions, as in die zin dat .. 'in that sense
that', in dat ~dit opzicht 'in thatlthis respect' , op die manier
'that way'.
3. In one example, though, Cornish 1986b mentiona the defNA-
demNA variation:
(a) "We do not undertake repairs without dry-cleaning
the (itthis~that -FC) garment" (notice in a Dry
Cleaning shop) (Cornish 1986b:157)
With this example Cornish illustrates the fact that the
markedness of anaphoric expressions is determined by the
accessibility of the discourse referent involved. The anaphor the
garment accesses to the slot of the frame dry cleaning. Cornish
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argues that in this case they or it would be referentially
insufficient, and he suggests - although he does not state it
explicitly - that the demNA-variant would be too strong a
referential device in this case.
The tendency of this explanation is clear: the deictic force of
demNAs is used when a defNA is referentially insuf'ficient.
However, the explanation is not valid, since the impossibility of
the demNA-variant is due to the simple fact that the underlying
referent has not yet been mentioned in previous discourse
representationa: scenario-related entities cannot be realised in
demNA-format, a fact which was already noted and explained
by Hawkins 1978.
4. It should be noted here that in these kinds of examples the
proximate-distal dichotomy of demonstratives does not bring
about an adequate contrast either (see for a further analysis of
the contrast function of demNAs section 4.2.2.1).
5. The difference between types of form and types of use is
comparable with the difference between lexical and contextual
classes, as is pointed out in section 1.4.
6. If the demonstrative version in this sentence is acceptable, then
the demNA is not the variant of a defNA, but of an indefinite
NP. In that case this u,aiter is not meant to denote a particular
waiter, but a member of the class of waiters, who are known to
be functioning in restaurants (see Prince 1981a and Maclaran
1980 for the analysis of indefinite this). In Dutch this functional
value can be effected by zo'n (literally 'such a', idiomatically
'this'), as in (a):
(a) Toen we daar aankwamen, kwam daar zo'n kelner
naar ons toegestapt.
When we arrived, this waiter came up to us.
7. In my own demNA-data, about 75qo of the demNAs find their
antecedent in the same or in the previous sentence, as is noted
in section 4.2.1.1.
8. Of course, those acrobats and those boys could refer to a
particular group too, if such a group were activated in the
contextinvolved.
9. This demNA-characteristic is mentioned in Corblin (1983:125)
too:
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Dans une chaïne de coréférence, 'ce N' occupera très
souuent la seconde place.
In the chain of co-reference, 'this~that N'often occupies the
second place.
10. A restriction on the use of contextualising demNAs is that the
anaphoric noun should have cue ualidity (Rosch 1977:29)
regarding the category which is described in the antecedent, or
that it should represent a classificatory criterion of the
antecedent, which is not the case in the following examples:
(a) The United Nations; took a decision about the debts of
the third world~. f?These ~?thoseJ Nations; did that
without consulting (?that ~ ?thisJ world~
(b) Een waluis; is gisteren aangespoeld in Oostende. ?Deze
vis; bleek te zijn verdwaald.
Yesterday, a whale was washed nshore at Ostend. This j'esh
appenred to 6e lost.
11. Note that we are only interested in evaluating interpretations
in written language, in which the arsenal of evaluative devices
is more restricted, as a result of Lhe absence of stress and
gestures for example.
12. Neither has it been claimed that demNA-substitution is the
only linguistic means to signal evaluation of discourse referents.
It is not even the only anaphoric device which can be used for
evaluative purposes. In Maes 1987 I show how cataphors can be
used to get a certain perspective on discourse referents.
Chapter 4
Deze ~ dit- and die ~ dat-
demonstrative NPs
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 DezeNPs and dieNPs in Dutch
Demonstrative nominal NPs in Dutch can be divided into two
classes, i.e., NPs with deze or dit as demonstrative determiner
(henceforth dezeNPs) and NPs with die or dat as demonstrative
determiner (henceforth dieNPs). The variation of demonstrative
determiners within each class is the result of superficial
congruence rules of gender and number: deze and die cover all
plural nouns and singular masculine and feminine nouns. Dit and
dat cover singular neuter nouns. The difference between the two
classes has been accounted for in various proposals in terms of
anaphoric distance (o.a. Pinkal 1986, Ariel 1988, Lichtenberk
1988, Halliday 8z Hasan 1976 and many others), focal value
(Sidner 1983; Kryk 1987) or deictic force (Kirsner 1979).
Within the scope of this study, there are two reasons for a further
investigation of the variation between dezeNPs and dieNPs
(henceforth the DD-variation).
(i) In the literature, various proposals can be found to
account for the difference between the two classes of
demonstrative NPs. They include contradictory
predictions about the function and the use of these,
which means that the proposals cannot all be empirically
adequate at once. In this chapter an evaluation will be
given of these proposals.
(ii) The analysis of the difference between defNAs and
demNAs in chapter 3 led to a clear claim regarding the
functioning of demNAs in written discourse: the function
of demNAs has been described in terms of semantic
modifications of discourse referents. At this semantic
level of language description it is assumed that there is
la6 CHAPTER 4
no difference between the two subclasses of
demonstrative NPs. This means that the DD-variation is
not considered to be a decisive element either in
determining the modificational character of demNAs as
such, or in determining the semantic type of the
modification (attribute, classify, contextualise, evaluate).
Thus far, this implies only a negative characterisation of the DD-
variation. In this chapter then, a positive characterisation of the
DD-variation is proposed which is congruent with the semantic
function of demNAs proposed in chapter 3. In contrast to the
semantic nature of demNAs, differences between deze~dit- and
dieldat-NPs will be described in pragmatic terms, all concerning
the relation between the discourse referent involved and
coordination points of referential domains evoked in the
discourse.
In accordance with chapter 3, the proposal focusses mainly on
anaphoric demonstrative NPs in written discourse (indicated as
demNAs, dezeNAs and dieNAs). However, many arguments are
applicable to all uses of demonstrative NPs. In those cases, the
terms demNPs, dezeNPs and dieNPs will be used.
4.1.2 Corpus and method
In this chapter, both the evaluation of existing proposals and my
own proposal are based on a corpus of written texts, consisting of
the following parts:
COR 1-2 a compilation of 18 informativelinstructive leaflets
number of words 28.424
number of demonstrative NPs 222
COR 3 excerpts from political journals, coming from subcorpus
2 of the so-called Eindhoven-corpus (see Uit den
Boogaert 1975)
number of demonstrative NPs 665
COR 4 a compilation of 22 popular scientific texts (500 to
1000 words each)
number of words 15.000
number of demonstrative NPs 104
COR 5-8 a compilation of book reviews, tv reviews,
autobiographical columns and personal comments from
the magazine Vrij Nederland
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number of words 28.961
number of demonstrative NPs 262
COR 9 excerpts from popular scientific texts, coming from
subcorpus 5 of the Eindhoven-corpus.'
Except for those in corpus 9, all demonstrative NPs, anaphoric as
well as non-anaphoric ones, are encoded according to a number of
variables. The variables encoded can be classified as follows:
(i) formal-morphological uariables
- the class of the demonstrative NP (dieldat vs. deze~dit)
- the form~structure of the demonstrative NP
(demonstrative determiner t N vs. complex NPs)
- the number of the demonstrative NP (singular vs. plural)
(ii) structural~ syntactic variables
- the syntactic function of the demonstrative NP (subject
vs. object vs. prepositional phrase)
- the position of the demonstrative NP in the clause (first
constituent in the clause vs. not first constituent)
- the position of the demonstrative NP in relation to other
demonstrative NPs (whether it is the only demonstrative
NP in the sentence or not)
(iii) structural ~ relational ~ anaphoric uariables
- the form of the antecedent (NP-antecedent vs. not-NP
antecedent vs. no antecedent)
- the position of the antecedent in terms of interuening
sentences (same sentence vs. previous sentence vs.
earlier)
- the focal position of the antecedent (first mention vs.
second mention vs. ~second mention)
(iv) semantic ~ relational ~ anaphoric uariables
- the type of referent involved (human vs. object vs.
situation~fact vs. eventlproces)
- the lexical relation between the antecedent and the
demonstrative NP (repetition vs. partial repetition vs.
several types of synonyms and superordinates)
- the semantic modificational type of the demonstrative NP
(classify vs. attribute vs. contextualise vs. eualuate).
The quantification of these demonstrative-NP variables is used as
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a method for evaluating the existing DD-variation proposals as
well as for testing my own proposal. Given the subtlety of the
differences between dezeNPs and dieNPs, it is necessary to use
quantificational evidence from the corpus. However, this does not
mean that arguments are exclusively based on quantificational
results. Evidence is also produced from constructed examples and
examples used in other proposals.
In section 4.2 existing proposals concerning the DD-variation are
evaluated; in section 4.3 my own DD-proposal is developed.
Conclusions follow in section 4.4.
4.2 Different proposals for the DD-variation
4.2.1 Distance: proximate vs. distal
4.2.1.1 Strict interpretation of distance
A proposal which could explain the difference between dezeNPs
and dieNPs in an easy and straightforward way, is the
explanation in terms of the so-called proximate-dista] dichotomy.
Applied to Dutch this 'localistic' proposal can be formulated as
follows: dezeNPs carry the semantic substance near or proximate;
dieNPs carry the semantic substance remote or distal. The
advantage of such a proposal is that it is based upon a criterion
that is known to be useful in describing deictic systems of
languages: the distance-dichotomy is often used as a classifying
tool in mapping out the system of deictic expressions in
languages (see for a concise survey Rauh 1983:15-16).
The prototype of demonstrative expressions for which the
localistic explanation is self-evident, is the use of deictic
demonstrative pronouns in contrastive spoken context, as in (1):
(1) Ik wil niet deze (hier), maar die (daar).
1 do not want this one (here), but that one (there).
In an example like (1) the locality hypothesis can be described as
follows: the features proximate and distal are part of or identical
with the semantics of the lexical items dezeldit and die~dat
respectively. This semantic value determines to which referent -
in the given situation of speech - the demonstrative gives acces.
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As the features proximate vs. distal are relative concepts, the use
of dezeldit or die~dat implies a contrast between the intended
referent and other possible referents. More precisely formulated:
if in some context the semantic value proximate is assigned to
referent x by means of dezeldit, then the semantic value distal
can be assigned to some explicitly present or implicitly derivable
referent y, and vice versa.~
In terms of an incremental discourse representation the locality
view can be formulated as follows:
(i) A demonstrative is a marked referential expression the
semantic value of which represents one pole on the
dichotomic distance axis proximate vs. distal and implies
the presence of the other pole on the axis.
(ii) The effect of the demonstrative is that the spatial
position of the referent with regard to (a) contrasting
referent(s) becomes part of the semantic representation of
the referent involved.
(iii) The spatial position of the referent has to be regarded as
information enabling the reader to access the intended
referent, by way of explicit or implicit contrast with other
referents.
A strict interpretation of locality like the one above is not
applicable to demNAs. The fact is that demNAs differ from
demonstratives as in (1) on three crucial points:
(i) Unlike purely deictic demonstratives, demNAs refer to
linguistic elements, antecedents. This means that
distance should not be conceived of as the 'literal'
distance between writer and object or between reader and
object, and that demNAs do not imply a literal, spatial
localisation of the referents involved. Thus, it is not
plausible to derive the basic meaning of demonstratives
in demNAs from the distance meaning of deictic
demonstratives.
(ii) Anaphoric demonstrative NPs in written discourse are
not referential expressions naturally occurring in
contexts in which two referents are contrasted. This is
shown in the acceptability judgments of the examples in
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section 3.3.3.1. Hence, it is not plausible to derive the
basic meaning of demonstratives in demNAs from an
(implicit or explicit) contrast between competing
referents.
(iii) Unlike anaphoric demonstrative pronouns, demNAs are
not only co-referential with an antecedent, but also
introduce the content of the following NP: this
characteristic is the essence of the MOD-hypothesis,
which implements the markedness of demNAs (see
chapter 3). If the demonstrative determiner is looked
upon as indicating what follows rather than what
precedes, then the notion of (anaphoric) distance may
well be irrelevant in distinguishing dezeNPs and dieNPs,
the distance between the deze-determiner and the die-
determiner and their following NP being the same.
These crucial differences indicate that the markedness of
anaphoric demonstrative NPs and the markedness of deictic
demonstratives pronouns function differently. This has already
been pointed out frequently, as e.g. in Kirsner (1979:356;
1987:81), Wierzbicka ( 1980:37) and Lyons (1977:671) 3
However, distance is often used as the central notion applicable
to all demonstrative uses. With anaphoric demonstratives, this
notion is implemented as anaphoric distance, i.e., the distance
between anaphor and antecedent, which is mostly indicated as
the number of intervening clauses between antecedent and
anaphoric demonstrative.
A first characterisation of the DD-variation in terms of anaphoric
distance can be found in Pinkal 1986. Pinkal amends Kamp's
1981 proposal for the treatment of definite NPs in Discourse
Representation Theory (DRT). The functional value Pinkal
assigns to complex demonstratiues (i.e., both classes of
demonstrative NPs) is "that they direct the hearer's focus of
attention to a new reference object that was not in focus beforé'
(1986:372). Pinkal's rule, expressing this focal function of both
classes of demonstrative NPs, is the following:
(2) (i) Add a new DR to CFt
(ii) replace the a in the constituent under
consideration by x
(iii) Add x-y to K where y~ CFk and y is the most
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salient satisfier of a in Uk
This rule regulates (i) that a demNA adds a new discourse
referent (DR) to the current focus (CFk); (ii) that the NP involved
(a) is replaced by x; (iii) that the equality x-y is added to the
current discourse representation structure (K), provided that y
not yet occupies a position in the current focus of K (y E CFk) and
that y is the most salient satisfier of the NP involved in the
universe of discourse (Uk).
In Pinkal's view, the function of focus shift, formalised as in (2) is
the same for both classes of demonstrative NPs. The only
difference is that there is an additional requirement underlying
this a, as opposed to that a, "that the antecedent must have been
uttered in the immediate pre-context... 'this' has a yet more
restricted anaphoric ran8e, which seems to depend on proximity in
th.e uttered string, in a very basic sensé' (1986:372).
Furthermore, in proposals with a totally difierent orientation,
anaphoric distance again is considered as accounting for the DD-
variation, i.e., in corpus research by Ariel and Lichtenberk 1988.
They investigate the relationship between different types of
anaphoric expressions and anaphoric distance. Both Ariel (for
English) and Lichtenberk (for To'aba'ita) have found a
relationship between anaphoric distance and classes of demNAs.
In both cases proximate demNAs (thislthese-NP for English; eri-
NP for To'aba'ita) are more frequent in short-distance positions,
i.e., when the antecedent is near, than distal-demNAs
(that~those-NP for English; baa-NP for To'aba'ita). Ariel does not
give quantitative evidence, in support of the relationship, but
restricts herself to the formulation of the following tendency:
When anaphoric, distal demonstratives tend to refer to
more remote entities, while praurimal demonstratives
refer to more immediate antecedents. (...) It is the distal
demonstratiue, an already lower Mid Accessibility
marker, that tends to develop into a full-fledged Low
Accessibility marker. (1988:76)
Unlike Ariel, Lichtenberk offers quantitative evidence for the
relationship mentioned: the average anaphoric distance in his
corpus is 3.4 clauses for proximate-demNAs and 8.6 clauses for
distal-demNAs (1988:323). However, little value should be
attached to the two localistic interpretations. In Ariel
quantitative evidence is absent, which makes it impossible to
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judge the correctness of the relationship. Lichtenberk's evidence
has to be looked upon as an artefact, i.e., it is the result of a
strange way of interpreting his data. This becomes clear in table
(1), which contains the distribution of proximate- and distal-
demNAs with an anaphoric distance between 1 clause and 6
clauses in Lichtenberk's corpus:
Table (1): The relationship between proximate-distal and
anaphoric distance in Lichtenberk (1988:323)
ana.phoric
distance eri (prox) baa (distal) total
n ~lo n 9o n ~o
1 129 77.7 37 22.3 166 100
2 37 67.3 18 32.7 55 100
3 30 69.8 13 30.2 43 100
4 25 67.6 12 32.4 37 100
5 8 53.3 7 46.7 15 100
6 10 58.8 7 41.2 17 100
The percentages in this table should be read from left to right,
i.e., 100 per cent for each anaphoric distance (1 to 6 clauses). The
conclusion Lichtenberk draws with regard to this table is the
following "..as the distance increases the percentage of the use of
eri decreases while that of óaa correspondingly increases"
(1988:323), which he regards as a clear indication for the
relevance of anaphoric distance in the DD-variation.
Assuming that the regularity Lichtenberk mentions is
indisputable, this would not yet be a reason for labelling baa the
distal-form and eri the proximate-form. The following three facts
provide arguments against such a labelling. Firstly, in all
anaphoric distance positions proximate-demNAs are more
frequent than distal-demNAs. Secondly, a high proportion of
distal-demNAs (n-37, i.e., 39.3~k of all distal-demNAs) find their
antecedent in the preceding clause, i.e., at anaphoric distance 1.
This proportion (39.3~0) is at least twice the percentage of distal-
demNAs in all the other anaphoric distance positions taken
separately. Finally, for both demonstrative classes, the demNA-
frequency decreases as the distance from the antecedent
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increases. This comes out in table (2) in which column-
percentages are given, which are more relevant than the row-
percentages in table (1).
Table (2): Reanalysis counts Lichtenberk (1988:323)
anaphoric
distance eri (prox) baa (distal) total
n qo n 9o n
1 129 53.9 37 39.3 166
2 37 15.5 18 19.1 55
3 30 12.6 13 13.8 43
4 25 10.5 12 12.8 37
5 8 3.3 7 7.5 15
6 10 4.2 7 7.5 17
total 239 100.0 94 100.0 333
Apart from this, the regularity itself is disputable. The fact is
that it is based on a relatively small number of demNA-
occurrences. Especially in classes 5 and 6 the number of demNAs
is very low. However, it is exactly these few demNAs that play an
important role in the correspondence Lichtenberk observes: in the
anaphoric distances 4, 5 and 6 in table (1) the percentages show
the strongest fluctuation.
A further indication against distance as an eaplanatory notion for
the DD-variation can be found in my own corpus. This corpus
(henceforth the DD-corpus) contains 1259 demonstrative NPs, 837
of which are anaphoric. For these anaphoric demonstrative NPs
the relationship between anaphoric distance and demonstrative
class is shown in table (3):
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Table (3): Relationship between dezeNAs ~ dieNAs and anaphoric
distance in the DD-corpus (n-837)
same s. preu. s. earlier total
n 9o n 9'o n qo n
deze 42 9.6 325 ?4.0 72 16.4 439
die 81 20.4 234 58.8 83 20.8 398
total 123 559 155 837
In the position earlier a slight preference can be found for dieNAs
(16.4 ~ vs. 20.8~0). However, the de,zel die-difference in this
position is smaller than in the other positions. In table (3) there
are at least three indications that disprove the distance
hypothesis. Firstly, there is the atriking fact that dieNAs more
often than dezeNAs occur together with the antecedent in the
same sentence. Secondly, as in Lichtenberk's corpus, the majority
of both classes of demNAs are located in the category previous
sentence. Thirdly, if we consider the positions same and preuious
sentence as being proximate, and the position earlier as distal,
then the following, non-significant differences (x~-2.74, df-1, ns)
between dezeNAs and dieNAs emerge:
Table (4): Relation dezeldie vs. anaphoric distance (proximate -
same or previous sentence; distal - earlier) in the DD-
corpus (n-837)
proximate distal total
n 9o n ~lo n
deze 367 83.6 72 16.4 439
die 315 79.1 83 20.9 398
total 682 155 837
Finally, the whimsicality of the relation between anaphoric
distance and the class of demNA is apparent in the corpus
analysis of Kirsner 1979. In a small Dutch written expository
corpus containing 113 demNAs, with a same-head noun as the
antecedent noun, he finds the following deze~die-distribution with
respect to anaphoric distance:
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Table (5): Deze~die and anaphoric distance in Kirsner (1979:365)
(n-113)
(a) same s (b)1 s back (c) earlier n
deze 15 38 8 61
die 35 16 1 52
total 50 54 9 113
The result turns out to be fully inconsistent with the distance
hypothesis, in that dezeNAs in this table on the average are more
remote from their antecedent than dieNAs. The same correlation
between referential distance and dezeNAsldieNAs is found in
other corpora-samples (n-108 and n-360 demNAs) in Kirsner 8a
van Heuven (1988:217-220). In all these samples, a strong
association was found between dezeNAs and the referential
distance ? 1 on the one hand, and between dieNAs and the
referential distance 0 on the other.
Although a larger number of intrasentential dieNAs is
undeniable, both in Kirsner's data and in mine, this cannot be
taken to be conclusive evidence for an association of dezeNAs
with distal and of dieNAs with proximate. If not only (a) in table
(5) is interpreted as proximate, but (a) and (b), and if the
occurrences under (c) are left out of consideration, given their low
number (n-9), the difference between dezeNAs and dieNAs in
same f previous sentence position is negligible, which would no
longer support Kirsner's 'contra-localistic' view but which is
consistent with the counts in table (4).
Differences in interpretation of the notion of referential distance -
Kirsner qualifies as distal what Lichtenberk and I qualify as
pro~cimate, i.e., demNAs with an antecedent one sentence back -
demonstrate how difficult it is to use the relative notion of
referential distance in the analysis of the DD-variation. This,
however, does not alter the fact that there are strong reasons for
preferring my implementation of referential distance, i.e., it is
plausible to consider the position one sentence back as proximate,
not just for demNAs, but for anaphors in general. ~rstly, where
the simple maintenance or remention of discourse referents is
concerned, the antecedent one sentence back is a position that is
both likely and easily processable, regardless whether the
anaphor is pronominal or nominal, as is shown in Clark 8s Sengul
(1979:40). Secondly, it turns out that pronouns, i.e., anaphoric
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devices which are known to be positioned near to their
antecedent, are frequently used with the antecedent one sentence
back. This is clear in the data-analysis of Fox (1984:293). In her
written expository, conversational and narrative corpus, the
percentage of pronouns with the antecedent in the preceding
clause is 84~Io, 49~k and 62~o respectively. Thus, if this position is
standard for semantically empty anaphoric expressions such as
pronouns, it would be highly implausible to label it distal for
demNAs.
In sum, we can say that Kirsner's referential-distance analysis
invalidates the localistic analysis of dezeNAs and dieNAs,
without offering strong evidence, however, for a contra-localistic
analysis. It only shows a tendency which can be found in the DD-
corpus as well, i.e., the high proportion of dieNAs with an
antecedent in the same sentence, a phenomenon for which I will
give an explanation in section 4.4.3.
4.2.1.2 Derived interpretations of distance
The preceding section made it clear that a strict version of
locality, in which demonstratives necessarily carry the meaning
of proximity or distance, is not a fruitful starting point for the
explanation of the difference between dezeNPs and dieNPs. This
does not mean however that locality as an explanatory principle
necessarily has to be abandoned. There are two ways in which
the localistic view can be kept applicable to the DD-variation: (i)
by expanding the dichotomic distance values by other semantic
values and (ii) by going beyond the literal interpretation of the
notion of distance in explaining functions and effects of the DD-
variation, that is, by tolerating metaphorical interpretations of
distance in explaining differences between dezeNPs and dieNPs.
The first solution is supported by non-binary descriptions of
deictic systems as the one in Hauenschild 1982. For
demonstrative pronouns in ftussian and Czech, she distinguishes
a tripartite meaning system. Applied to Dutch demonstrative
NPs, this would result in the following classes of demonstratives:
proximate (dezeNPs), distal (dieNPs), neutral (dezeNPsldieNPs).
The application of this tripartition to demNAs is problematic,
however, since it is unclear under what conditions demNAs have
to be assigned a localistic or neutral interpretation: literal
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distance is hardly ever there; anaphoric distance on the other
hand - the only implementation of the notion of distance in the
case of demNAs - is always at issue. So, if anaphoric distance is
the determining criterion, then all demNAs have to be assigned a
localistic interpretation. The decision as to when to assign a
localistic or neutral interpretation is all the more difficult since it
is difficult to describe the content of the qualification neutral. For
Hauenschild, neutral only has a negative content, meaning not-
distal nor proximate ( see also the critique in Kirsner 1979:357).
Hauenschild does not support her proposal by empirical corpus
evidence. Even though it is difficult to imagine how her
tripartition could be tested in my corpus, we might nevertheless
give it a try. I assume that in my corpus two classes of demNAs
can be distinguished, only one of them requiring a distance
interpretation. This distance-class of demNAs is considered to
have a purely identificational function. I further assume that this
class is implemented as the class of demNAs with the same head
noun as the antecedent (SHN-demNAs), literal and~or partial
repetition being the simplest device enabling the reader to access
the intended referent. In view of Hauenschild's tripartition, the
hypothesis could be formulated that SHN-demNAs show a clear
relationship between anaphoric distance and DD-variation, a
relation which is absent in the class of non-SHN-demNAs.
However, in my corpus, SHN-demNAs do not show a significant
relation between dezeNAs vs. dieNAs on the one hand, and
proximate (i.e., antecedent in the same or in the previous
sentence) vs. distal (i.e., earlier) on the other (x2-.34, df-1, ns), as
is apparent in table (6):'
Table (6): Relationship same-head demNAs and anaphoric
distance in the DD-corpus (n-378)
proximate distal total
n 9o n 96 n
deze 130 80.2 32 19.8 162
die 168 77.8 48 22.2 216
total 298 80 378
The second solution can be found for example in Halliday 8L
Hasan 1976 and Lakoff 1974. Halliday 8~ Hasan indicate that
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"the uses of this and that in endophoric reference are earplainable
by reference to their exophoric meanings; so it is important to start
from the general concept of proximity" (1976:59). Lakoff classifies
all uses of demonstratives lacking a spatio-temporal meaning as
forms of emotional deixis. In all these uses of demonstratives, she
recognises "a clear linguistic link between emotional, and spatial
'closeness' and 'distance': these are not mere accidental metaphors"
(Lakoff 1974:355). I.e., this-demonstrative NPs of emotional deixis
can be assigned the meaning of inetaphorical proximity, that-
demonstrative NPs of emotional deixis the meaning of
metaphorical distance.
Although Lakoff makes valuable observations with regard to the
relationships between this~that and pragmatic discourse
circumstances, the linking between this I that and mental distance
remains arbitrary. Three of Lakoffs examples (8), (10) and (45) -
repeated here as (3), (4) and (5) - illustrate that she refers to the
notion of the reader's involvement in explaining this-
demonstratives as well as that-demonstratives:
(3) I see there's going to be peace in the mideast. This Henry
Kissinger really is something!
This is used when the speaker wishes to allude to
something. Its most natural use seems to 6e with
proper names that the speaker expects the hearer to be
familiar with. (Lakoff 1974:347)
(4) There was this traveling salesman
This seems to give greater viuidness to the narratiue, to
inuolve the addressee in it more fully. (Lakoff 1974:347)
(5) That Henry Kissinger sure knows his , way around
Hollywood.
That appears to establish emotional solidarity between
the two Ii.e., the speaker and the addressee (A.M.)J.
(Lako fj` 1974:352)
However plausible it may be to assign such pragmatic effects to
the demonstrative NPs involved, it remains highly arbitrary to
ultimately classify (3) and (4) as emotionally close and (5) as
emotionally distalb The emotional solidarity in (5) can be
conceived of as a form of emotional closeness as well. Moreover,
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the relationship between the basic meaning of distance and such
emotional effects remains unclear.
The descriptive or explanatory value of the notion of inetaphorical
distance becomes even more precarious if we take into
consideration the fact that in written discourse not only the
distance or the relation between the writer and the referent is at
issue, but also the distance or the relation the writer wants to
suggest between the reader and the referent and between himself
and the reader. So, it is always possible to consider thislthat in
written context somehow as close or distal with respect to writer
or reader.
Finally, Lakoff deals only with conversationally marked
demonstrative NPs, in which metaphorical distance is intuitively
acceptable. However, extrapolating this notion to all
demonstrative NPs lacking a literal distance interpretation would
be psychologically very implausible. For a great number of
demonstrative NPs, e.g. in non-narrative and non-conversational
context, the (metaphorical) distance dichotomy is not acceptable
as a basic interpretation heuristic.
4.2.2 Focal value: Sidner 1983
A second interpretation assigned to the difference between
dezeNPs and dieNPs has been given in terms of focal value.
Sidner (1983:320-328) discusses the deictic pronouns and the
deictic determiners this and that as part of her focus theory,
regulating the resolution of definite anaphoric expressions in
discourse. She distinguishes two possible uses, i.e., the use of
demonstratives in copresent foci discourse situation and in focus-
mouement discourse situation. Sidner's proposal is meant to be
applicable to English; in my evaluation of Sidner, I shall act as if
it holds for Dutch and especially for my Dutch data as well.
4.2.2.1 Co-present foci
Co-present foci demonstratives are used "to talk about two objects
of the same typé' (1983:321). This is the case when in the same
discourse unit a this- as well as a that-form is used with a
contrastive effect. Sidner's co-present example is the following:
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(6) I'm having a party tomorrow night. It will be like the one
I had last week. That party was a big succes, because
everyone danced. This one will have better food. I've
asked everyone to bring something special. Want to
come? (Sidner 1983:321)
In cases like this, according to Sidner, the notion of proximity
offers too vague an explanation for the behaviour of this and that.
Instead, Sidner attributes the following difference in focal value
to co-present this I that:
This' is a determiner used for main focus, that is, 'this'
t ~noun phrase~ determines main focus, while 'that' t
~noun phrase~ co-specifies with a potential or old
focus. (Sidner 1983:322)
Demonstrative this indicates referents with main or discourse
focus, which in Sidner's proposal is the focus in which other foci
(e.g. actor foci) can be embedded. According to Sidner, main or
discourse focus reflects the prominence assigned by the writer or
speaker to the referent involved:
In the case where the speaker wants to indioate that
one of the two is more important, it will be co-specijzed
using 'this; when 'this' is used to mark relatiue
importance, it will be referred to as primary focus.
(Sidner 1983:321)
A special case of prominence is found in conversational co-present
cases, where this and that reflect the difference in speaker's and
hearer's focus:
When speaker and hearer (as a second speaker) have
difj`'erent focus, use 'that' as the determiner of a definite
noun phrase that co-specifies the hearer's foeus, and
use 'this' for the speaker's focus. (Sidner 1983:323)
In Sidner's resolution mechanism, the proposal for co-present foci
is meant to act as a procedural resolution instruction: if this and
that are used co-presently, then (i) assign mainldiscourse focus to
the referent underlying this and a focal position which is less
central to the referent underlying that, and (ii) assign higher
prominence and~or speaker's focus to the referent underlying this.
However, this proposal shows the same drawbacks as the
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distance proposal in section 4.2.1, although it pretends to be a
less vague alternative for that (1983:321). Just as it is arbitrary
to qualify the difference between co-present this and co-present
that as a difference in distance, it is equally arbitrary to qualify
it as a difference in focal status. This can be shown easily by
examples in which real (7) or anaphoric (8) distance is decisive in
choosing this vs. that:
(7a) Ik heb gisteren een werkaanbieding gekregen uit
Australië; en nu heb ik hier net een aanbieding uit
Antwerpen~. Dat verre aanbod; lijkt me aantrekkelijker
dan dit Belgische~.
Yesterday, I got an Australian job proposal and I just got one from
Antwerp. That alistant proposal seems more attractiue than this Belgian
one.
(7b) Ik heb gisteren een werkaanbieding gekregen uit
Australië; en nu heb ik hier net een aanbieding uit
Antwerpen~. ?Dit verre aanbod; lijkt me aantrekkelijker
dan ?dat Belgische,.
Yesterday, 1 got an Australian ,job proposal and 1 just got one from
Antwerp. This distant proposal seems more attractive than that Belgian
one.
(8) Ik heb al mijn gehele leven in New York; willen wonen,
maar ben nooit verder geraakt dan Antwerpen~. Deze
stad(~„~ is (...) dan die ((andere) stad)(;~,~.
My whole life, 1'oe wanted to live in New York, óut 1 never got beyond
Antwerp. This city is (...) than that (other) city.
The choice for dat or dit in (7a) is based on the distance in place
and time, possibly on anaphoric distance, but certainly not on the
focal status of the referents involved, both referents having equal
focal status at the beginning of the second sentence. However,
(7a) is certainly not less acceptable than (7b), on the contrary. In
(8), deze more naturally denotes the city last mentioned, i.e.,
Antwerpen, although New York rather than Antwerpen can be
assigned main focus. The focal interpretation becomes even more
arbitrary if focal status should coincide with the pragmatic values
importance and the locus of the speaker's concern, which is the
way Sidner sees it. In (?a) and (8) the locus of the speaker's
concern certainly coincides with the dat~die-referent. Whether
the referents underlying dat~die are relatively more important
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than the referents underlying dezeldit is difficult to say, because
importance in examples like these is diPficult to evaluate. So, in
examples with a clear distance interpretation like (7) and (8) the
notion of proximity overrules the notions of focal status and
speaker's concern s
According to the interrelation between this, main focus and
importance or speaker's concern then, the same can be said as for
the interrelation between this, proximate and emotionally close in
Lakoff 1974. The link is analytically legitimate in the examples
Sidner provides, but an absolute coupling is arbitrary, and cannot
be conceived of as a basic interpretation or resolution mechanism.
Moreover, the link between main focus and speaker's concern or
importance is exceptional in the light of Sidner's anaphora
resolution algorithm. It is the only time she relates the notion of
focus (being a technical concept, looked upon in terms of the
position of referents in the focus stack) to such pragmatic notions.
In the whole of her focus algorithm, it is strange that she doesn't
indicate the function of these pragmatic concepts in the resolution
of anaphors.
Apart from counterexamples of distance, co-present examples can
be found in which intuitively a difference in focal value or
prominence between the demNAs can be assumed, but in which
both referents are realised by the same demonstrative class, as in
(9):
(9) Voor het broeikaseffect zijn er twee verklaringen:
ontbossing; of veruuiling~. Die eerste uerklaring; is
plausibeler dan die tweede~.
There are two explanations for the greenhouse e({ect: dejoreataáon and
pollution. That rrst explanation is more plauaible than that aecond.
And, of cowse, there are demNPs expressing a contrast between
referents in which only one referent is expressed by a
demonstrative NP, as in (10):
(10) .. Dan; bestrijdt de KRO (alweer) de EO met een film.
Om acht uur Amos, in het Nederlands TTachtmerrie in
Sunset-home' geheten. En op vrijdag 10 april is het
(opnieuw) de KRO weer met 'Zorba de Griek', dit keer~
van zeven tot halftien. (6:0057)
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.. Then (again) the KRO fghts the EO with a Film. At eight o'clock
Amos; called 'Nachtmerrie in Sanset-home' in Drctch. And on Friday,
April IOth, there is the KRO again with Zorba the Greek', this time fi-om
seuen to nine thirty.
In short, two conclusions can be drawn: (i) if this and that are
used co-presently, they do not necessarily reflect the difference in
focal value, importance or speaker's concern, as Sidner claims. (ii)
If two or more demonstrative NPs are used co-presently, the
contrast between these NPs does not necessarily have to be
expressed by this vs. that, as is shown in (9).
In the foregoing we started from constructed examples in which
demNAs were used co-presently, as Sidner does. Given the subtle
differences between dezeNPs and dieNPs, it is not that difficult to
invent examples that counter the co-present interpretation in
terms of distance or focality. This, however, does not alter the
fact that the DD-variation is not naturally associated with the
phenomenon of contrastive referents in discourse and that
demonstrative NPs do not answer real use conditions in written
discourse. In other words, in discourse situations in which
referents are contrasted, dezeNPs vs. dieNPs are hardly used to
indicate this contrast, in spite of the acceptability of the
constructed examples above.
This is supported by the following two observations. Firstly, as
was shown in section 3.3.3.1, there are many other anaphoric
devices (e.g. marked pronouns, demonstrative pronouns,
alternative definite NPs, repeated definite NPs) that are more
suitable to access co-present referents than demonstrative NPs.
Incidentally, the two co-present demNAs SIDNER mentions
herself are not genuine demNAs either: in both cases the
anaphoric NP is elliptical, as in (6). Furthermore, the
unproductivity of co-present demNPs becomes obvious in the
analysis of co-present demNPs in the DD-corpus. In the corpus all
demonstrative NPs co-occurring in the same sentence with other
demonstrative NPs are examined. These cases prototypically are
candidates for co-present interpretation of demNPs, although co-
present demNPs occasionally occur in different sentences as well.
106 demNPs in the corpus occur together with another
demonstrative NP in the same sentence. This results in 53
demNP-duos. 9 demonstrative NPs co-occur with two other
demonstrative NPs in the same sentence, resulting in three
demNP-trios. The deze~die-distribution for these demonstrative
NPs is as in table (7):
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It is striking that most of the demNP-duos and -trios belong to
the same demonstrative class, i.e., either deze or die (n-88,
76.5010), and cannot be looked upon as co-present demNAs in the
sense of Sidner. Co-present demNAs have to be looked for in the
12 dezei-die-duos and the one dezefdie-trio. In these cases it
turns out that only in one case the DD-variation is used to access
referents in such a way that the first referent is "discussed
relatiue to the other or relatiue to a class in which both occur"
(Sidner 1983:320). That is example (11), in which an explanation
is possible in terms of distance as well as in terms of focality:
(11) Want achterop die pakken Uncle Ben's rijst; staan
recepten en op dit pakje~ stond een recept van chefkok
Hans de Bruin van restaurant Barbara' in Zwolle.
(7:093I094)
For, on the óack o` those packs o( Uncle Ben's rice lhere are recipes and
on this packet there was a recipe by chef Hans de Bruin from restaumnt
Barbara'in Zwolle.
Furthermore, in all duos and trios of the same demonstrative
class, there is only one example for which Sidner's co-present
characterisation holds, although the DD-variation is not used:
(12) En meteen was het vechten, wat die grote; won, dus die
slungel~ had bloed op zijn neus en stapte in en reed weg.
(7:123~124)
And straight away they started ~ghting. That big one won, so that lout
had blood on his nose and got in and drove away.
In short, the proposal for co-present demonstratives in terms of
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focal value is empirically problematic for various reasons: (i) co-
present demNPs need not reflect focal differences; (ii) co-present
demNPs do not necessarily show the deze~die-dichotomy and (iii)
co-present contrastive referents in discourse are realised by
referential devices other than demNAs.
4.2.2.2 Focus movement
Apart from co-present demonstratives Sidner distinguishes non-
co-present demonstratives, i.e., cases in which either this or that
is chosen as a demonstrative. Sidner's claim with respect to these
cases is that only some classes of this-NPs cause focus movement,
while that-NPs only remention an element without causing a
focus movement (1983:323-325).
Sidner distinguishes four uses of this:
type 1: this with same head noun (henceforth SHN) as
the cospecifier (i.e., the antecedent):
(13) Man's longest axon; runs for several feet, from the spinal
column to muscles that control movements of the toes. In
spite of its great length, this axon;, like all nerve fibers, is
a part of a single cell. (1983:324)
type 2: this with different head noun:
(14) Consider the roomful of electronic equipment that makes
up a modern, high-speed digital computer. .. Imagine the
room;, and everything in it, shrunk to about the size of a
cigarette package. Now suppose we give this marvellous
box; to a clever electrical engineer.. (1983:324)
type 3: this with empty head (i.e., substantival this):
(15) Since, however, the interpretation has been put forward
as a hypothesis, some weight will be added to it if it can
be shown to have an antecedent probability. This is what
I shall endeavor to do in the remaining pages. (1983:325)
type 4: this with quantified antecedent:
(16) We can therefore associate with each point; near the
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earth a vector g which is the acceleration that a body
would experience if it where released at this point;.
According to Sidner in type 1 and in type 3 the focus is moved to
whatever is specified by the head noun of the this-NP, whereas in
type 2 and in type 4 no focus movement is involved.'
In my demNA-analysis in chapter 3, some support can be found
for this proposal. Contextualising demNAs the prototype of which
are same head demNAs (i.e., Sidner's type-1 demNAs) are often -
but not exclusively - conceived of as a mechanism for the
installation of a referent as highest focal referent in the
discourse. Attributive demNAs, the prototype of which are
alternative NPs with attributive addition (i.e., Sidner's type-2
demNAs) only modify explicit focus referents, or, as Sídner
describes it "the same element is specified but from a different
perspectivé' (1983:323).
The problem however is that Sidner reserves these types
exclusively for this-demNAs, anaphoric that-demNAs doing no
more than "re-mention without causing a focus mouement"
(1983:325). For such a claim, the analysis in chapter 3 offers no
evidence: in all types of use of demNAs - classify, attribute,
contextualise - dezeNAs as well as dieNAs are possible, although
there are preferences (see section 4.4.2).
However, given the subtlety of the differences between dezeNPs
and dieNPs, it is necessary to confront Sidner's proposal not only
with constructed examples, but also with characteristics of
demNAs in the DD-corpus. Sidner presupposes that focus
movement is effected by type-1 demonstratives, i.e., dezeNAs with
the same head noun as the antecedent. The other demonstrative
this-type causing focus movement are demonstrative pronouns
(type 3), which are not at issue here, as they are not demNPs at
all.
If my data showed that there are hardly any SHN-dieNAs, or
none at all, this could be interpreted as lending support to
Sidner's focus-movement proposal, and more specifically to her
association of focus movement with same-head noun, for the
small number of SHN-dieNAs could then be interpreted as an
indication in favour of this association: in that case SHN-dieNAs
would be rare because of the conflict between the SHN-
characteristic indicating focus movement and the formal class of
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dieNAs, that do not tolerate focus movement. However, this
hypothesis is not supported in the DD-corpus: table (8) shows
that SHN-dieNAs are even significantly more frequent than
SHN-dezeNAs (x2-23.73, df-1, p ~ .05).
Table ( 8): Relationship deze~die and same head noun as
antecedent (fSHN) in the DD-corpus (n-1259)e
fSHN rest total
n 9~o n ~o n
deze 183 27.1 492 72.9 675
die 234 40.1 350 59.9 584
total 417 842 1259
These results do not confirm Sidner's focal interpretation, but
they do not disconfirm it either. The fact is that Sidner does not
claim that there are no or only few SHN-dieNAs. SHN-dieNAs
could have other functions than dezeNAs. What Sidner claims is
that SHN-dezeNAs, unlike SHN-dieNAs, cause focus movement.
In order to be able to test this claim I translate it as follows:
dezeNAs are associated more with characteristics indicating focus
movement than dieNAs.
The demNA-characteristics taken to be the strongest indicators of
focus movement are (i) post first mention position and (ii) the
antecedent in the preuious sentence. This means that the referent
involved is realised first in the antecedent in the preceding
sentence and that the demNA installs it as main-focus referent.
Focus movement was already associated with these
characteristics in the analysis of contextualising demNAs in
section 3.4.4, but it also fits in with Sidner's own characterisation
of focus movement:
Focus movement is recognised in a manner which is
akin to initial focus recognition. Any new term in the
discourse is a'potentia! focus'. The sentence following
its introduction may contain either an anaphor which
can be confcrmed as co-specifying with the potentía!
focus or an anaphorwhich co-specifies with the element
already in focus. If the anaphor co-specifies with the
potential focus, the co-specifïcation causes the potential
focus to become the discourse focus. (Sidner 1983:296)
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There are also other characteristics that can be considered to be
associated with focus movement: same head noun as the
antecedent is a characteristic which is congruent with Sidner's
type-1 this-NPs. ~rthermore, we noted in section 3.4.4 that
contextualising demNAs - excellent candidates for focus
movement - predominantly have the format of a simple NP, i.e.,
an NP consisting of a demonstrative determiner plus a noun.
FSnally, two characteristics are generally acknowledged as being
associated with focality, i.e., subject function and the position of
the NP as first constituent in the clause. Two corpus examples
containing all focal characteristics and showing clear examples of
focus movement are (17) and (18):
(17) Voor mensen met een ziektewetuitkering bestaan een
aantal aparte regels. Deze regels kunt u vinden onder het
kopje ziektewet. (2:0133)
For people on sick leaue, there are a number oj separate rules. These
rules can be jound under the heading Health Law.
(18) De mechanische klep is tot nu het meest toegepast. Die
klep moet aan hoge eisen voldoen. (4:0043)
The mechanical ualue so jar has been applied in most cases. That value
has to meet high standards.
The relationship between these characteristics and the DD-
variation in my corpus is given in the tables (9) -(13).
(i) There is no significant relationship between deze~die and post-
first-mention position (f ~- PFM) of the demonstratiue NA, as table
(9) shows (xa-.67, df-1, ns):
Table ( 9): Relationship dezeldie and post-first-mention position
(PFM) in the DD-corpus except subcorpus 3(n-588)9
tPFM rest total
n 9o n 9o n
deze 177 62.1 108 37.9 285
die 198 65.3 105 34.7 303
total 375 213 588
(ii) As is shown in table (10), the dezeNAs in the DD-corpus
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significantly more often occur with their antecedent one sentence
back (fISB), which supports the focal hypothesis (x2-8.28, df-1, p
~ .05):
Table (10): Relationship deze~die and the antecedent 1
sentence back (1SB) (n-1259)
f 1SB rest total
n 9o n ok n
deze 324 48.0 351 52.0 675
die 234 40.1 350 59.9 584
total 558 701 1259
(iii) Table (8) above shows that significantly more often than
dezeNAs dieNAs have the same head noun as their antecedent, a
result which counters the focal hypothesis (x2-23.73, df-1, p ~
.05).
(iv) In accordance with the focal hypothesis, significantly more
dezeNPs than dieNPs have simple-NP format (simple~complex)
(x2-21.32, df-1, p ~ .05), as table ( 11) shows:
Table (11): Relationship deze~die and format of the
demonstratiue NP (n-1259)
simple complex total
n 9o n 96 n
deze 543 80.4 132 19.6 675
die 404 69.2 180 30.8 584
total 947 312 1259
(v) Table (12) shows that dieNPs significantly more often occur in
subject position than dezeNPs, which counters the focal
hypothesis (x2-9.56, df-1, p ~ .05):
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Table (12): Relationship deze~die and fl- subject function of









(vi) Finally, table (13) shows that dezeNPs do not significantly
more often occur as first constituent in the clause (f I-FCC)
(x2-.055, df-1, ns)
Table (13): Relationship deze~die vs. t~- jirst-constituent












The focal analysis is summarised in table (14):
Table (14): Survey of the results of the focal analysis of the
DD-uariation in the DD-corpus
post-first-mention position
antecedent 1 sentence back
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Although there are two variables that support Sidner's focal
interpretation, there is no general tendency at all to associate
dezeNPs with focal characteristics rather than dieNPs. The most
important characteristics associated with focus movement do not
support the focus-movement claim - in fact, the opposite is true.
Moreover, dezeNPs - as in (17) - in which all these focal
characteristics are combined (21 occurrences; 3.1~ of all dezeNPs)
are not more frequent than dieNPs - as in (18) - which contain all
these characteristics (21 dieNPs; 3.6ok of all dieNPs).
Although dezeNAs do not occur significantly more often in post-
first-mention position - the opposite is true - it is possible that
post-first-mention dezeNAs are associated with the other focal
characteristics rather than post-first-mention dieNAs. If this were
the case, it could reasonably be seen as support for the fact that
the post-first-mention characteristic only signals focus movement
in the case of dezeNAs and that it has to be assigned another
value in the case of dieNAs. In order to check this hypothesis, the
focal analysis of the post-first-mention demNAs is summarised in
table (14a) which, however, differs only on minor points from
table (14):
Table (14a): Summary of focal analysis of post-first-mention
demNAs in the DD-corpus (n-375)
deze die significance
olo olo
f 1 sentence back 68.9 55.1 significant
f same head noun 79.1 87.4 significant
(wrong direction)
f simple-NP format 83.1 78.8 not significant
f subject position 33.9 40.1 not significant
(wrong direction)
f first-const. position 68.9 53.0 signifïcant
In sum, the analysis of the focal variables in the DD-corpus do
not support the difference between dezeNPs and dieNPs in terms
of focus movement.
So far, we have looked upon Sidner's this lthat-cl aim as an
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empirical claim. But her computational reference resolution
framework involves more than simply this weak empirical claim,
the this~that-rule being part of the input of the focussing
algorithm determining the specification (i.e., the resolution) of
definite NPs. Since focus is the basis of her anaphor resolution
system and since this and that imply a different focal value,
Sidner in the first place attributes an identificational difference
to this vs. that, the difference being that this and that in principle
activate a different set of possible referents. As to focus-
movement this, the activated set contains all candidates for main
focus; in the case of that, it is the set of non-candidates for main
focus. Thus, this and that imply a different search heuristic in
accessing the intended referent and in resolving reference.
However, if empirical evidence for such a difference in searching
procedure is lacking, as is shown in this section, then
automatically the implementation of this difference cannot be
maintained either.
4.2.3 High vs. low deixis: Kirsner
In several articles Kirsner proposes a treatment of the difference
between dezeNPs and dieNPs in Dutch in terms of deixis (1979,
1987, 1989, 1991; Kirsner 8z van Heuven 1988; Kirsner, van
Heuven 8s Vermeulen 1987). Although subsequent articles add
refinements to the deixis-proposal, its core has remained
unchanged since 1979. I will concentrate upon his 1979-article
and mention only substantial amendments drawn from later
papers. Kirsner's 1979 proposal for the demonstrative
determiners deze and die in Dutch starts from the idea that
Dutch demonstratives "are organised into a grammatical system
(..) that exhaustiuely subclassifies a semantic substance that we
may call "deixis" and define as "the force with which the hearer is
instructed to find the referent (Garcia 1975:65)" (1979:358). Deze
means high deixis, greater urging that the hearer find the
referent; die represents low deixis, lesser urging that the referent
find the referent.'o Deixis is used in relation with the following
three use conditions (1979:358-59):
(a) When there is a suggestion that there is a specific
existing referent, that it is a localisable entity rather
than a disembodied general concept.
(b) If the hearer has not yet differentiated (distinguished)
the referent from all other possible ones of the noun in
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question; when it is harder to select the referent in
question.
(c) If the referent - for some other reason - requires special
highlighting.
In view of these characteristics of deixis, Kirsner assumes that
"deze will be used when the hearer's task is more difficult (i.e.,
when it is harder to select the referent in question) and that it will
suggest more forcefully than die that a specifïc referent exists"
(1979:360). Kirsner generalises this assumption as follows:
More generally, three strategies suggest themselues,
each of which is consistent with deixis as defined
aboue:
1. NOTEWORTHINESS. The speaker will direct
attention strongest to entities that he, the speaker, is
most interested in talking about.
2. GIVENNESS. The speaker will direct the hearer's
attention strongest to entities that are not giuen, "in the
hearer's consciousness" (Chaje 1974).
3. FOREGROUNDING. The speaker will use more
than one means of drawing the appropriate amount of
attention to the noun's referent, so that strong urging of
the hearer to find it will be coupled with devices for
foregrounding the noun in question and weak urging
will be coupled with deuices fnr backgrounding.
(1979:360}
Kirsner implements these strategies in objective and measurable
discourse characteristics, enabling him to put the highllow deixis
hypothesis to the test in a corpus of two texts: an essay by H.
Haasse (i.e., corpus H: number of demNAs - 257; dezeNAs - 104;
dieNAs - 153) and a chapter from a philosophical book by
Nuchelmans (i.e., corpus N: number of demNAs - 367; dezeNAs -
252; dieNAs - 115). With respect to each of these characteristics,
Kirsner finds significant differences between dezeNAs and
dieNAs in favour of his deixis hypothesis, in one corpus (H or N)
or in both. Kirsner's results are shown in table (15):
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Table (15): Survey of the results of the quantitatiue analysis
of demonstrative NPs in Kirsner's 1979 corpora
HandN
H N Discourse characteristics associated with
noteworthiness
F nf DEZE-referents refer to human entities more
often than DIE-referents
F F DEZE concerns singular NPs more often than
DIE
F nf DEZE refers to named people more often than
DIE
nf F DEZE occurs in subject position more often than
DIE
H N Discourse characteristics associated with
givenness
nf F DEZE refers to new nouns more often than DIE
nf F DEZE refers to decayed entities (in terms of
intervening sentences) more often than DIE
H N Discourse characteristics associated with
foregrounding
na F DEZE occurs in main clause more often than DIE
na F DEZE occurs in first three words of sentence more
often than DIE
nf F DEZE occurs in first sentence of paragraph more
often than DIE
F: statistically significant skewing in support of ('for") the
hypothesis
nf.~ NONsignificant skewing in support of ('for') the
hypothesis
na: NONsignificant skewing "against" the hypothesis
Kirsner certainly offers the most thorough analysis of the DD-
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variation, involving a variety of discourse factors sensitive to this
variation and resulting in lots of valuable observations. However,
his proposal is problematic with respect to the following two
points: the characterisation of the difference between high and
low deixis is ambivalent and Kirsner's quantitative results are
not supported sufficiently in my data.
The ambiualence of the notion of deixis
Although Kirsner determines the function of the DD-variation
ultimately as 'greater~lesser urging that the hearer ~nd the
referent", in the determination of the conditions of use, the
strategies and the discourse characteristics implementing them, a
paradoxical ambiguity can be noticed between an
identificationaUsemantic and a non-identificationaUpragmatic
function of dezel die:
(i) The characterisation of use condition (b) and the
givenness strategy, together with the discourse
characteristics decay and new noun fits in clearly with an
identificational function of demNAs: dezeNAs are better
able to access identificationally problematic referents
than dieNAs. As far as anaphoric distance is concerned,
Kirsner's identificational analysis of demNAs leads to a
'contra-localistic' view: deze is associated with distal and
die with proximate.
(ii) The characterisation of use condition (a) and the
noteworthiness strategy, together with the discourse
characteristics human, singular referents, named entities,
subject does not fit in with an identificational function of
demonstrative NPs: from the viewpoint of identificational
difficulty or economy, it is paradoxical that the deictic
force of dezeNAs should be brought into action to resolve
a simple identificational problem, i.e., to access a referent
with features which are conceptually simple, such as
singular, human and named. One would expect these
referents to be accessible more easily than disembodied
general concepts for example. For the use of the deictic
force in cases like these, a non-identificational
characterisation is needed: dezeNAs indicate a certain
status of the referent (existing, human...) and they
indicate the importance of the referent for the speaker
(noteworthy, important..). It is this prominence-
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interpretation which in Kirsner 8z van Heuven (1988:235-
236) is taken to be the guiding principle in choosing
between deze and die.
(iii) The characterisation of condition (c) and the
foregrounding strategy, together with the discourse
characteristics main clause, sentence position, paragraph
position, fits in with an identificational as well as with a
non-identificational function of demonstrative NP. The
fact is that referents can be highlighted or foregrounded
because they are difficult to access or because they carry
pragmatic values of importance or speaker's concern.
The application of Kirsner's characteristics to the DD-corpus
Most of Kirsner's quantitative analyses are replicated in the DD-
corpus. If his DD-claim is correct, then the discourse
characteristics in my corpus ahould show a similar relation to the
DD-distribution as in Kirsner's corpus. However, the tables (16) -
(19) show a low correspondence with Kirsner's quantitative
results.
(i) Noteworthiness
Kirsner's significant result concerning human dezeNPs is not
supported in our data (t~-HLTM). Table (16) shows the opposite:
human dieNPs are significantly more frequent than dezeNPs
(x2-12.34, df-1, p ~ .05)
Table (16): Relationship deze~die us. human referents
(n-1259)
tHUM -HUM total
n 9o n ~Xo n
deze 67 9.9 608 90.1 675
die 97 16.6 487 83.4 584
total 164 1095 1259
In the DD-corpus as well as in Kirsner's corpora dezeNPa more
often are singular NPs (fl- sing) than dieNPs (xZ-5.18, df-1, p ~
.05), see table (17):
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Table (17): Relationship dezeldie us. singular~plural
(n-1259)
fSING -SING total
n 9o n qo n
deze 522 77.3 153 22.7 675
die 419 71.7 165 28.3 584
total 941 318 1259
Whether dezeNPs more often access named referents than
dieNPs, is not investigated in the DD-corpus.
Table (12) in section 4.2.2.2 shows that in the DD-corpus dieNPs
significantly more often occur in subject position than dezeNPs
(x2-9.56, df-1, p ~ .05), which counters Kirsner's hypothesis.
(ii) Giuenness
In the DD-corpus as well as in Kirsner's data, dezeNAs contain
significantly more new nouns compared to their antecedents (f~-
NN) than dieNAs (x2-12.59, df-1, p ~.05), see table (18):
Table (18): Relationship deze~die us. new noun (n-1259)
fNN rest total
n 9o n olo n
deze 122 18.1 553 81.9 675
die 64 11.0 520 89.0 584
total 186 1073 1259
Whether dezeNAs in the DD-corpus more often access decayed
referents than dieNAs, depends crucially on the implementation of
distance or decay. If we adopt Kirsner's implementation
(proximate - referential distance 0; distal - rest) then my data
support Kirsner's hypothesis (x2-19.37, df-1, p ~.05), as is shown
in table ( 19). However, according to the considerations in section
4.2.1.1, I prefer to interpret distal demNAs as further than 1
sentence back. In that case, Kirsner's hypothesis is not supported,
as is seen in table (4) in section 4.2.1.1.
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Table (19): Relationship between dezeldie and anaphoric
distance (same sentence us. earlier) for the
demNAs in the DD-corpus (n-837)
same s. earlier total
n qo n 96 n
deze 42 9.6 397 90.4 439
die 81 20.3 317 79.? 398
total 123 714 837
(iii) Foregrounding
Whether dezeNPs more often occur in the main clause than
dieNPs is not eaamined in our corpus.
Whether dezeNPs more often occur in the first three words of the
sentence than dieNAs is not analysed as such, but in the DD-
corpus it is analysed whether the demonstrative NP is the first
constituent in the clause or not (fl-FCC). The ( non-significant)
results support Kirsner's hypothesis, as is seen in table (13) in
section 4.2.2.2.
DezeNPs more often occur in the ~rst sentence of the paragraph
than dieNPs. This characteristic is not analysed, but an
indication of the correctness is the fact that, unlike dieNAs,
dezeNAs can refer to 'antecedents' in titles. These dezeNPs are
mostly located in the first sentence of the paragraph.
The replication in this section results in the following table,
comparable with table (15):
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Table (20): Suruey of results of quantitative analysis in the
DD-corpus compared with Kirsner's results
DD-cor H-cor N-cor
Noteworthiness
human entities A F nf
singular NPs F F F
named people - F nf
subject position A nf F
Givenness
new nouns F nf F
decayed referents na nf F
Foregrounding
main clause - na F
first clause position nf na F
first sent. of par. - nf F
F: statistically significant skewing For the hypothesis
A: statistically significant skewing Against the hypothesis
nf.~ NONsignificant skewing For the hypothesis
na:NONsignificant skewing Against the hypothesis
Significant support for Kirsner's hypothesis is only found in the
variables number and new nouns. Significant non-support is
found in the variables humanness and subject position.
In view of the non-replicability of his implementation of deixis,
Kirsner's 1979-proposal has to be qualified as empirically
inadequate, despite its intuitive plausibility. In view of the
ambivalence of the notion of deixis, his proposal has to be
qualified as theoretically intransparent, being located on different
levels of language description.
In later articles (especially 1987, 1989 and Kirsner 8a van Heuven
1988), mainly two of the 1979-1ist of discourse characteristics are
taken to be central in the interpretation of the DD-variation.
Firstly, there is the difference in anaphoric or referential distance
between dezeNAs and dieNAs, a characteristic whose validity I
have contested sufficiently. Secondly, there is the association of
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dezeNAs with new nouns, which is consistent with my data.
Mainly on the basis of these characteristics Kirsner associates
dezeNAs with reinterpreting (summarising, reformulating)
referents and dieNAs with simply repeating referents (e.g.
1987:107; 1989:169; Kirsner 8a van Heuven 1988:223). The
validity of this association will be discussed in section 4.4.2.
4.2.4 Conclusion
Two conclusions can be drawn from the preceding evaluations:
(i) Proposals founding the variation between dezeNPs and
dieNPs on elements indicating the accessibility of
referents - such as anaphoric distance, givenness, focal
value - turned out not to be satisfactory. Firstly, they
lead to contradictory predictions: in focal and deictic
proposals dezeNAs are stronger identificational devices;
in localistic proposals dieNPs are looked upon as strong
devices capable of accessing remote referents. Secondly,
the implementation of these proposals in measurable
variables does not (sufficiently) sustain the test of my
corpus.
So, dezeNPs and dieNPs cannot be looked upon merely as
two different values on a scale on which referential
expressions are classified according to their
identificational force, or according to the accessibility
status of the referents involved, such as the anaphora
hierarchy of Lakoff (1976:295), the accessibility hierarchy
in Ariel (1988:81) or the topic accessibility scale in Givón
(1983:17). Put in different terms: deze and die cannot be
attributed different, scalar search instructions, such as
search far away vs. close, search for a focal us. non-focal
referent or search harder~less hard etc.
(ii) Proposals founding the DD-variation on the qualitative
relationship between writer and referent (noteworthiness,
emotional closeness etc.) offer partially plausible
explanations for certain DD-variations in certain
contexts. But so far the qualitative notions have been too
vague (noteworthiness) or too apecific (emotional
closeness) to be able to act as an interpretative heuristic
for the DD-variation.
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4.3 DemNPs and referential domains
4.3.1 The presence-presupposition-proposal (PPP)
In characterising the DD-variation in written discourse I start
from the intuition connected with the use of each demonstrative
determiner that the accessed referent has to be present in the
discourse, i.e., that it is related to the context or situation of
discourse. In fact, this intuition hinges on a minimal
interpretation of the deictic quality associated with each
demonstrative determiner, being that deixis not necessarily
implies contrast, monstration or pointing but only the
presupposition of being present. This minimal interpretation of
demonstratives is convincingly argued for in Kleiber 1983. He
claims that neither the meaning of doigt tendu (i.e., the locality
interpretation), nor the meaning of monstration (the
'demonstration') of the referent can be assigned to
demonstratives, not even in spoken context. The only thing which
can be postulated is that "leur objet de référence doit être p~sent
dans la situation d'énonciation" ('their object of reference has to
be present in the utterance situation'). Furthermore, the presence
intuition is congruent with the empirical fact and the adequacy
condition that the referent underlying demonstrative NPs always
has focal, marked value in the discourse.
Needless to say, most of the demonstrative proposals take basic
ideas as their starting point which are more specific than the
presence intuition. This is so with all identificationally inspired
proposals in which demonstratives are seen as search instructions
to find the referent somewhere (near~far) or in relation to other
referents, i.e., all localistic proposals and also Hawkins
(1978:152), I.Sbner (1985:321). But it also applies to
qualificational proposals, especially proposals in which
demonstratives necessarily imply attitudes of or towards
discourse participants (emotional closeness, importance, speaker's
concern etc.).
Instead of casting the presence-intuition in such a specific
theoretical mold and thereby jeopardising the general validity of
the demonstrative proposal, I will implement the presence
intuition in the following way: the use of a demonstrative simply
implies the association of the underlying referent with a
particular referential domain which is present in the text. This is
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considered to be the only pragmatic presupposition underlying
demonstratives. The presence or P-Presupposition (PP) of
demonstratives is defined as follows:
Presence-Presuppositionof Demonstratiues
A demonstrative NP expreases the association of the
underlying referent with a referential domain evoked in
the discourse.
In order to be able to handle the different functions and uses of
demonstrative NPs, and in line with the dichotomic nature of
Dutch demonstratives (deze~dit vs. die~dat), I will distinguish
two types of referential domains with which referents can be
associated. FSrstly, in each written text a deictic reference domain
[DRD] can be discerned. This simply means that each text is
embedded in its speech situation. DRD is constituted by the
coordination points Biihler (1982:11) distinguishes in his deictic
f'aeld of human language, i.e., here, now and I. The adaptation of
these DRD-coordinates for written language yields four deictic
reference points, entailed minimally in a discourse, i.e., place,
time, writer and discourse~text. In every discourse, each of these
reference points can be made explicit by means of referential-
deictic expressions. 5econdly, in texts referential domains can be
established the coordination points of which are clearly different
from DRD. The coordination points of these other referential
domains [ORD] can be defined as place, time and reader.
The presence-presupposition, combined with the postulation of
the two types of referential domains, produces the following
characterisation of the DD-variation:
Deze-Presence-Presupposition
A dezeNP expresses the association of the underlying
referent with one or more coordination point(s) of the
deictic reference domain (DRD) of the discourse involved:
the underlying referent is assigned the pragmatic value
[DRD].
Die-Presence-Presupposition
A dieNP expresses the association of the underlying
referent with one or more coordination point(s) of an
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other referential domain (ORD) in the discourse involved:
the underlying referent is assigned the pragmatic value
[ORDI.
Given the distinct coordination points in DRD and ORD,
mentioned above, the pragmatic values [DRD] and [ORD] are
subdivided into distinct subvalues, which can be dichotomised as
follows: on the one hand the association with actor-coordinates in
the referential domains, i.e., writer and reader respectively,
resulting in the pragmatic values [DRDw] and [ORDr]; on the
other hand the association with other coordinates, i.e., place, time
and discourse, resulting in the pragmatic values [DRDp], [DRDt],
[DRDd], [ORDp], [ORDt]. As such, the different types of
coordination points in a referential domain are a fruitful starting
point in coming to grips with the problem of the relationship
between 'literal', spatio-temporal uses of demonstratives and
'relational', actor-oriented uses of demonstratives.
In summary, the subdivision of the pragmatic values DRD and
ORD on the basis of writerlreader and other coordination points
results in the following figure:
Figure (1): Pragmatic referential-domain values
[RD]
[DRD] [ORD]
[DRDw] [DRDdpld] [ORDr] [ORDtIp]
Below, I will substantiate the PP-proposal, focussing especially on
the following merites:
(i) The pragmatic values, based on the different coordination
points of referential domains, yield natural classes of
demonstrative NPs.
(ii) There is empirical evidence to dichotomise the use of
demonstratives into classes associated with actor-
coordinates (writer and reader) and classes associated
with spatio-temporal coordinates.
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(iii) The analysis of demonstratives in terms of the PP-
proposal dces not relapse into metaphorical or conceptual
extensions which are irretraceable and hence intuitively
or psychologically implausible.
(iv) The PP-proposal does not require the postulation of
different (homonymic or polysemic) meanings of the
demonstrative determiners."
In the corroboration of the PP-proposal the following line will be
pursued. Firstly, in section 4.3.2, the proposal will be matched
against a number of demNPs which constitute distinct
demonstrative types, either because they are felt to be so
intuitively, or because they are according to other demonstrative
proposals. Secondly, in section 4.3.3, the PP-proposal is tested
against my corpus.
4.3.2 Referential domains and demonstrative use
4.3.2.1 Spatio-temporal coordination points
The intuitive relevance of the relationship between referential
domains and the DD-variation in written discourse is
demonstrated most easily by the following two types of
demonstrative NPs, representing broad classes of use of dezeNPs
and dieNPs respectively, i.e., so-called selfreferential dezeNPs, as
in (19) and so-called 'diegetic' narratiue dieNPs as in (20).12 The
demonstratives in both classes are characterised by the fact that
they cannot or hardly be replaced by the other variant.
(19) Er zijn dit jaar [DRDtI in dit land [DRDpI
vierhonderdtwintig moorden gepleegd.
This year, four hundred and twenty murders have been committed in
this country.
(20) Er was eens een prins;. (Die I?deze) prins; [ORDtIp] had
een kasteel.
Once upon a time there was a prince. IThat ~ this) prince had a castle.
The dezeNPs in (19) obligatorily associate the referents with the
deictic reference domain of the text, more precisely with the
coordination points of time and place. Changing dezeNPs into
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dieNPs necessarily results in the interruption of this association.
The dieNP in (20) associates the referent with the coordination
points time and place of a referential domain [ORD] evoked by
the content of the text, i.e., the story told.13 Again, the
replacement of die by deze disturbs this association: the referent
would no longer be associated with the referential domain of the
story. The inadequacy of the deze-variant results from the fact
that it is difficult in this example to associate the story-referent
with the hic et nunc of the text, i.e., DRD."
According to PPP, selfreference dezeNPs and diegetic narrative
dieNPs constitute natural correlates. In both cases, there is an
association with spatio-temporal coordinates of a referential
domain, i.e., DRD or ORD. This is extremely clear in selfreference
dezeNPs, which simply access these coordinates in the text. In
these cases the association with DRD is obligatory, i.e., the
dezeNPs in (19) cannot but be interpreted as expressing DRD-
association. But this does not alter the fact that in (20) too the
ORD-association is clear. This is indicated by the fact that the
presence-presupposition underlying die prins in (20) has to be
made explicit as in (20a) and not as in (20b), which would be the
explicit version of the presence-presupposition underlying deze
prins, provided we qualify this variant as adequate:
(20a) De prins die eens ergens was.
The prince who was somewhere once.
(20b) De prins waarover ik hier en nu vertel.
The prince about whom I'm telling you here and now.
The relevance of [ORDdp] can be illustrated by a discussion of
(21), an example from Anne Frank's 'Het Achterhuis', which is
used by Kirsner as a convincing counterexample against the
localistic hypothesis:
(21) Het is smoorheet, iedereen puft en bakt en in (die ~
?deze) hitte moet ik alles belopen.
It is boiling hot, we are all positively melting, and in Ithat I this) heat I
have to walk everywhere.
About this example, Kirsner notices the following:
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Euen though Anne Frank is directly experiencing the
heat (in the here-and-now), informants agree that deze
is much less likely than die. (Kirsner 1979:357)
This example is indeed very damaging to the locality hypothesis,
but at the same time it shows that Kirsner's notion of deixis in
this case runs into trouble. The demonstrative NP involved is
extremely foregrounded: changing the demonstrative NP to a less
foregrounded clause position decreases the acceptability
drastically, as is seen in (21a). According to Kirsner,
foregrounding as in (21) ahould be a clear indication for the use of
the high-deixis variant.
(21a) Het is smoorheet, iedereen puft en bakt en ik moet alles
belopen in {die I ?deze} hitte.
It is boEling hot, we are oll positiuely melting, and I haue to walk
euerywhere in Ithat I thisJ heat.
In PPP-terms, the pragmatic value [ORDp~t] is assigned to the
referent underlying the demonstrative NP in (21). This means
that the referent is associated with the coordination points of
another referential domain. The postulation of such a domain
becomes plausible in view of the context of (21), given in (21b):
(21b) Woensdag, 24 juni 1942
Lieve Kitty,
Het is smoorheet, iedereen puft en bakt en in die hitte
moet ik alles belopen. Nu zie ik pas hoe fijn een tram
toch is, vooral een open, maar dat genot is voor. ons Joden
niet langer weggelegd, voor ons is de benenwagen goed
genoeg. Gisteren moest ik tussen de middag naar de Jan
Luykenstraat naar de tandarts. ... (F`rank 1979:30)
Wednesday, June 24th 1942
Dear Riuy,
It is boiling hot, we are al! positiuely melting, and in that heat 1 have to
walk euerywhere. Only now do 1 see how nice it is to haue a tram,
especially an open one, but that delight is no longer reserved jor us Jews,
jor ua shanks's pony is good enough. Yesterday at noon 1 had to go to the
JanLuykenstraat to the dentist. ..
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In the setting of Anne FYank's autobiography it makes sense to
distinguish DRD, including the 'writing I', from ORD. ORD
contains the story, in which the writer plays the part of the main
actor. Given the postulation of these two referential domains, the
fragment can be said to be poised between them: in sentences 1
and 3 the level of the story is explicitly present. The first clause
of the second sentence contains the writer's reflection on the
narrative. So, the dieNP in sentence 1 reflects the referential
level of the content~story. Although the die-version is the most
adequate by far, the replacement by deze is not excluded at all.
The effect would then be that the writer reports from within the
story, i.e., that he chooses to let ORD and DRD coincide.
Although the [ORDtIp]-association is the most indisputable in
diegetic story-telling discourse, it is by no means restricted to
these cases. In non-diegetic discourse, in which the 'real world'
referential domain is evoked, dieNPs carrying the pragmatic
value [ORDdp] often suggest factivity, i.e., the demonstrative
choice expresses or is at least congruent with the factual nature
of the referent, existing and observable in the real world which is
evoked in the discourse. The difference between 'factual' ORD-
association and DRD-association is shown in (22), as the explicit
versions in brackets make clear: the die-version provides the
referent with a factual connotation, resulting from the [ORDpIt]-
value, whereas the deze-version reflects the expository character
of the text in which referents are exposed 'on the spot', i.e.,
within DRD.'s
(22a) In de grote steden neemt de luchtvervuiling; toe. Die
luchtueruuiling (i.e., de luchtueruuiling die in de grote
steden werkel~jk toeslaat); [ORDp] is het gevolg van
wanbeleid.
In the big cities air pollution is increasing. That airpollution (i.e., the
air pollution which really hits the big cities) is a result o( bad policy.
(22b) In de grote steden neemt de luchtueruuiling; toe. Deze
luchtueruuiling (i.e., de luchtuervuiling in de grote steden
waarover deze tekst handelt); [DRDd] is het gevolg van
wanbeleid.
In the big cities air pollution is increasing. That air pollution (i.e., the
air pollution in the big cities which this text deals with) is a result o(
bad policy.
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As we saw above, selfreference-dezeNPs do not allow for the
strategic variation between deze and die. This disparity generates
interesting cases, like the following variant of (19):
(19a) Er zijn dit jaar in dit land vierhonderdtwintig moorden;
gepleegd. Die moorden; zijn grotendeels in de grote steden
gepleegd.
This year (our hundred and tu~enty murders haoe been rnmmitted in tlus
country. Those murdera urere committed predominantly in the big cities.
In the first sentence dezeNPs stake out real-world coordination
points which are obligatorily associated with DRD, whereas the
dieNP in the second sentence is associated with the same real-
world coordinates, but this time conceived of as a referential
domain which is distinct from the hic et nunc of the text. These
cases result from the difference between anaphoric
demonstratives in which the DD-variation is in principle
available, and selfreference-dezeNPs, which do not allow this
variation.
Within the perspective of the presence-presupposition,
selfreference dezeNPs constitute a strong indication to consider
dezeNPs as the basic class of demonstrative NPs. They are
associated with DR,D, being the only referential domain in
discourse which has to be presupposed obligatorily. Support for
the ~asicality' of dezeNPs can be found in the fact that so-called
selfreference demonstratives in Dutch discourse - see e.g. (19) -
inevitably take the form of a dezeNP. F~rther support comes
from the fact that in principle in every discourse the coordination
points of DRD can be made explicit by means of dezeNPs. FSnally
there is a cross-linguistic argument for the basic value of
dezeNPs: in languages in which there is in written non-
contrastive context only one demonstrative-NP form available - as
in French ce(tte) and in German dies- - it is always the same
demonstrative NP-form as that which is used in selfreference-
demonstrative NPs.
However, the basicality of dezeNPs with regard to the presence-
presupposition neither means that dezeNPs in Dutch discourse
are most frequently used nor that demonstrative NPs should be
dezeNPs by default. It will be shown that different discourse
conditions can result in the use of dezeNPs as well as dieNPs as
default demonstrative class in a text.
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In sum, within the PP-proposal, the association with spatio-
temporal coordinates of referential domains yields correlative
classes of demonstratives, i.e., selfreference dezeNPs [DRDtlpld]
vs. narrative~f'actual dieNPs [ORDtIp]. As is clear from the
examples above and as will be confirmed by my corpus, ORD
turns out to be an effective tool in explaining demonstrative uses
in at least two respects: (i) it enables us to simply associate
dieNPs with the ORD of the content of the text, thus refraining
from making specific claims about relations between discourse
participants and (ii) it enables us to elucidate the strategic use of
referential domain shifts in discourse.
4.3.2.2 Actor-oriented coordination points
While the demonstrative NPs above were considered to be
expressing a'neutral' association with spatio-temporal
coordinates of referential domains evoked in the discourse, the
effect of other demonstrative NPs has to be described in terms of
associative relations between referent, writer and reader. In fact,
there are lots of typical demonstrative uses which can be
accounted for, intuitively as well as theoretically, in terms of
pragmatic relations between writer and reader. As a shorthand, I
will call these uses relatíonal.
Basically, there are two relational types of demonstrative NPs:
those bearing the pragmatic values [DRDw) and those bearing
the value [ORDr]. Each type is claimed to reflect one basic
relational mode between writer and reader, i.e., (i) [DR.Dw]
reflects the unequal relational mode and (ii) [ORDr] reflects the
equall mutual relational mode. Both modes have to be considered
the result of a writer's strategic choice. Generally speaking, in the
first mode the writer chooses to establish his own coordination
point or viewpoint independent of the reader's in order to realise
his plans and goals, whereas in the second mode he chooses to
adapt himself to the coordination point or viewpoint of the
reader. A first impression of both modes is given in (23) and
(24), is
(23) Deze sprankelende wereld van passie [DR.Dw], zoals ik
dat zou willen noemen, is eigen aan de schrijver.
This sparkling world o~passiort, as I would like to cal[ it, is peculiar to
the writer.
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(24) Die spanning uan die twee werelden [OR.Dr], begrijp je.
(3:4155)
That tension ojthose two worlds, you understand.
It ia plausible to capture the different effects of both
demonstratives in these examples in terms of DR.D~OR.D-
association and in terms of a different basic relational mode
between writer and reader. This does not alter the fact that the
notions of readerlwriter-association and relational mode cannot
fully account for the inferences connected with these
demonstratives. Thus, in (23), the pragmatic value [DRDw]
underdetermines interpretative aspects of the deze-demonstrative,
signalling for example the fact that the writer wants to be
responsible for the way he describes the referent. In (24), the
notions of [ORDr] and equaUmutual relational mode do not spell
out the inference that die can plausibly be seen as an invitation
or appeal to the reader to understand what the writer says or to
agree with it.
This underdetermination is no problem, however; on the contrary.
Firstly, these relational inferences asaociated with
demonstratives are natural extensions of the pragmatic values.
Secondly, it would be descriptively incorrect to incorporate these
specifications into the basic pragmatic values underlying
demonstratives, since it is not plausible to assume that the
demonstrative determiner is entirely responsible for these
specifications. If demonstratives give rise to complicated
inferences in terms of notions such as reader's appeal or writer's
responsibility, this is never or hardly ever caused only by the
demonstrative choice. In the examples above the explicit mention
of writer and reader and signals like begrijp je 'you understand'
and zoals ik dat zou willen noemen 'as I would like to call it' help
the reader to make such inferences. Apart from such contextual
signals there are also more global discourse clues which cause
such relational inferences. In an expository text, for example, the
writer normally establishes another relation with the reader than
in a conversational or narrative text. Consequently, it is more
accurate to say that the use of a demonstrative, with its
pragmatic value, is congruent with writerlreader-inferences
resulting from local contextual clues and global discourse
conditions, than to say that these inferences are inherent in the
semantics or pragmatics of demonstratives.
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In order to shed light on the relation between pragmatic values,
relational modes and relational inferences, I shall now present a
number of relational dieNPs and dezeNPs.
Relational dieNPs
Consider first the following relational die-examples:
(24) Die spanning van die twee werelden [ORDr], begrijp je.
(3:4155)
That tension ojthose two worlds, you understand.
(25) Hoe zat dat trouwens met die eerste Sonsbeek-expositie in
1949 [ORDr]? (3:1595)
Come to think oj it, how did that ~rst Sonsbeek exhibition go in 1949?
(26) Ik heb bijvoorbeeld iets met hem meegemaakt, we
speelden met Johnny Griffin en die speelde ontzaglijk
hoge tempo's. Dat is voor een pianist in de eerste plaats
ontzettend moeilijk, om van die hoge tempo's [ORDr] te
spelen. (3:3886)
1 remember him, u~e were playing with Johnny Cri~in and he was
playing incredibly high tempos. First oj all, it is very dij)``ccult jor a
pianist to play those high tempos.
(27) Ze knielden voor hem neer met die typisch Braziliaanse
aanhankelijkheid [ORDr]. (9:1211)
They kneeled down in jront ojhim with that typical Brazilian devotion.
(28) Met al die ellende in de wereld [ORDr~t~p], moeten we het
hoofd koel houden.
What with al1 that misery in the world, we have to keep a cool head.
(29) Als getuige moet je een eed afleggen dat je aanwezig was
op die en die plaats [ORDrIp] en op dat en dat tijdstip
[ORDdr]. (Kirsner 1991)
As a witness you must swear an oath that you were present in such and
such a place and at such and such a time.
(30) Eindelijk wordt eens bewezen dat al dat geklaag [ORDr]
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over het onderwijs niet helemaal klopt. (7:0158)
Finally it is proued that there is something wrong wtth all that
complaining about eduartion.
(31) Je kunt je toch niet voorstellen dat dat soort vrouwen
[ORDr] bij Sonja Barend zou gaan zitten. Dan zouden ze
even korte metten met al dat gezeur van inspraak en
praatgroepen en klachten over onbegrip [ORDr] maken.
(7:0130-0131)
You arnnot imagine women like that appearingon Sonja Barendá show.
They would gioe short shrijt to all that bellyaching about participation
and talk groups and those complainta about lack ojunderstanding.
(32) "Ha (die )~deze) Frits [ORDr]!" zei de jongen, gaf hem
een harde klap op de schouder, bleef voor hem staan en
zei... (Van Het Reve 1961:35, cited in Kirsner 1979:357).
'Ah, Fritsf," the boy said, slapped him on the shoulder, iemained
standing right in jront ojhim and said...
As was noted before, the relational inferences we are interested
in are largely dependent on global discourse conditions.
Therefore, in order to be able to draw legitimate inferences, it is
important to recognise that all ~ocal' sentences presented above
are considered to fit in with conversational discourse. The
examples fit in to texts in which it is the writer's purpose to
establish a mutual, equal relation with the reader. This mode is
mostly active in spoken discourse, which is known to contain far
more dieNPs than dezeNPs."
In all the examples above we can discern a general writer's
strategy which is consistent with both (ORDr] and the
equavmutual relational mode, i.e., the speaker wants to make an
explicit appeal to the reader, as an attempt to secure the reader's
collaboration, agreement, collegiality and mutual understanding
about the referent.
The invitation to mutual understanding is expressed explicitly in
the inviting phrase begrijp je 'you understand' in (24) - as was
already mentioned above - and in the question-format in (25).
Also the reparaphrasing clause om van die hoge tempo's te spelen
'to play those high tempos' in (26) can be interpreted that way.
Note, that dieNPs in both (26) and (27) can be followed easily by
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the added appeal weet je wel 'you know'.
By using dieNPs in these cases the writer implicitly credits the
reader with a certain familiarity with the referent, although the
reader need not be 'really' familiar with the referent at all. For
example, the reader of (27) need not be familiar with the devotion
of Brazilians for the writer to use the die-variant.
In (28) and (29) the aim of the writer's appeal for collaboration is
the reader's acceptance of the referent in all its vagueness (see
also Kirsner 1991). The use of dieNPs here is meant to preclude
questions like what misery ~ place ~ time do you exactly mean? In
my view, what imprecise dieNPs do is not so much signal
referential vagueness, as indicate the writer's attempt to obtain
the reader's acceptance of this vagueness.
Not only the acceptance of referential vagueness is at stake in
relational dieNPs, but also the acceptance of the writer's opinion
about referents, as is clear in (30) and (31). By using dieNPs the
writer appeals to the reader to agree with the writer's opinions
that one should not complain about education in (30) and that
women's talk about partic.ipation etc. is bullshit in (31).
Finally, the salutatory demonstrative use, as Kirsner 1991 calls
dieNPs like the one in (32), fits in most naturally with the
equaUmutual relational mode. These dieNPs are used
conventionally in face to face greetings. Ha, die x has to be
considered prototypically an autonomous speech act. Including
only a vocative address of the referent, it can hardly be used to
convey information. Rather, it functions purely as a relational
marker, signalling the writer's move towards the reader and
inducing a relationship of solidarity and familiarity. Expressions
that most naturally accompany such greetings are relational
questions like how are you. The interpretation of the greeting in
such mutual relational terms is congruent with the fact that the
replacement of die by deze is absolutely excluded. In my view, the
relational interpretation given here is more plausible than the
interpretation Kirsner 1991 gives within the cognitive grammar
framework:
In fact, the meaning postulated for die' (namely
DIFFERENTIATION REQUIRED AND MADE, NOT
NEAR) seems quite appropriate when one considers
that, in contrast to Ha Bob; whiclt merely greets Bob,
Ha die Bob!' communicates an additional modicum of
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surprise either at Bob himself or what he has just said.
This surprise or unexpectedness seems maximaUy
congruent with NOT NEAR (interpreted perhaps
"epistemically" as a lack of familiarity) as opposed to
the NEAR of deze' or the total absence of locative
infermation signaled by de'. (Kirsner 1991:2~-28)
This explanation, which forces us to interpret Ha, die x as a
reaction to something surprising and which associates die with a
lack of familiarity, is incompatible with the equallmutual
relational mode and is highly counterintuitive.
Relational dezeNPs
Consider the following dezeNPs:
(33) Zo beschouwd is het ABN dus een standaardtaal die
persoonlijk bezit van een spreker is; het is niet een
geografisch af te grenzen verschijnsel... Ook
Nederlanders in dialectgebieden kunnen ABN-sprekers
zijn; sommigen hanteren uitsluitend deze standaardtaal
[DR.DwId] ... (Kírsner 1987:90)
Viewed in this way, ABN is a starrdardlanguage which is the personal
property o( n speaker; it is not a geographically delinuted phenomenon...
Dutch people in dialect areas may also be ABN-speakers; a~me use this
standard language exclusively...
(23) Deze sprankelende wereld uan passie [DRDw], zoals ik
dat zou willen noemen, is eigen aan de schrijver.
This sparkling world o(passion, as 1 would like to call it, is peculiar to
the writer.
These examples fit in with discourse conditions that incite the
speaker to eatablish an unequal relation with the reader. Both
examples occur in texts which are - broadly speaking - expository.
The relational mode between writer and reader in such texts can
best be described as a relation between teacher and pupil, the
purpose of the writer being to instruct or teach the reader or to
expound something to him. In my corpus, as well as in other
corpora (e.g. Kirsner's 1979:368), dezeNPs are dominant in
expository texts. In my view, the basic discourse conditions
responsible for this are the unequal relational mode and the
association with the writer's perspective, both congruent with the
[DRDw]-value.
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Example (33) is just one example taken from an expository
context, in which deze basically expresses the teacher-pupil
relational mode which has to be postulated in expository context.
Furthermore, in this example, the same effect as in the deze-
version of example (22) can be discerned, i.e., the effect associated
with the pragmatic value [DRDd], which can be made explicit by
the following inference: the standard language with which I'm
dealing here and now. So, both the unequal relational mode
[DRDw] and the handling of the referent 'on the spot' [DRDd]
account for the demonstrative choice in this and in many other
expository dezeNPs.
Relational modes us. deictic regions
The idea of connecting demonstrative choice with referential
domains and basic relational modes is supported by the
demonstrative proposal of Janssen (1991a,b,c). Janssen's proposal
starts from the differentiated relation between the speaker's
vantage point towards referents and different deictic regions
within the writer's mental field of vision:
When using a demonstrative, the speaker has a uantage
point in mind from which he surueys a mental field of
uision. (..) the speaker conceives the fceld as being
divided into distinct parts, here indicated as region A
and region B. (..) By using the deictic 'this; the speaker
indicates that he enuisages the entity inuolued as being
located in the region that is of áentral referential
concern' to him. By using the deictic 'that' the speaker
indicates that he envisages the entity inuolued as being
located in the region that is indeed of referential
concern to him, but is not his central referential
concern. Even though the entity inuolved is in the
speaker's focus of attention, it's not in the fixus of his
referential concern. (..) The two di~j`'erent types of
referential concern will be termed 'focal' and 'disfocal:
(Janssen 1991a:12)
It is obvious that this proposal supports the interpretation of
demonstratives in terms of referential domains and relational
modes: (i) In my view as well as in Janssen's demonstratives
necessarily express that referents are located in or associated
with a deictic region or referential domain. (ii) Janssens's mental
field of vision and the vantage point of the speaker can be looked
upon as the most important components in determining the
relational mode between writer and reader. It seems to me to be
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fully consistent with his view to interpret the relational examples
above in terms of the natural connection of discourse referents
with the speaker's or the reader's vantage point.
However, there is one element Janssen associates with deictics
which in my view endangers the general applicability of the
proposal. For Janssen the most general facet in the meaning of a
demonstrative is the notion of centrality of referential concern,
focal referential concern and disfocal referential concern being
necessarily part of the meaning of deze and die reapectively. It is
difficult both to accept intuitively that and to determine whether
all referents underlying dezeNPs are of central referential
concern, whereas all referents underlying dieNPs "are indeed of
referential concern to the speaker, but are not his central
referential concern". The intrinsic meaning of disfocality, affiliated
with each referent underlying a dieNP, suggests either that by
using die other referents are more central in the speaker's
referential concern or that, for some reason or other, the referent
underlying a dieNP doea not deserve the speaker's central
referential concern. Either possibility is improbable, if only in the
light of most of the non-contrastively used factual, conversational
or narrative dieNPs presented above. If the speaker tells us a
story about a prince, as in (21), what referent can be more central
to the speaker than the main character in the story, i.e., the
prince? Or, even more clearly, if the speaker greets Frits, as in
(32), it is implausible either to assume another referent being
more central than Frits, or to presuppose reasons why Frits
should not be central in the speaker's referential concern.
If the notion of referential (dis)focality is not meant to be
implemented that way, at least it means that a referent is
connected with a region which referentially is or is not (i.e., not
yet or no longer) of central concern to the writer. And this alone
is problematic in view of texts in which highl,y accessible
referents, embedded in the context of a conversation or story, can
repeatedly be accessed by dieNPs. Furthermore, such a minimal
interpretation is hardly tenable in view of the considerable
differences across text types in the percentages of die vs. deze. If
conversational discourse contains almost exclusively die-
demonstratives, what exactly does it mean then that all these
referents are located in a region which is referentially disfocal?
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4.3.2.3 Mixed uses of demonstratives
In the analysis of spatio-temporal and relational demonstrative
uses it has already become clear that these uses do not have to be
discriminated neatly in al] demonstrative occurrences. In fact,
there are natural combinations between them which are often
united within the same demonstrative occurrence. For example,
notions such as narrativity [ORDdp] and reader's appeal [ORDr],
as well as exposition on the spot [DRDd] and unequal relational
mode [DRDw] can be combined in the same demonstrative, as can
already be seen in examples like (28) and (33).
A clear combination of spatio-temporal and relational use can be
found in the following two correlative uses of demonstrative
determiners, which I will call announcing demonstratiues.
Consider the following examples:
(34) Bij dit alles even deze kanttekening [DRDd~w]: ... (3:2143)
Here I would like to add this marginal note: ...
(35) Toen ik deze maand dacht dat ik dood zou gaan, was ik
ten diepste verbaasd over deze openbaring [DRDdIw]: dat
ik geen pijn had, en geen angst ook. (3:2613)
When I thought this month that 1 was going to die, 1 was really uery
surprised at this revelation: that ! hnd no pain, and no fear either.
(36) Ik wil nu deze opmerking [DRDdIw] maken: .. (Kirsner
1991)
I now want to make this remark: ...
(37) De toeslagenwet moet ervoor zorgen dat die mensen die
een loondervingsuitkering ontvangen en waarvan hun
totale inkomen onder het uoor hun geldende sociale
minimum ligt [ORDdpI(r)] een extra bijdrage krijgen, ..
(2:0126)
The allowance [aw is Meant to give an extm allowance to those people
who receive a compensation jor loss oj wages and whose total income is
lower than the social minimum applicable to thPm.
(38) Het aanvullingsfonds geeft namelijk vergoedingen voor
die onkosten die niet (of slechts gedeeltel~jk) door de
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gewone ziekenfondsuerzekering worden vergoed
[ORDt~pl(r)]. (2:0156)
The jact ia that the supplementnry jund paya compensation jor those
expenaea which are not (or only partially) rejunded by the normal health
seruice.
(39) Die enkele keer dat ik naar de kerk ga [ORDdpI(r)] ..
(Kirsner 1991)
Those rare jew times that Igo to church ...
(40) Het doet denken aan die keer dat Den Uyl de zendtijd
uorderde om het volk kond te doen uan dat de olie op
was.. [ORDtlplr] (7:0178]
It reminds one oj that time that Den Uy! clairned time on radio and
teleuision to announce to the people that there was no more oil.
Both demonstrative-NP types are correlative in that they both
announce something which follows, and in that they are both
restricted to particular syntactic conditions: the dezeNPs, as in
(34) -(36), naturally occurring before a colon, precede and
announce an independent clause. The dieNPs, as in (37) -(40)
announce restrictive relative clauses. Their relevance, although
not as correlative classes, is acknowledged by Kirsner (1991). The
dezeNP-type coincides with what he calls the information status
use, the dieNP-type with his emphatic use. Also Maclaran 1980
discusses the use of restrictive that in English.1e
The superficial correlations mentioned thus far do not yet make
an explanation possible in terms of PPP. However, other, more
fundamental characteristics have to be mentioned. The dezeNPs
in (34) -(36) have to be classified as propositional cataphors.
They access a discourse segment, i.e., a referent which only exists
within the referential domain of the text. Moreover, they qualify
the speech-act status of that discourse segment: the proposition
expressed in that segment is qualified as a note, a revelation and
a remark respectively. This qualification presupposes an overt,
pragmatic action of the writer, who takes the responsibility for
this qualification. Thus, it is normal that in the texts in which
these examples occur the coordination point of the writer should
be explicitly present.
On the other hand, dieNPs as in (37) -(40) typically access
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referents with the connotation of referents existing in the outside
world or associated with a referential domain which is distinct
from DRD. In all cases, there is a clear place and~or time
association, located outside the text. Apart from its spatio-
temporal connotations, die can also be said to 'rouse' familiarity
with the referent or to stimulate collaboration in resolving this
peculiar (non-)anaphoric use of die. More about these announcing
dieNPs and the relational inferences associated with them can be
found in the following section, see example (58).
4.3.3 PPP and the DD-corpus
In this section evidence will be provided in favour of the
presence-presupposition proposal on the basis of the analysis of
the DD-corpus. Although the analysis will mainly corroborrate
the descriptive ideas of the previous section, its surplus value is
twofold: (i) analysing real-life data forces us to deal not only with
'clear-effect' demonstrative uses but also with weak uses of
demonstratives and (ii) corpus analysis shows how different uses
of demonstratives can be discriminated andlor combined.
The starting point of the analysis is table (21), which shows the
percentages of dezeNPs vs. dieNPs in the different subcorpora I
analysed. The survey shows the striking fact that the deze~die-
ratio differs considerably over the different subcorpora. It has
already become clear in the preceding section that this result is
highly consistent with my view of demonstrative choice being
determined to a large extent by global discourse conditions, i.e.,
conditions determining the type of discourse involved, such as
content and relational mode.
Table (21): DD-distribution per corpus19
corl cor2 cror3 cor4 mrb eoró eor7 cor8 total
n 96 n 96 n 96 n 96 n 96 n 96 n ~ n R, n
dexe 84 85.9 99 80.5 390 b8.1 bb 52.9 9 23 7 20.6 12 10.3 19 23.2 67b
die 15 14.1 24 19.5 281 41.9 49 47.1 30 77 27 79.4 9b 89.7 69 76.8 584
total 99 100 123 100 671 ]00 104 100 39 100 34 100 107 100 B2 100 1259
In the analysis of the DD-variation of the DD-corpus, I will
restrict myself to the two extremes: firstly, the corpora 1 and 2
with an exceptional number and percentage of dezeNPs and
secondly the corpora 5, 6, 7 and 8, with the exceptional number of
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dieNPs. Subsequently I will analyse the dezel die-ratios in the
deze-corpora (i.e., the corpora 1 8~ 2) and in the die-corpora (i.e.,
the corpora 5, 6, 7, 8).
4.3.3.1 The deze-corpora (1, 2)
DezeNPs
The corpora 1 and 2 each contain 9 leaflets with instruction or
information about an official body (library, hospital, school...) or a
regulation (allowance law, custody, health inaurance,
supplementary fund). In view of their informationaVinstructional
function, the brochures can be said to be expository. With respect
to the DD-distribution the following expository discourse
characteristics are relevant:
(i) In the leaflets the text itself is explicitly present as a
coordination point in DRD: in 14 of the 18 texts
selfreference demonstratives [DRDd] explicitly access this
coordination point, as in (41). 62 of the dezeNPs in these
corpora (28~0) are selfreference demonstrative NPs.
(41) Deze brochure [DRDd] geeft u informatie over kleine
handigheidjes bij problemen in en om het huis. (2:0211)
This órochure ojjers you handy tips to solue problems in and around the
house.
(ii) The information in leaflets typically describes
possibilities, conditions, activities of an organisation or
regulation. The information does not contain facts or
events, instantiated in space and time, but general
information applicable to all interested readers. The
'potentialis' character of the information is congruent
with the informational or instructional purpose of
leaflets. In most of the leaflets, this purpose is explicitly
expressed, as in (42) and (43):
(42) In deze folder kunt u algemene informatie vinden ouer
deze toeslagenwet. (2:0127-0128)
In this leatlet you can fnd general injormation on this allowance law.
(.43) Wij willen u in dit boekje meer informatie geven over het
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functioneren van Sportgroep Gehandicapten Goirle.
(1:0037)
In this booklet, we want to give you some more information about the
functioning of the Sports Group for Disabled People Goirle.
(iii) Most of the leaflets are in the relational mode which is
prototypical for expository texts: the writer presents
himself as the informer of the reader and thus creates
the unequal teacher-pupil mode, as is clear in (43).
These characteristics, annex examples, fit in with use conditions
imposed on dezeNPs by the PP-proposal, thus providing strong
support for the high ratio of dezeNPs in the subcorpora 1 and 2:
(i) The explicit presence of the text and the 'text moment'
ensures an easily accessible association point for [DRDd]-
dezeNPs.
(ii) The 'potentialis' character of the content of leaflets
provides referents with the connotation of 'non-factivity',
or at least the presupposition of not being instantiated
within a particular scenario or referential domain, thus
providing a strong counterindication for the use of
dieNPs.
(iii) The expository mode induces two discourse conditions
facilitating dezeNPs, i.e., the unequal teacher-pupil
relational mode and the 'on-the-spot effect' cited above.
An indication for this effect is the fact that the
demonstrative determiner in this expository context can
naturally be replaced by (under consideration ~ at issuel
in this leaflet.
In sum, in terms of PPP, there is no reason for establishing
another referential domain by default with which referents have
to be associated. It is natural to associate referents with the
coordination points DRDw and DRDd, thus expressing the
unequal relational mode and the 'on-the-spot effect' associated
with expository discourse.
DieNPs
These conditions facilitating dezeNPs do not alter the fact that in
a limited number of demonstrative NPs (n-39) the die-variant is
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chosen, as is seen in table (21). The majority of dieNPs are
located in three leaflets (leaflet 6, 12 and 16: 27 dieNPs, i.e.,
69qo). The question now is how these dieNPs can be accounted
for. Qualitative analysis makes it clear that for all dieNPs text
circumstances can be indicated which can explain the activation
of ORD.
One circumstance that can account for a considerable class of
dieNPs is what I call instantiation. 25 out of 39 occurrences of
dieNPs (64.1~0) can be accounted for by the notion of
instantiation. The notion of instantiation can account for the
dieNPs in two leaflets with an abnormally high proportion of
dieNPs (leaflet 12: 23 deze and 9 die; leaflet 16: 10 deze and 7
die). Let us first consider the dieNPs in leaflet 16, in which
administrative regulations are described for interim workers at
'Randstad uitzendbureau'. In the leaflet the potentialis or general
perspective proper to these expository texts is often shifted to the
instantiated perspective of the reader for whom the regulations
hold. In PPP-terms, the effect of instantiation is captured by the
postulation of another referential domain apart from the
expository scene. The difference between general and instantiated
perspective upon the referent is clear in the following examples,
especially in (44). The underlying inferences are made explicit in
brackets:
(44) Voordat u voor de eerste keer gaat werken, vult u een
loonbelastingverklaring in. Die verklaring (i.e., de
verklaring, die u op dat moment invult) [ORDt1r] is nodig
om te bepalen in welke tariefgroep u valt. Deze
aerklaring (i.e., de loonbelastingsverklaring, waarover in
deze folder sprake is) [DRDd] hceft u maar één keer in te
vullen, namelijk voor uw eerste werkdag. (2:0197-0198)
Bejore you go to work jor the frst time, you have to hll out an income
tax statement. That statement (i.e., the declaration that you f ll out at
that particular moment) is needed in order to determine in what tax
bracket you belong. You haue to ~ll out this declaration (i.e., the
declaration under consideration in this leaflet) only once, and that is
bejore your ~rst working day.
(45) Maakt u overuren of werkt u in ploegendienst, dan
ontvangt u een toeslag. Vraag uw intercedent(e) wat u in
dat geual (d.i. het geval, waarin u zich op dat moment
bevindt) [ORDdr] moet invullen. (2:0157)
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If you work overtime or in shijts, you receive an estra allowance. Ask
your intercedent what you have to f!! out in that case (i.e., the aase that
applies to you at that moment)
(46) U bent opgenomen in het ziekenfonds dat u aan
Randstad opgeeft. U moet zich b~j dat ziekenfonds (d.i.
het ziekenhuis, dat u in dat geval hebt opgegeven)
[ORDt~r] zelf inelden. (2:0158)
You are registered with the health insurance agency that you ~illed in on
your Randstad forms. Now you haue to register with thnt health agency
(i.e., the health agency that you selected in that case) yourselj.
The same shifts can be found in the dieNPs in leaflet 12.
Consider (47):
(47) Een klein deel van al deze inkomsten wordt voor
hoogstens twee jaar niet meegeteld met het totale
inkomen. Dit is de vrijlatingsregeling. De grootte van dit
deel [DRDd] ligt tussen 5ok en 15~k van het
minimumloon. (..) Die grens van twee jaar [ORDtlplr]
geldt niet voor u als u een uitkering ontvangt op grond
van de werkeloosheidswet en pas na het bereiken van de
leeftijd van 57,5 jaar werkeloos bent geworden en dus pas
na die leeftijd van 57,5jaar [ORDtIp~r] recht kreeg op die
uitkering [ORDtlplr] . De vrijlatingsregeling geldt dan net
zolang als u recht heeft op die uitkering [ORDt~p~r].
(2:0134-0141)
For two years at the most, a small part of this income is not added to the
total income. This is the exemption regulntion. The amount oj this part
lies in between 596 and 1596 of the minimum wage. (..) That limit oj two
years dces not apply to you ijyou receive unemployment benefit and did
rtol become unemployed until after the age of 57,5 and were therejore not
entitled to that óene~l until after that age oj 57,5. The esemption
regulation then applies as long as you are entitled to that benefit.
The introduction of this fragment corresponds perfectly well with
the expository leaflet characteristics outlined above: a general
regulation is exposed on the spot, i.e., on the level of DRD. In
sentence four an exception to this general regulation is
introduced. In describing this exception, the general perspective
is left: the exception is instantiated, applied to the concrete case
of the reader, which presupposes the postulation of the referential
domain in which the reader undergoes the exception concerned.




Instantiation also explains individual occurrences of dieNPs in
other leaflets, as in (48):
(48) Als u een patiënt op een andere afdeling wilt bezoeken
dan is het nodig dat de hoofdverpleegkundige uan die
afdeling (i.e., de bepaalde afdeling die u in dat geval wilt
bezoeken) [ORDtlplr] hierover wordt geïnformeerd.
(2:0110)
Ij you want to visit a patient in another ward, it ia necessary to in~orm
Llae head nurae oj that ward (i.e., that particular ward you want to visit
in that case).
Another class of dieNPs can be explained through the notion of
factivity. That is the case in 8 dieNP-occurrences. In these cases
the demonstrative die imposes on the referent involved the
connotation of factual referent, existing in the outside world.
Factivity explains the high ratio of dieNPs in leaflet 6(5 de2e and
11 die). Two examples:
(49) Het gebeurt overal. Gewoon thuis: de brievenbus raakt
overvol. Iedereen stopt er informatie in. Kilo's informatie.
En die stroom [ORDtJp] grceit alleen maar.
It happena everywhere. Simply at home: the letter-boz geta chock-ful1.
Everyone puta in(ormation in it. Kclograma o~ information. And that
atream ia growing and growing.
(50) Maar waar haalt iedereen zijn gegevens vandaan? Niet
iedereen kent de weg in informatieland. Van oudsher
helpen bibliothecarissen en documentalisten daarbij.
Stoffige uiterlijken, strenge haarknotjes, krijtstreep
pakken met uitgelubberde knieën: dat beeld [OR.DtJp]
bestaat er van hen. Fout, helemaal fout.
But where do people get their information? Not everyone knowa the way
in in(ormationland. Libnariana and documentaliata have alwaya helped
them here. Stu~y facea, aevere looking buna, atriped suita with baggy
kneea. That is the image we have of them. Wrong, all wrong.
Leaflet 6 gives information about a library academy. In the
leaflet the information requirements in our society are described.
The emphasis here lies on the 'real' character of these
requirements. Moreover, in (50) there is a clear distinction
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between the opinion of the writer (on DRD) and that of people in
the outside world (on ORD) about the image of librarians.
Apart from instantiation and factivity, there are two remaining
classes of dieNPs in the deze-corpora. Firstly, there are three
dieNPs in which the demonstrative choice can be explained in
terms of referential uagueness (1:0054, 2:0121, 2:0206), as in (51),
to which the interpretative elements of vagueness and reader's
appeal for collaboration apply, as in (24) above. Finally, there are
three announcing dieNPs (1:0067, 2:0126, 2:0156), for which the
same interpretation holds as for the examples (38), (39) and (40)
above.
(51) Indien u bijvoorbeeld naar de dokter moet of om een an-
dere reden afwezig bent, dan werkt u niet en krijgt u de
betreffende uren niet uitbetaald. Randstad reserveert
0.2~ boven op uw bruto uurloon uoor dat soort uerlo~n
uren [ORDr]. (2:0206)
If `or example you haue to go to lhe doctor or ij you are absent jor
another reason, then you do not work and you do not get paid for these
hours. Randstad reserues 0.296 on yourgross hourly wage for those kinds
o~ hours lost.
The distribution of dieNPs according to their functional value is
summarised in table (22):









4.3.3.2 The die-corpora (5,6,7,8)
DieNPs
Corpora 5 and 6 are reviews (5 book reviews, 6 tv-programme
reviews); 7 contains autobiographical fragments and corpus 8
personal comments on actual events. All corpora are from the
same magazine (Vrij Nederland), and by the same writer (Rinus
Ferdinandusse). All these corpora share the following global
discourse characteristics which account for the dieNP-occurrences
in these corpora:
(i) Facts taken from books, tv-programmes, everyday topics
or events determine the content of all texta, favouring
dieNPs with the pragmatic value [ORDtIp].
(ii) The texts in these subcorpora are mostly narrative, also
favouring dieNPs with the pragmatic value [ORDtIp].
(iii) The corpora all concern informal and conuersational
texts, in which the writer explicitly takes the reader as
his partner. By default, the writer establishes an
equaUmutual relational mode with the reader, in which
several reader-inferences can be distinguished. This
favours the use of dieNPs, with the pragmatic value
[ORDr].zo
Both types of association, expressed by the values [ORDtIp] and
[ORDr] respectively, are often combined, dieNPs being congruent
with both the narrative and the conversational character of the
text involved.
There are clear cases, however, in which one of the two pragmatic
values has to be assigned or at least is dominant. Firstly, there
are spatio-temporal cases. Consider (52), (53) and (54) in which
the referents underlying the demonstrative NPs are associated
with the coordinates time or place of ORD, and (55) which is
similar to the diegetic-narrative example in (20):
(52) Laatst keek ik naar het acht uur journaal. Daar werd
melding gemaakt van een bezoek van premier Lubbers
aan China. 'Lubbers,' zo zei de nieuwslezeres aan het
eind van het bericht, 'zat aan een groots banket. Met
stokjes.' En precies op dat moment [ORDt] zag je onze
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minister-president met stokjes eten. (6:0066)
Some time ago, I watched the 8 oélock news. There was a report qf a
visit o~Prime Minister Lubbers to China. 'Lubbers'said the journalist at
the end oj the report 'was a guest at a big banquet. With chopsticks.' And
exactly al that moment you could see our prime minister eating with
chopsticks.
(53) Ik ben er zelfs van overtuigd dat de Nederlandse
ministerraad in die dagen [ORDtJ is afgeluisterd (5:0031)
1 am even convinced that the Dutch assembly oj ministers was bugged in
those days.
(54) Zo begint de psychologische thriller van René Appel, en
het vervelende is, dat hij Tunesië heeft gekozen, want
daardoor springt onwillekeurig de naam Patricia
Highsmith naar voren, die in dat zelfde land [OR.Dp] een
jonge schrijver ook met een soortgelijk probleem opzadelt.
(5:0036)
That is how René Appel's psychological thriller starts, and the trouble is
that he chose Tunis, because that way the name oj Patricia Highsmith,
who in that same country saddles a young writer with a similar
problem, strongly suggests itselj:
(55) Wat wij zagen was dat een auto op straat zo stond te
flikkeren maar ulak naast die auto [ORDp] was een
parkeerplaats. (7:0118)
What we saw was a car blinking its ltghts in the street, but there was a
parking place right next to lhat car.
Furthermore, there are die-demonstratives which, by means of
the pragmatic value [ORDr], in the first place express the mutual
relational mode between writer and reader. In general, these
demonstratives are used to somehow involve the reader. As I
already showed in the preceding section, this 'involvement'
strategy can be elucidated by relational inferences.
The pragmatic value [ORDr] is apparent in the frequent use of
dieNPs which are non-anaphoric or have to be situated in the
twilight zone of anaphoricity. If we take the presence of a clear
and unambiguous antecedent as the precondition for
anaphoricity, about one third of all dieNPs in these subcorpora do
not meet this condition. In these cases, the writer makes an
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appeal to the reader to get his collaboration in resolving reference
(cf. the cases of referential vagueness mentioned in the preceding
sections).
First, consider the non-anaphoric dieNPs in (56}(57). In
examples like these, the context doesn't provide any indication in
order to access the referent involved. The value of [ORDr] has to
be interpreted as a suggestion of the writer that he considers the
reader to be able to access the referent on the basis of knowledge
he shares with the writer, as is made explicit between brackets:
(56) ~beginnirtg of the text~
Je kon nu echt merken dat het lente begon te worden
want er stonden weer uan die dikke Duitse auto's op de
stcepen (waarvan ik veronderatel dat je ze kent) [ORDr].
(7:0136)
It was clear nau that spring was coming again, jor again there were
those big German cars on the pauemente (which I assume you know).
(57) Dan lees je in de krant weer van die boze reacties uan
Duitsers ( i.e., waarvan ik aanneem dat je ze kent)
[ORDr]. (7:0140)
Then you can read in the papers about those angry reactions jrom
Germans (i.e, which I nssume you know).
The same sort of inferences are associated with the announcing
dieNPs, as in (58). Apart from the factual inferences which can be
assigned to this dieNP-type, the announcing dieNPs in these
subcorpora are clearly related too to the mutual-knowledge
appeal I described above:
(58) Je kent nog wel uan die uerhalen van uoetballers die hun
schoenen aandeden en ... [ORDtlplr] (7:0151)
You know those stories about ~ootba[l players who put their ahces on
and..
Furthermore, [OADr] has to be assigned to a great number of
dieNPs situated in the tcuilight zone of anaphoricity. In all these
cases, there are certain indications in the context which can be
used to access the referent. But these indications require a lot
more of the reader's inferring than is needed in standard, formal
discourse, in which the anaphor is connected to an explicit
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antecedent according to the normal accessibility conditions on
discourse reference. The use of the die-variant in these cases is a
signal to the reader to appeal to his goodwill and collaboration in
resolving reference, for, he has to be prepared to draw more or
other kinds of contextual inferences than anaphoric expressions
normally require, as is clear in the following examples:
(59) Als ik zijn [Lubbers' (AM)] adviseur was - eigenlijk droom
ik te vaak dat dat telefoontje komt [i.e., waarin Lubbers
de schrijver zou vragen om zijn adviseur te worden (AM)]
[ORDr] - zou ik hem met nadruk gewezen hebben op de
mogelijkheid van de premier om zendtijd te vorderen op
Hilversum 1 en 2. (7:0177)
Ijl were Lubbers' advisor - in fact I dream too ojten that that telephone
call comes [i.e., in which Lubbers would ask the writer to become his
aduisorJ - I would haue mode it emphaticnlly clear to him that it is
possible jor the Prime Minister to claim broadcasting tíme on Hilversum
1 and 2.
(60) Waarom zijn er nu geen filmsterren meer? Nou, dat
antwoord [i.e., het antwoord op deze vraag (AM)] [ORDr]
heb ik al gegeven. (6:0059)
Why are there no film stars anymore? Pue already giuen that anawer [i.e.,
the answer to that questionJ.
Furthermore, there are quantifying dieNPs in which the
combination of the quantifier and the die-demonstrative signals
imprecise reference, often combined with a pejorative or negative
attitude of the speaker towards the referent, as is shown in (30),
(31) above and (61), (62) below:
(61) En dat geeft aan wat er aan dat soort berichtjes [ORDr]
ontbreekt: ... (8:243)
And that indicates what is wrong with those kinds o['report: ...
(62) Maar tegenwoordig moet er altijd wat 'zijn'. En dus gaan
al die dorpen en streken [ORDr) wat bedenken. En zo
krijg je al die pretparken en museumpjes [OR.Dr]. (7:0080-
0081)
But these days there always has to be something here. And that's why all
those uillages and regions start thinking oj something. And so you get all
those amusement parks and museums.
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As was pointed out in the previous section, the dieNPs prompt
the reader to accept the reference in all its vagueness and invite
him to agree with the writer's opinions regarding the referents.
Finally, relational inferences are not restricted to non-anaphoric
dieNPs at all. Consider the following example with an anaphoric
dieNP, implying similar inferences of evaluation and~or mutual
knowledge:
(63) Gorbatsjov ... En ten tweede blijft die Gorbatsjou [ORDr]
een communist, dus die maakt wel mooie praatjes maar
die zit ondertussen de hele dag microfoontjes in de
Amerikaanse ambassade in te bouwen. (7:0174)
Gorbat.chev .. And besides, tiiat Gorbatcheu remains a communist, so (or
a![ his ~ine talk, he is installin,g microphones in the Amerècan embassy
att day.
In sum, the pragmatic value [ORDr] of dieNPs in the die-corpora
implies conversational characteristics of the relation between
writer and reader, especially the appeal to the reader to
collaborate in the resolution and acceptance of reference.
DezeNPs
The 'opinionative' and narrative character of the die-corpora not
only favour the use of dieNPs, they are also responsible for two
uses of dezeNPs in these corpora, which together contain 13
dezeNPs (28.3010 of all dezeNPs):
(i) The opinionative character yields dieNPs, signalling the
writer's attempt to gain the reader acceptance, but it also
yields dezeNPs in which the writer expresses the fact
that he himself wants to be responsible for the way in
which he describes the referent.
(ii) Apart from many diegetic narrative dieNPs, the narrative
character of the die-corpora also yields dezeNPs in
contexts in which the writer explicitly intervenes in the
narrative line of the discourse.
Both characteristics are present in the following example. The
dezeNP follows a long narration of the content of a thriller. On
the one hand it indicates the rupture in the story line and on the
other it expresses the evaluation of the writer regarding the
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content of the thriller:
(64) ~Previous paragraph:Narration of the int~duction and
mise en scène of the thriller 'Operation Red Storm' by
Tom Clancy. New paragraph~
Wie door deze onzin [DRDw] heen is kan opgeruimd aan
Clancy's oorlog beginnen. (5:0018)
Once you'oe got through this nonsense, you can start on Clancy's war
good-humouredly.
Other dezeNPs are simply located in text sections in which the
writer intervenes in the narrative line of the text, as in (65). The
clause in which the dezeNP is embedded is located outside the
story line. An indication of the writer's intervention is the
presence of typically pragmatic operators as maar but' and toch
'however'.
(65) Toen bij de laatste kabinetsformatie het
staatssecretariaat voor Emancipatie verdween, ging er
gejammer op en toen bekend werd dat de vrouwen
werden ondergebracht bij De Koning en Louw de Graaf
werd er zelfs gewanhoopt, maar deze c~jfers [DR.Dw]
wijzen toch uit dat er nog steeds vooruitgang is.
When during the last jormation oj the gouernment the Department oj
Emancipation disappeared, lamentations were heardand when the news
came that women were to reside under the responsibility oj Dr Koning
and Louw de Graaj there was despair, but these ~gures indicate that
there is progress atéll.
On the other hand dezeNPs indicate the opinion of the writer
regarding the referent and they express the fact that the writer
himself is responsible for the qualification of the referent. It is no
coincidence that all these dezeNPs are attributive demNAs:
(66) Jaren heb ik gedacht dat deze vorm van humor [DRDw],
of laat ik liever zeggen deze vorm van uermaak [DRDw),
... (6:0049-0050)
For many years I haue thought that this type oj humour, or maybe I
should say this type ojentertainment, ...
(67) Deze merkwaardige terugval op de showbusiness [DRDw]
doet een beetje denken aan Braks die ... (8:0219)
nnn
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This remarkable backsliding in show business reminds me o(Braks, who
Apart from these strategic uses of dezeNPs, there are selfreference
dezeNPs to which the pragmatic value [DR.Dd] has to be
assigned. In the deze-corpora there are 24 selfreference
demonstrative NPs.
(68) Deze zomer [DR.Dt] kwam de pocket in ons land. (5:0017)
This summer the paperback entered our country.
(69) Op de radio was te horen waar het allemaal heenleidt:
welke ellende dit lanc~je [DRDpIw] te wachten staat!
(7:0165)
On the radio one could hear what this all leada to: what
misery is in store (or this country!
Apart from these dezeNP-classes, nine dezeNPs remain in the
die-corpora. Three of them are situated in direct discourse, i.e.,
between quotation marks; three dezeNPs are explained by a
contrastive context - see (11). Finally, in 3 cases the value of
demonstrative deze is unclear.
The distribution of dezeNPs according to their functional value is
summarised in table (23):
Table (23): Distribution of functional types of dezeNPs in the
die-corpora (n-39)
n qa
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4.4 Conclusion
4.4.1 Theoretical evaluation of PPP
The main theoretical qualities of my DD-proposal can be
summarised as follows:
An absolute dichotomy
PPP is based on an absolute dichotomy, each pole of which
(i) represents a conceptually distinct pragmatic value, i.e.,
either DRD-association or ORD-association,
(ii) is connected with a distinct class of demonstrative
determiners.
The dependence on global discourse conditions
Although the effect of demonstrative choice can be demonstrated
in 'local', individual utterances, in the PP-proposal, demonstrative
choice is ultimately made dependent on global discourse
conditions. The most important condition is the relational mode
between discourse participants. Further conditions which are
mentioned are the purpose underlying discourse and the nature of
the content, yielding dichotomies such as narrative vs. expository.
Differences between dezeNPs and dieNPs can be described in
terms of these interrelated global discourse conditions.
It turns out that the pragmatic values, based on the association
with coordination points of DftD and ORD are naturally
extendable to 'demonstrative' inferences the contours of which are
designed by these global discourse conditions.
As such, my proposal does not make the DD-variation dependent
on the individual 'identificational history' of a referent in a
discourse (in terms of accessibility or referential distance) nor on
the focal mechanism, conceived of as the attentional hierarchy of
referents involved at a particular moment in the discourse.
Rather, it makes the DD-variation dependent on general
characteristics of the relation between referent, writer and reader
in discourse.
Localistic and actor-oriented demonstrative uses
The dichotomy between actor coordinates and spatio-temporal
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coordinates of referential domains provides a suitable theoretical
mold for dealing with differences between and combinations of
spatio-temporal uses and relational uses of demonstratives. In
combining both uses the way PPP enablea us to, and in
distinguishing clearly between pragmatic values and pragmatic
inferences, two important problems can be avoided:
(i) 1'he problem of ouerdetermination: being based on the
minimal presence-presupposition, the proposal does not
start from one specific (semantic) substance which should
underlie all demonstrative uses. This minimality is
especially fruitful in view of demonstratives for which
neither distance nor focality or relational aspects turn
out to be the determining factor, as is the case with most
partial-repetition demNAs in post-first-mention position
(so-called contextualising demNAs). Within PPP, they can
simply be said to express some kind of referential-domain
association which is congruent with the global conditions
obtaining in the discourse.
(ii) the problem of underdetermination: the different
coordination points provide us with enough anchor points
for plausible extensions in the form of pragmatic
inferences, thus enabling us to refrain from disputable,
intractable watered-down metaphors with which special
cases are linked to the basic substance of the proposal.
Furthermore, an important aspect of my proposal is that
these pragmatic inferences are not carried solely by the
demonstrative, but also by other local-contextual and
global discourse clues.
The pragmatic nature of the DD-variation
In PPP, the difference between deze and die is claimed to affect
only the pragmatic position of the referent vis-à-vis coordination
points in referential domains evoked in the text. At least as far as
anaphoric demonstrative NPs are concerned, this means that the
demonstrative choice does not affect the semantic interpretation
of demonstrative NPs. More precisely, the choice of die or deze
does not change the semantic representation of the referent.
Varying demonstratives only results in changes of pragmatic
inferences associated with referents, i.e., inferences in which the
presence of the referent vis-à-vis the discourse situation is stated
and in which the relationship of the referent vis-à-vis the
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discourse actors is made explicit.
4.4.2 A two-module processing of demonstratives
In the introduction of this chapter, an important condition was
imposed on my PP-proposal, namely that it should be congruent
with the MOD-proposal regulating the semantic interpretation of
demNAs. In view of the results of this and the previous chapter,
the congruence between PPP and MOD is guaranteed by the fact
that both proposals regulate the interpretation of demonstrative
NPs on a different level of language description, i.e., the
pragmatic and the semantic level respectively. Thus, my view of
demonstratives implies a two-module interpretation of a
demonstrative NP, including a semantic interpretation in which
its modificational value with regard to the semantic
representation is elucidated, and a pragmatic interpretation
dealing with the spatio-temporal andlor relational inferences
associated with demonstrative NPs.
An important empirical reason for distinguishing between a
semantic and a pragmatic interpretation component is the
observation that in each semantic modification type genuine
dezeNAs and dieNAs can be found, and that the modificational
value of demNAs does not automatically alter if the
demonstrative determiner is replaced by a determiner of the
other demonstrative class. This is demonstrated in the following
examples. After the replacement of the demonstrative determiner,
the demNAs in (70) and (71) remain quantificational or
classifying, the demNAs in (72) and (73) attributive and the
demNAs in (17) and (18) contextualising.21
(70) Globokar, Holliger, Penderecki... Geen uan deze
componisten (classifylquantifying; [tDRD]) heeft de
capaciteiten van Stockhausen, en dat maakt de zaak dan
soms pijnlijk. (3:1201)
Globokar, Holliger, Penderecki... None oj these composers has the
capacities ojStockhausen, and that sometimes makes it painjul.
(71) Volgens een functionaris van de universiteit van
Californië loopt een geschoold acedemicus, 'die drie of
vier jaar geleden een keuze had kunnen doen uit
aanbiedingen, nu de kans pompbediende of taxi-chauffeur
te moeten worden'. Maar ook in dat soort functies
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(quantifying; [ORDrD is op het ogenblik moeilijk werk te
vinden. (3:2064)
According to an ojfcial jrom the uniuersity oj Calijornia, a uniuerslty
graduate, who three or jour years ago would have been in a po~sition to
pick and choose, now runs the risk oj hauing to accept the ,jnb ojpump
attendant or oab driuer. But also in that line oj work jobs are Itard to
jind at the moment.
(72) Nasser is dood, die bevr~jder en vader des uaderlands die
ondanks alles toch ~inks' dacht (attribute; [ORDr])
(3:1502)
Nasser is dead, that liberator and pater patriae who despite everything
had lejt wing vtewa.
(73) Deze tintelende, slagvaardige en zeer erudiete geleerde
(attribute; [DRDw]) was een mens, die met alle vezels
van zijn bestaan verbonden was met het bonte leven en
de harde werkelijkheid. (3:2859)
This scintillating, e~cient and very erudite scientist was a person who
with all the fïbers oj his existence was associated with colourjul life and
hardreality.
(17) Voor mensen met een ziektewetuitkering bestaan een
aantal aparte regels. Deze regels (contextualise; [DRDdll
kunt u vinden onder het kopje ziektewet. (2:0133)
For people on aick leaue, there are a number oj separate rules. These
rulea can be jound und.er the heading Health Law.
(18) De mechanische klep is tot nu het meest toegepast. Die
klep (contextualise; [ORDt~pD moet aan hoge eisen
voldcen. (4:0043)
The mechanical ualve so jar has been applied in most cases. That ualve
has to meet high atandards.
This conceptual and empirical distinction between a semantic and
a pragmatic interpretation module for demonstratives does not
ban the possibility of coalitions between pragmatic and semantic
classes of demonstratives. In fact, my data clearly demonstrate
such natural coalitions. This is shown in table (24), which
contains the number of classify-, attribute- and contextualise-
dezeNAs and dieNAs, in the total number of anaphoric
demonstrative NPs with NP-antecedent in the DD-corpus
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(n-580). In this table, the preference for attributive dezeNAs and
classifying dieNAs is obvious.
Table (24): Number of classifying, attributive and
contextualising dezeNAs and dieNAs with NP-









The preference for attributiue dezeNAs is reflected in other
significant diíierences mentioned earlier, i.e., in the preference for
non-same-head-noun dezeNAs in table (8) and for new-noun
dezeNAs in table (18), preferences which are confirmed in
Kirsner's data too. The fact is that attributive demNAs are
prototypically realised by NPs with a different and
supplementary lexical load with regard to the antecedent NP.
The analysis of these attributive dezeNAs in terms of PPP shows
that they have to be assigned the pragmatic value [DRDw], often
combined with [DRDd]. They have to be interpreted
pragmatically as (66)-(67) above: the demonstratives express the
association of the referent with the viewpoint of the writer and
with the speech situation of the discourse involved. Starting from
this association, the reader draws pragmatic inferences which
capture the writer's responsibility regarding the way the referent
is described and~or regarding the expository 'on-the-spot effect'.
Whereas Kirsner (1987:103I107; 1989:169; Kirsner 8i van Heuven
1988:223~229), looks upon this preference simply as evidence for
the association of dezeNAs with reinterpreting referents and
dieNAs with simply repeating referents, within my two-module
framework I regard it as a natural coalitíon between the
semantic modificational type attribute and the pragmatic value
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[DRDwId]. Apparently, the attributive demNA-type fits in more
naturally with or is used more frequently in discourse situations
in which the unequal relational mode - triggering DRDwId - is
established, i.e., typically expository context and discourse
situations with interventions and evaluations of the writer
towards referents.
The second preference is that for classifying dieNAs. Again, a
natural coalition between semantic and pragmatic types can be
elucidated. An important class of these dieNAs turns out to entail
some kind of quantificational semantic modification, as is
described in 3.4.2.2. See (74) and also the examples (71), (30) and
(31). In contrast, an important (but less frequently used) class of
classifying dezeNAs entails classifying modifications, as in (75):
(74) Reken maar dat men in de Gouden Driehoek;, en dat
soort uerzendplaatsen; (classifying; [ORDr]), nauwkeurig
volgt waar er gaten in de wet vallen. (8:0247)
You aan be sure that people in the Golden Triangle, and that kind of
shipment places, keep an eye out jor any loopholes appearing in the law.
(75) Het Weens Mozartensemble; .., leuke werkjes in
uitvoering, zoals die alleen maar uan dit ensemble;
(classifying; [DRDd]) kunnen komen. (3:1696)
The V'cenna Mozart ensemóle ..., nice pieces in terms o(performartce, the
ruay only this ensemble can play them.
The dieNA in (74) classifies the referent(s) into a vaguely
delineated class of referents. This semantic modification is
congruent with the pragmatic value [ORDr] expressing the
mutual relational mode between writer and reader and the
reader's appeal to accept the vagueness of the reference.
The dezeNA in (75) activates the class of the referent in a totally
different way. The effect of the classify-modification is that the
referent is contrasted with other referents of the same class. This
semantic value is congruent with the pragmatic value [DRDd],
expressing a contrast between the referent which is exposed on
the spot, and other referents which are not at issue in the
discourse.~
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4.4.3 Intrasentential dieNAs
The two-module processing procedure can account elegantly for
persistent preferences in the DD-distribution. One preference,
however, has not been explained so far, i.e., the preference for
intrasentential dieNAs.
In Kirsner's corpus-analysis as well as in mine, dieNAs turned
out to be significantly more frequent than dezeNAs in positions
where the antecedent occurs in the same sentence, as is shown in
table (19) in section 4.2.3.
In view of my data, and especially in view of the two analysed
corpora (1-2 and 5-8), this preference has to be looked upon as an
epiphenomenon. The fact is that the high ratio of intrasentential
dieNAs is a consequence of various text conditions facilitating
dieNPs, each of which is consistent with the pragmatic value
[ORD]. In the deze-corpora, all 11 intrasententíal dieNAs are
clear examples of instantiation, a factor, as we know, that favours
dieNPs, as is seen in table (22).
In the die-corpora (5-8), 12 intrasentential dieNAs are embedded
in coordinated clauses connected with the narrative en 'and', as in
(76). In cases like these, antecedent and dieNA are not closer
related to each other than in the case of demNAs with an
antecedent in the previous sentence:
(76) Dat zegt president-commissaris van de NRC tegen de
chef uan de parlementaire redactie;, en die chef
[contextualise; ORDdp] zegt .. (5:0001)
That is what the president of the NRC says to the head of the
parliamentary staff, and that hend says ..
Apart from these, there are 8 intrasentential dieNAs which can
be characterised as conversational and informal, hinging heavily
on inferences the reader has to make, such as (77) and (78):
(77) Dus op een gegeven moment weten alle Duitsers; in dat
land; [classify; ORDrltlp] dat je niet met
voorjaarsvakantie naar Amsterdam moet gaan.
So, at a given moment all the Cermans in thal country know that you
shor~ldn't go to Amsterdam ~or yo~cr spring holiday.
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(78) Dus let op mijn woorden, ouer tien jaar is er geen paling
meer;, en die kant, [classify?; ORDr] gaat het met de
kabeljauw ook op.
So, mark my words, in ten years ihere wiU be no more eel, and that's the
way thinga are going with cod as well.
So, it turns out that some typical conditiona facilitating the
occurrence of die naturally pertain intrasententially, which - at
least in these corpora - can account for the preference for
intrasentential die.
4.4.4 PPP and crosslinguistic data
As I confined myself to Dutch data in this chapter, the
crosslinguistic validity of my demonstrative proposal is not
touched upon. In this section I will go into one demonstrative
curiosity between languages, without pretending to provide
crosslinguistic validation for my PP-proposal. I only want to show
that the PP-proposal enables us to deal elegantly with such
peculiarities between languages.
Look at the following examplea:
(79) Th.: was hastn (dann) gelesen?
X.: (ja) diesen Aufsatz von dem Olson. (Auer
1981:303)
Th.: what did you read?
X.: this easay by Olson.
(80) He kissed her with this unbelievable passion. (Lakoff
1974:347; Prince 1981a:234)
(27) Ze knielden voor hem neer met die typisch Braziliaanse
aanhankelijkheid. (9:1211)
They kneeled down in jront o(him with that typical Brazilian deuotion.
It is clear that these examples are perfectly comparable.
Semantically, they represent specific NPs with an existential
presupposition. Referentially, both demonstrative NPs are clearly
neither deictic, nor anaphoric. All demonstratives can be replaced
by an indefinite NP (see e.g. Prince 1981a and Maclaran 1980).
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All sentences fit in to a narrative and conversational kind of
discourse. In summary, it is hard to discover relevant referential
or semantic differences in these examples, which implies that
proposals based on fixed referential values or semantic meanings
attached to both classes of demonstratives will get into serious
trouble in explaining such peculiarities.
In view of PPP, differences such as these have to be looked upon
as the result of a different strategic choice: given the fact that the
writer wants to introduce a new referent to the reader in a
marked way, he can choose two strategies to do so. In Dutch, the
writer chooses to associate the referent with ORD, thus
suggesting a mutuaVequal relational mode with the reader. This
association induces the reader to make pragmatic inferences to
the effect that the referent is provisionally considered as familiar,
in the knowledge that more information about the referent will
follow (i.e., the typical interpretation assigned to [ORDr)-dieNPs).
In English and German, the writer obviously chooses to associate
the referent to his own perspective, establishing as such an
unequal relational mode and inciting inferences in which the
writer's responsibility for the introduction of a new, unfamiliar
referent is expressed. This interpretation is consistent with
Prince's (1981a:242) characterisation of this demonstrative use,
which she calls indefinite-this. She states that the use of
indefinite this - as opposed to all definite NPs - does not trigger
familiarity inferences. Also the characterisation of Maclaran 1980
is stated in terms of mutuality, i.e., "the hearer is being instructed
that the referent is to be found in the speaker's world, not in the
shared world of speaker and hearer". However, in my view, the
use of this Idies- cannot be interpreted in terms of search
instructions, since the examples show that the apriori familiarity
or unfamiliarity of the reader with the referent is not a necessary
condition for the use of either demonstrative form. The relevant
question is not whether or not - apart from this particular text
setting - the referent can be found in the shared world of writer
and reader, but whether or not the writer chooses to present the
referent as if it is contained in the shared world, as a means to
establish and maintain the equaUmutual or unequal relational
mode with the reader.
Thus, if in cases like these Dutch die is used as against German
and English dies-~this it has to be regarded as the expression of
different conventionalised writer's strategies to introduce new
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referents in the discourse, hinging on different relational modes
between writer and reader.
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Notes to chapter 4
1. In this section examples from the different corpora are marked
by the number of the corpus (1 to 9), followed by the number of
the demonstrative NP in that corpus (for the corpora 1,2,4,5,6,7
and 8) or followed by the number of the sentence in which that
demonstrative NP occurs (for the corpora 3 and 9).
2. For an extensive critique of different versions of the locality
hypothesis for demonstratives, see Kleiber 1983.
3. Besides, there are convincing examples that show that
demonstratives in conversational context which are natural
candidates for a nearlfar interpretation do not obey the
predictions of the locality hypothesis. Look at the following
example from Janssen (1991c):
(a) Doctor: Doet het hier zeer? I Dcet het zeer op
deze plek?
Patient: Ja, daar. I Ja, op die plek.
Doctor: Dces it hurt here? ~ Is this where it hurts?
Patient: Yes, there. ~ Yes, that is where it hurts.
4. So-called attributive demNAs consisting of a same-head noun as
the antecedent plus an attributive modifier (n-39) are not
counted as identificational SHN-demNAs. The fact is that they
clearly have a predicative function.
5. The problem increases if we take into account that the
translation of the examples in Dutch results in dieNAs in all
examples, see section 4.4.4.
6. In Sidner's example D41-B (1983:322) the effect of anaphoric
'distance is clearly present too, but the speaker's concern (this
plan is the plan of the speaker) coincides with the plan last
mentioned in the discourse.
7. According to the classification of demNAs in my MOD-proposal
in chapter 3, Sidner's classification is disputable in certain
respects. It is based purely on lexical-analytical types, not upon
contextual types. Hence it is neceasarily inaccurate, in view of
the fact that, apart from the form of the antecedent, other
context conditions can determine the (modificational) type of
demNAs as well. Moreover, the analysis in chapter 3 shows that
within Sidner's type 2 two subtypes have to be distinguiahed,
i.e., a c[assify-type, the basic form of which is the superordinate
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relation between anaphor and antecedent, and an attribute-
type, the basic form of which is the attributive alternative
anaphor.
Similarly, there is a clear difference in Sidner's type 1
demonstratives between demNAs simply repeating their
antecedenta (typical contextualise-demNAs ín MOD-terms) and
demNAs containing a repeated head noun plua attributive pre-
andlor post-modifiers ( typical attribute-demNAs in MOD-terms).
)~nally, Sidner's type-4 example coincides with the
quantificational effect of demonstratives described in section
3.4.2.2.
8. Unlike in table (6), the attributive SHN-demNAs are included
in this table.
9. In corpus 3, this characteristic could not be examined, because
it consists of only small fragments from different texts.
10. A similar characterisation can be found in the Algemene
Nederlandse Spraakkunst (ANS):
Komen deze die en die dat niet samen in één zin uoor,
dan is deze dit in het algemeen meer nadrukkelijk
verwijzend dan die dat. (ANS 1984:216)
If deze~die and die~dat do not occur together in the same
sentence, then generally deze~dit refers more emphatically
than die~dat.
11. In his critical description of two analyses of demonatratives, the
'Columbia School' analysis and the 'Cognitive Grammar'
analysis, Kirsner 1991 shows extensively that demonstrative
proposals are very sensitive to the drawbacks, mentioned in (iii)
and (iv).
12. See for the difference between mimetic (showing) narration and
diegetic (telling) narration, Redeker (1986:62), note 1.
13. Narrative discourse ia not at all restricted to the establishment
of only one ORD. Redeker (1986:63), for example, ahows
convincingly that in film descriptions four different referential
domains can be distinguished, each signalled by clear linguiatic
devices.
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14. The association between dieNPs and past tense, being the
default tense in diegetic narratives, is made clear in Kirsner,
van Heuven ~ Vermeulen (1987:136).
15. Also Kirsner (1987:89) mentions the relation between dezeNPs
and objects which are present on the scene.
16. It is possible to distinguish yet another actor-oriented type of
demonstrative NPs, i.e., the use of dieNPs not indicating the
association with writer or reader, but the non-association with
the writer, as is shown in (a) (see also the dieNP in the second
clause of the second sentence of the Anne Frank example).
(a) Met die bruut wil ik niks meer te maken hebben.
I do want to haue anything to do with that bully anymo~e.
Although examples like these could suggest that all pragmatic
RD-values have a positive and a negative subvalue (e.g.
[fDRDw] vs. [-DRDw]), there is no other empirical ground for
doubling the number of pragmatic values. So, I will categorise
examples like these under the pragmatic value [ORDr].
17. In a sample of the spoken data in de Jong 1979 (1498
demonstratives), as mentioned in Kirsner et al. (1987:139), only
5010 of the demonstratives are deze-demonstratives.
18. Our examples show clearly that - at least in Dutch - announcing
or restrictive dieNPs are not necessarily non-specific, which is,
however, claimed by Maclaran (1980:816-17).
19. In this table, corpus 9 is not incorporated, since the
demonstrative NPs were neither counted nor encoded in that
corpus.
20. The association of dieNPs with spoken Dutch is demonstrated
in Kirsner, van Heuven 8a Vermeulen (1987:138-140).
21. Of course, this does not mean that the replacement of the
demonstrative determiner by anóther demonstrative determiner
leaves the acceptability judgments unchanged: most of the
replacements decrease the acceptability of the examples, since
they cause problems with regard to the pragmatic inferences
resulting from the ORDIDRD-association.
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22. The same difference between classifying dezeNPs and dieNPs
can be found in fixed expressions like the following: op deze
manier 'this way' vs. op die manier 'that way', in deze zin dat...
'in this sense that' va. in die zin dat... 'in that sense that'. The
die-veraiona are more generally and vaguely referring and do
not require a specific antecedent. They often can be replaced by
elements like zodoende 'thus', zo 'thus'. The deze-versions
indicate one particular element of a clasa to the exclusion of all
other elements.
Chapter 5
Nominal anaphors in legal
decisions'
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter the behaviour of nominal anaphors is investigated
in a specific institutional type of discourse, i.e., civil court
decisions, a highly formalised type of discourse. In these texts,
there is a very unusual variation between pronominal and
nominal anaphors: the anaphors are almost exclusively nominal
(see section 5.2.2). This observation is in itself already an
interesting starting point for an explanation, but it becomes
highly relevant in the setting of this study: legal decisions can be
seen as an application case with regard to identifying as well as
qualifying explanations for the occurrence of nominal anaphors in
discourse.
In this chapter, it will be shown that the notion of accessibility or
- more general - the identificational function of referential
expressions strongly underdetermines the behaviour and the
functions of nominal anaphors, an idea which is consistent with
the results put forward in the preceding chapters. The key-claim
which will be argued for in this chapter is that the functional
explanation of occurrences of nominal anaphors necessarily
exceeds the identificational framework in which the pronominal-
nominal variation is traditionally treated. It will be shown that
nominal anaphors require explanations in terms of non-
identificational (i.e., semantic and pragmatic) functions which
find their raison d'être in the type of text involved and ultimately
in the institution in which texts are embedded.
The analysis is based on a 4,400 word corpus of 8 old-fashioned
decisions in Dutch coming from a lower Belgian civil court.2 The
starting point in this chapter is the distribution of nominal and
pronominal anaphors in the decisions: the proportion of nominal
anaphors is extremely high. Starting from this observation, the
following hypotheses can be constructed, fitting in with the two
functional views on nominal anaphors put forward in section 1.2.
~ j~ (;HAP'I'ER 5
The identificational hypothesis
The variation of anaphoric expressions is caused by
referentially problematic discourse conditions in
decisions, decreasing the accessibility of referents
Referentially problematic discourse conditions in decisions are
meant to be analytically determinable discourse elements, which
in other discourse varieties and studies on reference have already
been advanced as elements explaining the variation of nominal
and pronominal anaphors (see section 1.2.1). If this hypothesis
can be validated, then the behaviour of anaphors in decisions is
fully in conformity with the accessibility view. Nominal anaphors
then indicate or reflect in the current text setting the low-
accessibility status of the referent concerned, low accessibility
being caused by internal aspects of discourse organisation and
discourse content. It will be shown, however, that this hypothesis
only partially explains the NA-facts.
The variation of anaphoric expressions can also be caused by
elements that cannot be accounted for in terms of accessibility.
According to the qualificational view on nominal anaphors, the
following hypothesis regarding nominal anaphors in decisions can
be postulated:
The qualif'acational hypothesis
The variation of anaphors in decisions is caused by non-
identificational functions anaphors can fulfill in
discourse.
In the previous chapters various instantiations can be found of
non-identificational functions of nominal anaphors. Not only do
these nominal anaphors identify their referents, they also turned
out to be used to signal or cause changes in the semantic
representation of the discourse referent (chapter 2 8z 3) or to
signal pragmatic changes in the relationship between discourse
participants and referents (chapter 4). It turns out that such
qualificational functions of nominal anaphors can account for a
fair number of NAs in civil-court decisions. As in the previous
chapters, these qualificational functions are based on aspects
affecting the semantic or pragmatic development of referents in
discourse, i.e., aspects which can be detected independent of text-
external conditions imposed on discourse.
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However, given the fact that decisions are encapsulated in a
powerful and regulating institution of law and justice, it is
plausible that this institutional setting plays an important role in
determining the nature of the qualificational function of NAs. I
will show in this chapter that characteristics of the text-external
institutional setting of decisions guide the qualificational
interpretations of NAs in these texts.
In sections 5.3 to 5.5 the validity of the different NA-explanations
will be investigated. First, however, section 5.2 offers an accurate
description of pronominal and nominal anaphors and of the
relationship between both. Section 5.6 concludes this chapter.
5.2 Anaphoric expressions in decisions
5.2.1 The number of anaphors
In the analysis of the decisions, anaphors are defined as
referential expressions the underlying referent of which is
already linguistically present in previous discourse. Accordingly,
nominal anaphors are defined as non-pronominal anaphoric NPs,
rementioning or re-accessing an old referent. This broad definition
of anaphoricity can be reconciled with the definition of NA, given
in chapter 1.3, and with the definition mostly found in data-
oriented research on reference.
The number of anaphors in the decisions is 231. Given a corpus
of 4400 words, it represents only 5.25~0 of the total number of
words in the corpus.3 Compared with other corpora, this is a low
anaphor-ratio. Ariel's 1988 data, for example, include four short
stories, each containing about 2200 words. These stories contain
755 anaphors, i.e., 8.ó010 of the total number of words (1988:70).'
An explanation for the relatively low ratio of anaphors in the
total number of words in the corpus, is offered by the fact that in
the decisions certain syntactic positions are not available for
occurrences of anaphors. In fact, the decisions are constructed as
one sentence, consisting of a set of non-finite clauses related to
one main clause. The basic frame of a decision is expressed in (1):
(1) De rechtbank van ..., gezien..., gehoord..., overwegende...
om deze redenen, beslist ...
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The court in ..., having aeen ..., having heard, considering..., jor these
reasons, decides ...6
This construction makes it possible to leave out the subjects in
the subclauses which would normally be anaphoric elements
referring to the court. A conventional construction would
undoubtedly yield more anaphors, as is shown in (2):
(2) De rechtbank ziet... (De rechtbank I ze) hoort ... (De
rechtbank ~ze1 overweegt ... (De rechtbank ~ ze) beslist...
The rnurt has seoen... (The court ~ it) has heard ... (The court ~ it) takes
into consideration... (The court I it) decidea ...
Thus, one main topic of the decisions, i.e., the court, occurs only
very rarely as an anaphor in the decisions.
Another structural peculiarity that is responsible for the low ratio
of anaphors is the use of nominal constructions with a head noun
accompanied by a set of non-finite clausea as in (3), containing
only one anaphor:
(3) ...beschikking verleend in zake: Mevrouw A.M.,
laborante, thans werkloos, geboren te S., wonende te S.,
Pstraat, nr. 21, thans verblijvende bij haar ouders te S.,
Vstraat, 43, bijgestaan door haar raadsman, Meester
B.V., advocaat te S., er kantoorhoudende Hstraat, 5.
(201)s
...has decreed jor the jollowing case...: Mrs A.M., lab assistant, currently
unemployed, óorn at S., liuing at S. 2] Pstreet, currently residing with
her parents at S, 43 Vstreet, assiated by her counsellor, B.V., J.D.,
barrister at S., with his o~4ce at 5 Hstreet.
In rewriting these constructions in full-subclause format, a
number of syntactic positions are created which can be filled up
by anaphors. This is shown in the non-nominal variant of (3), i.e.,
(4), which contains seven anaphors:
(4) In de zaak Mevrouw A.M. werd beschikking verleend.
Meurouw A.M. is laborante, ze is thans werkloos. Ze is
geboren te S., 2e woont te S., Pstraat, nr. 21; ze verblijft
thans bij haar ouders te S., Vstraat, 43. Ze wordt
bijgestaan door haar raadsman, Meester B.V., advocaat
te S. Die houdt er kantoor in de Hstraat.
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In the arse o( Mrs A.M. the (ollowing was decreed. Mrs A.M. is a lab
assistant, she is currently unemployed. She was born at S. She is
currently living at S., 21 Pstreet. She is residing with her pnrents at S.,
43 Vstreet. She is assisted by her counsellor, B.V., J.D., attorney at S. He
has his of~ce there at 5 Hstreet.
These two structural peculiarities can account for the relatively
low ratio of anaphors in the decisions. It is unclear whether the
structural unavailability of these positions for anaphors affects
the portion of pronominal anaphors rather than that of nominal
anaphors in the decisions. A way to clarify this is to rewrite the
decisions, as is done in (4). In the rewritten version, it should
then become apparent which anaphor positions (created in the
rewritten version) are occupied by pronominal or by nominal
anaphors. However, this procedure is pointless: the purpose of the
analysis in this chapter is the explanation of the peculiar
relationship between nominal and pronominal anaphors in
decisions. Rewriting attempts all start from normal proportions in
normal texts between pronominal and nominal anaphors, and
cannot take into account the specific institutional embedding of
the decisions. So, in analysing anaphors in the corpus of
decisions, we cannot but exclude the anaphor-decreasing effect of
the structural peculiarities mentioned above.
5.2.2 The relation pronominal vs. nominal anaphors
The distribution of pronominal and nominal anaphors in the
decisions is as follows':









This distribution is very unusual, compared to distributions in
similar analyses of anaphors. In the corpus-analysis of Ariel
(1988:70), more than 70qo of all anaphors are pronominal.
Francik (1985:24-25) presents the distribution of pronominal and
nominal NPs in 40 elicited narratives about two actors. In these
40 narratives, 2070 references to these actors occur. 56.6~ of
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these are pronominal. If we take into account that each narrative
probably contains a non-anaphoric first mention of the two actors
in the form of a nominal NP (80 occurrences in all) then the
proportion of anaphoric pronouns is higher than 60ok. Clancy
(1980:133) gives the distribution of pronominal, elliptical and
nominal anaphors in the so-called pear-stories (English and
Japanese) she analyses. Noun anaphors only represent 15.7qo of
the English data and 26.8~ of the Japanese data. Fox (1984:293)
compares the proportion of pronominal and nominal anaphors in
different types of texts, i.e., conversational, narrative and
expository. In the expository corpus the proportion of nominal
NPs is highest, but there too, pronouns constitute the highest
proportion of anaphors (52.5~0).
Finally, in my own corpus of 30 opinion texts, in each of which
one human referent is the main topic, 709 anaphors occur that
refer to these 30 referents. Although the texts have been
especially selected for their interesting potential of nominal
anaphors, pronouns constitute the highest proportion of anaphors
(n-371; 52.3010).
5.2.3 Analysis of pronominal anaphors
The number of pronominal elements referring to human referents
in the decisions is 17 (i.e., 8.4010). However, only 7 of these can be
regarded as so-called referential pronouns, i.e., as pronominal
anaphors which can be replaced by a nominal anaphor without
causing ungrammaticality or without disrupting the anaphoric
relatione The antecedents of these referential pronouns are
situated either in the previous clause (4 occurrences) as in (5) or
in coordinated main clauses (2 occurrences) as in (6):
(5) Eiseres; kan niet bij haar ouders blijven. Z~j; wordt
gemachtigd om op een ander nog nader te bepalen adres
te verblijven. (408)
Plaintijj cannot stay with her parents. She ta authorised to stay at
another address to be determined later.
(6) Overwegende dat de part~jen; samen gehuwd zijn, maar
feitelijk gescheiden leven. Dat z~j; drie kinderen hebben...
(707)
Considering that the parties are married, but are in jact liuing apart.
NOMINAL ANAPHORS IN DECISIONS 223
That they have three children.
The remaining pronouns are non-referential. They cannot be
replaced by a non-pronoun without causing ungrammaticality or
a disruption of the anaphoric relation, as is shown in (7):
(7) Wij...verlenen aan uerweerder; akte van het feit dat hij;
zich niet verzet tegen het toekennen van de afzonderlijke
woonst in de echtelijke woning ... (638)
We direct that it 6e entered into the reeords that dejendanl dces not
resist part o( the marital home being assigned to plaintijf.
Although the proportions of pronominal and nominal anaphors
are in themselves already peculiar, the dichotomy between
referential and non-referential pronouns makes the proportion of
pronominal anaphors even more unusual: 10 out of 17 pronouns
are non-referential. There, the writer is forced to choose
pronominal anaphors and the option of nominal anaphors is not
available.
The remaining 7 referential pronouns - the only cases in the
decisions where the writer deliberately chooses pronouns - occur
in discourse conditions which are ideal for pronominalisation: (i)
in all cases the antecedent is located in the previous clause or
sentence; (ii) pronoun as well as antecedent occupy the thematic
role of subject, as is seen in (5) and (6); (iii) all referential
pronouns refer to the protagonists of the decision, i.e., the process
parties.9
5.2.4 Formal analysis of nominal anaphors
The number of nominal anaphors is 186, i.e., 91.6ob of all
anaphors. The format of the nominal anaphors is eapressed in
table (2):
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Table (2): Format of nominal anaphors (n-186)
n qo
'bare' definite 159 85.5
possessive t N 7 3.8
demonstrative t N 9 4.8
other element t N 11 5.9
total 186 100.0
The most peculiar fact is that the vast majority of the nominal
anaphors have an 'illegal' format, i.e., that of a definite singular
NP without determiner. These NPs only indicate legal roles, such
as eiser(es) 'plaintiff, verweerder 'defendant' or partij 'party' (see
section 5.4.2). The nouns eiser(es) and verweerder are used
exclusively without determiner.
The demonstrative nominal anaphors (n-9) only once contain a
normal demonstrative determiner (dit kind 'this child' 421). The
other demonstrative NPs contain lexical elements referring to
other segments of the decisions (especially the archaic voornoemd
'mentioned above' or hiernagenoemd 'mentioned below'). In 7
nominal anaphors the referent is linked to another referent by
means of a possessive pronoun (6 occurrences, e.g. hun raadsman
'their counsellor' 207) or by means of a post-modifier (one
occurrence, i.e., de raadsman van eiseres 'the counsellor of
plaintiff 504).
5.3 The identificational hypothesis
5.3.1 Preventing referential incoherence
The unusual proportions of nominal and pronominal anaphors
could easily be explained if in most cases the replacement of
nominal by pronominal anaphors resulted in referential
incoherence. In that case, the concluaion would be justified that in
decisions referentially problematic discourse conditions give rise
to the frequent use of nominal anaphors. The term referential
incoherence refers to two processing phenomena:
(i) the reader is not able to link the pronoun to a referent
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which is readily available at that moment of the
discourse, and hence he is not able to construct a
coherent representation of the discourse. I will refer to
this as referential obscurity.
(ii) the reader is not able to link the pronoun to one
unambiguous referent, because there are two or more
candidates available for the anaphor. This does not mean
that somewhere in the discourse a referent - other than
the intended referent - is mentioned which can
potentially act as the intended referent, for example
because of a congruence in gender and number. ftather, it
implies that, at that moment of the discourse, the
accessibility of referents is such that more that one
referent yields a reasonable and coherent interpretation.
I will refer to this as referential ambiguity. An example is
(8):
(8) Original version
(Wij) ...Veroordelen verweerder om voor zijn kind
maandelijks een onderhoudsgeld te betalen van ...
Voor zover verweerder niet vrijwillig overgaat tot
betaling machtigen eiseres, om het onderhoudsgeld voor
het kind Sarn rechtstreeks vooraf te nemen op alle
inkomsten van verweerder. (243)
Substituted version
(Wij) ...Veroordelen verweerder om voor zWn kind
maandelijks een onderhoudsgeld te betalen van ... .
Voor zover verweerder niet vrijwillig overgaat tot
betaling machtigen eiseres, om het onderhoudsgeld voor
haar (kind? ~ eiseres?) rechtstreeks vooraf te nemen op
alle inkomsten van verweerder. (243)
We decree that dejendant pay ~or his child a monthly allowance o( ... If
de(endant dces not pay uoluntarily, (we) authorise plaintiJj to take the
allowance for ~the child Sara ~ her~ directly out o( the defend,ant's
income in advance.
In order to check to what extent referential (inkoherence can be
the motive for the use of nominal anaphors, the replaceability of
all nominal anaphors in the decisions is analysed. For each
nominal anaphor it is checked whether the discourse remains
referentially coherent if it is replaced by a pronominal variant.'o
The results of the analysis are shown in table (3):
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Table ( 3): Replaceability of NAs by pronouns (n-186)
n ~o
replaceable 139 81.3
ref. obscure 16 9.4
ref. ambiguous 10 5.8
unclear 6 3.5
non applicable 15 -
total 186 100.0
This analysis shows that only a small number of the nominal
anaphor replacements cause referential incoherence. Only 10 NA-
replacements cause referential ambiguity. The small number of
ambiguous anaphors was to be expected, for the corpus is
composed of decisions with only one party or with two parties,
indicated by NPs differing in number orland gender." By
choosing discourse protagonists (i.e., parties) indicated by NPs
difiering in gender or number, referential ambiguity normally
cannot occur in simple cases of switch reference, i.e., when in
successive clauses a different protagonist acts as subject and~or
topic. All 10 ambiguous NA-replacements indeed concern non-
protagonists (children or attorneys of parties).
There are two aspects which explain the 16 cases in which NA-
replacement causes referential obscurity. In 11 cases the NA
refers to a non-protagonist referent which is remote, such as
children of the parties, attorneys, foster families etc.; in 5 cases
protagonist-NAs refer to a remote antecedent. They all occur in
parts of the texts in which other referents are topical, for example
in decision 8, in which the tasks of an expert are described
extensively. Non-protagonist status, remoteness and re-
establishment of referents are known in the literature as reasons
to re-access referents with nominal anaphors (see Francik 1985;
Clancy 1980; Marslen-Wilson et al. 1982).
In 6 cases, it is unclear whether the impossibility of replacing
NAs is caused by referential obscurity or ambiguity. Finally,
there are 15 NAs which cannot be replaced; at the beginning of
the decisions, they install referents in their legal role as
protagonists in the decisions. An example is (9):
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(9) IN ZAKE
V.H.I., inpakster, wonende ...
eiseres
TEGEN:
S.H., hulpwever, wonende te ...
verweerder
IN THE CASE OF
V.H.I., packer, liuing ...
plaintifj
AGAINST:
S.K, assistant weaver, liuing at ...
dejendant
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In cases like these, the legal-role indications clearly have a
predicative value. A genuine co-referential link is not under
discussion here, which is clear in (9a), the explicit version of (9):
(9a) In this decision
V.H.I., packer, living ... is assigned the role of plaintiff
and
S.H., assistant weaver, living in ... is assigned the role of
defendant.
It can be concluded that in less than 20~0 of the cases the
replacement of nominal anaphors by pronominal anaphors causes
referential incoherence. This means that referential incoherence
only rarely accounts for the use of nominal anaphors in the
decisions. Thus, two contextual phenomena, affecting the
resolution of anaphors in discourse, play only a marginal role in
determining the format of anaphoric expressions, i.e., (i)
competing candidates, causing referential ambiguity and (ii)
distance between antecedent and anaphor, causing referential
obscurity. However, in other studies on reference, these
phenomena can or are supposed to account for almost the entire
variation in explicit and non-explicit anaphoric forms - see Clancy
(1980:160); Ariel 1988; Givón 1983.
5.3.2 Indicating structural boundaries
A second possible explanation for the high proportion of nominal
anaphors can be found in their structure-indicating function.
R.esearch on reference, e.g. Clancy 1980 and Fox 1984, has clearly
shown that nominal anaphors can be associated with structural
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boundaries in discourse.
In the corpus, there are discourse boundaries between the three
standard components of each decision, i.e., the introductory part
(gezien 'having seen', gehoord ~aving heard'), the argumentation
or considering part (ouerwegende dat 'considering that') and the
dictum (om deze redenen 'for these reasons'). The structural
position of the antecedents of the anaphors is indicated in table
(4):
Table (4): Relationship between anaphoric form and structural
position of antecedent (n-203)
antecedent antecedent
across boundary not across boundary
n 96 n ~
pronominal 0 0 17 100.0
anaphors
nominal 30 16.1 156 83.9
anaphors
total 30 14.8 173 85.2
It turns out that all anaphors with an antecedent across a
discourse boundary are nominal. So far a structural explanation
of the occurrence of nominal anaphors is applicable. However,
this explanation should be taken in a relative sense in view of the
fact that only 16.loAo of all nominal anaphors (n-186) - and 14.4010
of all replaceable nominal anaphors (n-139) - refer to an
antecedent over such a discourse boundary. So, another function
must be assigned to the remaining anaphors.
5.3.3 Indicating non-protagonist status
According to Francik 1985, NAs can be explained by the fact that
they refer to non-protagonists in discourse. In the decisions, this
would mean that nominal anaphors would refer to referents not
indicating process parties or the court itself. However, the results
are contrary to these expectations, as table (5) shows:
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Table (5): Relationship between anaphoric form and protagonist
status of referent (n-203)
non-protagonist protagonist
n olo n oIo
pronominal anaphors 1 5.9 16 94.1
nominal anaphors 36 19.4 150 80.6
total 37 18.2 166 81.8
The conclusion is clear: pronominal anaphora refer to
protagonists, which is in keeping with the accessibility view.
However, nominal anaphors do not refer to non-protagonists: the
bulk of NAs refer to the process parties in the decisions.
5.3.4 Conclusion
Competing candidates, distance, discourse boundaries and non-
protagonist status are discourse conditions decreasing the
accessibility of referents. In keeping with the accessibility view,
these discourse conditions favour the occurrence of nominal
anaphors. Or, conversely, nominal anaphors can be conceived of
as indicators of the discourse conditions mentioned in this
section. However, they only explain a small number of the NA-
occurrences: their cumulative explanation rate is 39.2~0 (n-73).
5.4 The qualificational hypothesis
5.4.1 Expressing role changes
In contrast to the previous explanations, which affect the
relationship between formal discourse organisation and the
accessibility of referents, this section focuses on explanations
based on the qualificational value of nominal anaphors. In the
decisions, two qualificational explanations can be indicated, the
first of which is role change.
The nominal anaphors in the decisions indicate different roles of
the referents. They can indicate (i) persons (by means of proper
names), (ii) legal roles adopted by the referents in the decision
(e.g. plaintiff, defendant, appellant ...), (iii) other roles referents
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adopt in scenarios evoked in the decisions (e.g. husband) or (iv) a
combination of different roles ( e.g. the child J.S. or the mother-
plaintif~. The distribution of nominal anaphors according to their
role value results in the following table:
Table (6): Role indication of nominal anaphors (n-186)
n R6
proper names 20 10.8
legal roles 127 68.3
other roles 25 13.4
combination of roles 14 7.5
total 186 100.0
The proportion of legal-role indications is high, and would have
been even higher if it had not been for a rather special
circumstance in one decision: in the dictum of decision 7, the
parties are almost exclusively indicated by their proper names.
The reason for this is the fact that legal-role indications in that
decision are extremely complicated and hence unusable as
nominal anaphor - as the role assignments in (10) show. This
accidental circumstance explains 16 out of 20 occurrences of
proper-name anaphors , i.e., 80oIo.
(10) V.J., schipper, wonend te ...
appellant op hoofdberoep, ge'intimeerde op incidenteel
beroep
TEGEN:
V.H.A, huisvrouw, wonende te ...
ge'intimeerde op hoofdberoep, appellante op incidenteel
óeroep
V.J., bargee, liuing at ...
appellant on main appeal, respondent to an appeal on a point ojlaw
ACAINST:
V.HA., housewije, liuing in ...
on main appeal, appellant to an appeal on a point ojlaw
Non-legal-role indications are indications of roles the referents
occupy in the story of the case in question: referents can take the
role of father, mother, child, husband, wife, tenant etc. The kind
of non-legal role reflects the kind of decision.
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In the combination cases, two roles are combined. Only a few NAs
have the syntactic character of an apposition, as in meester V.,
aduocaat uoorncemd ~, J.D., attorney mentioned above'. Most of
the combinations are so-called binomials', sequences of two
expressions, belonging to the same formal class, and having the
same syntactic function, as in mceder-eiseres 'mother-plaintiff,
het minderjarige kind D.W.S. 'the infant child D.W.S.'.12
Role indication of referents in the decisions provides a possible
qualitative explanation for the use of NAs. NAs could be
accounted for by what I call contextual accommodation. This
means that the role indicating the referent is adapted to the
context at hand. An NA indicates the role which is the most
adequate in that particular context. In this view, NAs are
accounted for if the anaphor-context requires another role than
the antecedent-context. Two clear role changes are given in (11)
and (12):
(11) Bij onze beschikking van ... werd dagstelling verleend en
partijen werden opgeroepen bij gerechtsbrieven van 14
mei 1982.
Part~jen werden gehoord in hun middelen en conclusies ...
Partijenzijn gehuwd op 23 september 1958 en hebben ...
Het is ter zitting gebleken dat de verstandhouding tussen
de echtgenoten ernstig verstoord is. (606)
By our decree oj ... a date was set and parties were summoned by legal
couer of May 14th, 1982. Parties were heard in their means and their
conclusions. Parties urere married on September 23rd, 1958. It became
clear at the session that the relationship between the married couple is
seriously disturbed.
(12) Wij,
Kennen het bestuur over de persoon en de goederen van
het minderjarige kind S. toe aan eiseres, met bezoekrecht
aan verweerder om de veertien dagen op zaterdag van 10
tot 18 uur op last van het kind zelf bij de moeder af te
halen, daarentegen dient de mceder het kind bij de uader
terug af te halen. (228)
we,
assign guidance ooer the person and the goods oj the injant child S. to
plaintijj, with uisiling rights to dejendant every other week on Saturdays
jrom 10 AM to 6 PM, with the obligation jor the child to be oollected
from the mother. However, the mother is to collect the child jrom the
jather.
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In both examples, legal roles change into family-roles. In (11) the
adequacy of the role change is clear: the defendant and the
plaintiff may well be on good terms, whereas the understanding
between them as a married couple is severely disturbed. In (12)
too, the role change is adequate: it describea the tasks the parties
in their qualities of father and mother have to accomplish with
regard to their child. The role changing function ia the clearest in
the beginning of each decision, where the legal roles are installed,
as in example (9).
Non-legal-role indications exclusively occw in contexts in which
the scenario they are related to is activated. Legal roles have a
broader scope. They can occur in all scenarios in the decisions.
This is an indication of the fact that role changes are not
identificational at all: in all cases legal-role indications would be
sufficient. Conteatual accommodation is a qualificational function
of nominal anaphors. An NA no longer merely reflects the
accessibility statua of the referent, but also signala the moat
adequate role indication of the referent in the context at hand.
Table (7) shows that role change between antecedent and
anaphor can explain a considerable subset of the nominal
anaphors.19
Table (7): The occurrence of nominal anaphors in role-change and
non-role-change situation (n-186)
n qa
role change 44 23.7
no role change l4'~ 76.3
total 186 100.0
Role changes could be compared with the notions of world- or
scenario-shift, put forward elsewhere to explain occurrences of
nominal anaphors. Thus, Clancy explains the preference for
nominal NPs at the beginning of the stories in her English corpus
(13 out of 260 nominal anaphors) by looking upon them as
signalling the transition of the real-world perspective to the story-
world perspective (1980:147-150). Anderson et al. 1983 provide
evidence for the fact that scenario-bound referents lose their
availability after the transition to another scenario in the
discourse. However, this does not apply to the role changes as
described in the decisions. The reason for this is twofold:
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(i) In the scenario-shift proposals mentioned above, nominal
anaphors are merely indicators of scenario shift, a
function which is not fundamentally different from other
accessibility functions of NAs, such as the indication of
remoteness of the antecedent, or of discourse boundaries.
In all these proposals, the fact that the anaphor is
nominal - as opposed to pronominal - is the crucial
trigger for determining its functional value. In my
interpretation of role-change, however, it is the lexical
content of the NA - as opposed to the content of previous
NAs - that is crucial in determining the functional value
of NAs.
(ii) Although the notion of scenario is useful in describing
the different settings which can be evoked in decisions,
there is a clear difference between scenario-shift and
what I called role change. The fact is that not every
single role change causes a scenario shift or is
accompanied by one and that not every scenario-shift has
to be signalled by a role change. Within the same
discourse unit (proposition, clause) indications of
different roles can occur, as in (13) where a legal-role
indication coincides with family-role indications in the
same unit, within which scenario-shifts cannot plausibly
be assumed.
(13) Verweerder biedt aan om voor het onderhoud van
echtgenote en kind respektievelijk 16.500 frank en 3.500
frank per maand te betalen. (616-617)
Defendant ojfers to pay in support oj his wife and child the monthly
sums of 16,500 francs and 3,500 francs respectively.
Moreover, nominal anaphors themselves can signal two roles at a
time (as in e.g. moeder-eiseres 'mother-plaintiff). Furthermore
there is the fact mentioned earlier that legal-role indications can
occur in any scenario, as is shown for example in (14) and (15):
(14) Eiseres is geboren op 1 oktober 1960 en verweerder op 26
december 1959. (209-210)
Plaintiff was born on October lat, 1960 and defendanl on December
26th, 1959.
(15) ... Zeggen dat het volledig bedrag van de kinderbijslag
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aan eiseres toekomt. (246)
... Say that the full amorcnt oj the child benefit is due to plaintitj:
Thus, it is the variation between the lexical content of the
antecedent and the lexical content of the anaphor that
determines the role changing function of NAs and not the
variation between nominal and pronominal anaphors.
The qualificational nature of the role changing function of NAs
can be substantiated by the following observationa. The
replacement of the nominal anaphors by pronouns rarely causes
referential incoherence - as is ahown in table (3). The
replacement of non-legal-role indications by legal-role indications
never causes referential incoherence. These replacements only
result in differences in perspective, adequacy, relevance andlor
informative value, notions known as qualificational from the
preceding chapters.
5.4.2 Suggesting direct discourse
A further pragmatic explanation for a subset of NAs can be found
in the illocutionary mode of the decisions. Decisions are written
in the performative, transactional mode. Things are not merely
described or elaborated upon (see e.g. Kurzon 1989:298), they are
established as they are described. This mode is especially clear in
the dictum, which consists of an enumeration of clauses
beginning with a performative verb. A characteristic of the
dictum is that it does not communicate events or facts, but that it
performs actions. The action verbs in the dictum are mostly
explicitly performative. They indicate what parties have to do,
what they are permitted or not permitted to do, what they get or
have to give etc. The following performative verbs occur in the
decisions: machtigen 'authorise', gelasten 'orderldirect', zeggen
'say', toekennen 'assign', veroordelen 'convict~condemn', toelaten
'permitlallow', beuelen 'order', toevertrouwen 'entrust', uerbod
opleggen 'prohibit', uerw~jzen 'direct', uerklaren 'declare',
ontbinden 'dissolve', uerlenen 'grant', uerbod doen 'forbid',
compenseren 'compensate', uitspreken 'utter', ontzeggen
'denylrefuse', opdragen be assigned', aanhouden 'arresd
apprehend', aanstellen 'appoint'.
Some of the verbs are not explicitly performative. A verb like
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zeggen 'say' can have the character of a statement. At the
beginning of a dictum-clause, however, the verb zeggen is
performative and introduces a decree, as is clear in (16):
(16) Wij ... zeggen dat het onderhoudsgeld wordt gekoppeld
aan het indexcijfer van de maand juli 1984 en eenmaal 's
jaar dient te worden aangepast in de maand augustus op
het indexcijfer van de maand tevoren; zeggen dat het
volledig bedrag van de kinderbijslag aan eiseres tcekomt;
(245)
We ... say that the allowance is linked to the iredex-~gure o( the month oi
July 1984 and must be adapted euery year in the month o(August on the
basis oj the index-~ìgure oj the preuious month; say that the (ull amount
of the child benejtt is due to plaintij(,~
The performative value of these clauses can be seen as a sound
explanatory basis for the nominal character of a subset of
anaphors in the decisions. Performative speech acts typically
imply an interactional, direct-discourse situation. The most
frequent stereotype form of a performative speech act underlying
the clauses in the dictum is the following:
(17) ~judge to parties~
{I I we) condemn I declare you ...
The interactional direct-discourse perspective, as in (17), is not
entirely applicable to decisions. Decisions are forms of written
communication, in which pronouns as in (17) can ónly be used to
a limited extent. Thus, the second person pronoun, for example, is
unable to disambiguate between plaintiff and defendant. Also,
decisions not only represent the actual realisation of the decision,
but they are also its written report. Finally, decisions as official
reports are not only addressed to the parties in the lawsuit, but
can be used by others too, for instance as precedents. These
characteristics of decisions do not allow the use of the stereotype
format of a performative speech act in the dictum. However, this
format is approximated as much as possible: the agent-part in the
performative speech acts - i.e., the court - is referred to by means
of both de rechtbank 'the court' and wij 'we', as in (18):
(18) Om deze redenen, Wij J. Z., rechter ... uitspraak doende
bij voorlopige beschikking, in openbare terechtzitting op
tegenspraak: ... (8)
~oa CHAPTER 5
For these reasons, We J.Z., judge .. . decreeing by prelEminary prooision,
in open court ajter jul[ argument on both sides ...
The datiuelexperiencer-part of the speech acts, i.e., the process
parties, is referred to exclusively by means of definite-description
anaphors without determiners: all anaphors filling an argument
slot of a performative verb in the decisions (n-47; 23.2~0 of all
anaphors) have this bare' nominal format, as is seen in table (8):
Table (8): Relationship between anaphoric form and argument-






pronominal 0 0 17 100.0
anaphors
nominal 47 25.3 139 74.7
anaphors
total 47 23.2 156 76.8
Examples of argument-slot anaphors are found in (19):
(19) Wij ... Kennen aan uerweerder het voorlopig
gebruiksrecht toe van ...; Leggen aan part~jen verbod op
deze goederen te verplaatsen, ...; Veroordelen eiseres om
aan verweerder terug te betalen ... (426-431)
We ... assign dejendant the provisional right of use oj...; (oróid parties to
mooe these goods; Condemn plaintij)`'to rejund dejendant jor ...
The choice of this type of anaphor in these positions is not
accidental, since it supports the direct-discourse perspective of
performative communication better than pronominal anaphors.
By omitting the definite determiner the legal-role indications get
the format of proper names. Not only do proper names have the
denoting property of uniquely identifying referents, they also
have an addressing or vocative property with respect to the
referent. Definite descriptions do not have either of these
characteristics by default. The omission of the determiner
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provides the definite descriptions with both characteristics. The
vocative property of 'bare' definite descriptions - as opposed to
normal definite descriptions and third-person pronouns - is shown
in (20):
(20) (Boer ~~de boer ~~hij1, pas op je kippen.
(Farmer ~ the farmer ~ he), take care of your chickens.
It is this vocative property which accounts for the use of bare
nominal anaphors in the argument slots of performative verbs in
the dictum of the decisions. Bare nominal anaphors are able to
suggest the direct-discourse perspective, which is essential in
performative speech acts, as is seen in (19a):
(19a) Wij ... Kennen aan (U, verweerder ~?U, de uerweerder ~
~U, hem) het voorlopig gebruiksrecht toe van ...;
Leggen aan (U, part(jen (?U, de partijen )~U, hen)
verbod op deze gcederen te verplaatsen, ...;
Veroordelen (U, eiseres (?U, de eiseres )~U, haar) om
aan (U, verweerder (?U, de uerweerder (~U, hem) terug
te betalen ... (426)
We ... assign to (you, defendant I you, the defendant ~ you, hirnJ the
pm~isional right of use of...;
forbid (you, parties I you, the parties I you, themJ to moue these goods;
Corutemn Jyou, plaintiff ~ you, the plaintijf ~ you, herJ to rejund {you,
defendant I you, the defendant I you, him) for ...
The vocative function of the performative nominal anaphors in
the decisions is supported by the analysis of cataphorically
related referential expressions in Maes 1987. There I explained
the acceptability of 'illegal' cataphoric relationships like the ones
in (21}(25), by introducing the notion of direct-discourse
perspective:
(21) ~Walter~ ... The teacher warned him that Walter would
have to work harder.
(22) ~Mary~ ... She was told that under no circumstances
would Mary have to compromise herself.
(23) ~Mary~ ... She was told that if she wanted to get
anywhere in this dog-eat-dog world, Mary was going to
have to start stepping on some people.
(24) ~Mary~ ... She was told that Mary would have to step on
some people.
~33
(25) ~John~ ... He was told that John was a jerk."
~~r~tty~~~x ~
According to the structural restrictions on co-referentiality, such
as Reinhart (1983:43), the cataphoric relationships in these
sentences cause ungrammaticality, since the nominal anaphor is
in the structural domain of the pronominal antecedent. However,
it is claimed in Maes 1987 that the sentences are clearly
acceptable, provided that the discourse referents underlying these
co-referential NPs are highly accessible at the moment the
sentences occur in the discourae, which normally means that both
antecedent and pronoun are anaphorically related to a preceding
mention of the discourse referent. The function of the nominal
remention of the referent then lies in the activation of the direct-
discourse perspective. Note that the replacement of the proper
names by 'normal' definite descriptions would not allow the same
direct-discourse interpretation. This interpretation is made
explicit in the a-versions below.'s
(21a) The teacher warned Walter: "You would have to work
harder!"
(22a) Mary was told "Do not compromise yowself, Mary, under
no circumstances!"
(23a) She was told:"If you want to get anywhere in this
dog-eat-dog world, you have to start stepping on some
people".
(24a) She was told:"You have to step on some people".
(25a) John was told: 'you are a jerk".
Our conclusion is that the direct-discourse perspective offers a
sound explanation for a clear-cut subset of nominal anaphors in
the decisions, an explanation which follows from the performative
character of the dictum of the decisions. Such an explanation fits
in with the non-identificational function of nominal anaphors: the
direct-discourse suggestion does not affect the accessibility of the
referent, but it imposes a pragmatic interactional perspective
upon the referent.
5.4.3 Conc]usion
So far, a fair number of NA-occurrences can be explained through
text-internal variables, which can be determined analytically in
the decisions involved. In the first column, table (9) lists the
number of NAs accounted for by each variable. The successive
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variables only apply to the remaining unexplained NAs. In the
following column the cumulative percentage of explained NAs is
given:
Table (9): Accumulatiue explanation rate for NAs of
textinternal uariables (n-186)
NA-explaining uariable accounted for accounted for
n 90
ref. incoherence 47 47~186~100-25.3
discourse boundary 14 61I186~`10(1-32.8
non-protagonist 12 73I186~`100-39.2
role change 19 921186~`100-49.5
direct discourse 33 125~186~`100-67.2
All these variables together have an explanation rate of 67.2~0.
The remaining NA-occurrences (n-61, 32.8~ of all NAs) are
extremely atypical, in the sense that there are no text-internal
characteristics that can explain their nominal format. No
generalizable formal, semantic or pragmatic discourse
characteristic turns out to be capable of explaining them.
One major factor we have not yet taken into account in
explaining NAs, is the fact that decisions take up a well-
established place in the highly structured institution of the law.
This in fact means two things: firstly, a decision is not a free-
style text, but a highly canonised text form which is modelled
along the strict lines dictated by legal conventions and tradition.
Secondly, a decision takes up a position in between other forms of
communication in the legal procedure.'s
In order to explain the functionality of nominal anaphors, I will
in the following section touch on relevant aspects of the function
of the law and of the function of decisions within the institution
of the law. The institutional analysis of decisions will turn out to
provide a suitable framework in which especially qualificational
functions of NAs find a natural place. Hence, in view of the
institutional function of decisions, not only the remaining NAs
can be explained, but also the above mentioned qualificational
variables can be fitted in.
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5.5 Decisions as institutional texts
5.5.1 Law and counterfactuality
The law, as expressed, among other things, in deciaions, is
basically meant to solve conflicts. It does not solve these conflicts
on an individual basis, i.e., it does not decide upon cases and
conflicts only by evaluating and deciding upon the individual
facts concerned. Instead, the law solves a conflict by divesting the
conflict of its individual and subjective character, i.e., by
disindividualising the conflict, without, however, neglecting the
individual aspects of the case. The nature of solving conflicts by
law can be expressed by the following three interpretations
associated with Hegel's notion of Aufhebung, expressing the
dialectical relationship between law as a system of rules and
concepts on the one hand and the specificity of the case on the
other:"
to confirm the conflict as a conflict
to finish the conflict
to raise the conflict to a higher level.
Thus, the function of the law is that it creates an artificial level
at which factual circumstances are abstracted from and
individual inequalities are equalised. As such, the law creates a
mise en scène in which the interaction between conflicting parties
is objectified. The fact is that the judge is not supposed to decide
in favour or against this or that individual, but to determine that
which according to objective law is the relationship that applies.
Philosophers of law have implemented this idea of the function of
the law in many ways: the law is said to reduce, transform or
reconstruct factual reality. An interesting starting point for the
institutional explanation of nominal anaphors can be found in the
idea, put forward in Foqué 8s 't Hart 1990, that the law has to be
looked upon as a counterfactual reconstruction of factual
reality:'A
De handelin,q of óeslissing dient uanuit een oogpunt
uan integriteit steeds reconstrueerbaar te zijn ás if,
alsof zij het resultaat is uan die beginselen (algemene
rechtsheginselen (A.M.)], alsof de handeling of
beslissinf; op een andere wijze tot stand gekomen is dan
dat wellicht ieitelijk' het geual is. Deze reconstructie ás
if is met antírre wrx~rden een 'cYintraFactiuhe'
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constructie, die bewerkstelligt dat een concrete
handeling of beslissing betrokken kan worden op het
beeld dat de maatschappij waarin gehandeld of beslist
wordt uan zichzelf heeft (het imaginaire sociale) en in
de integriteit uan dat zelfbeeld opgenomen kan worden.
(Foqué 8c 't Hart 1990:138).
To achieue integrity, the action or decision should
always be reconstructable ás if, as if they are the
result of those principles ,(general principles of justice
(AM)J, as if the action or decision has come about in
another way than might actually haue been the case in
reality. In other words, this reconstruction ás if is a
counterfactual construction, which causes a concrete
action or decision to be related to the self-image of the
society in which the action or decision takes place (the
'imaginaire sociale) and in the integrity ofwhich it can
be incorporated.
Legal concepts have an artificial, counterfactual meaning. This
means that the terminology does not directly have empirical
factuality as its object and hence can be called counterfactual
(Foqué 8z 't Hart 1990:139). Applied to decisions, the idea of
counterfactuality means that a decision is not seen as deciding
upon individual conflicts, but 'as if it were an objectified decision
taken on the basis of principles of justice, applicable to everyone.
In view of our interest in discourse referents, especially the
counterfactual characterisation of the notion of legal subject is
important:
Zo is in het bijzondere de juridische artegorie uan de
rechtssubjectiviteit een contrafactische categorie: zij
beschrijft niet de feitelijkheid uan het menszijn van elk
indiuidu, maar zij maakt het mogelijk het handelen en
het beslissen uan die feitelijke indiuiduen te
reconstrueren alsof dat handelen en beslissen het
produkt is uan een urije, autonome en steeds aan
zichzelf gelijkblijvende actor. Daardoor worden dat
handelen en dat beslissen niet gereduceerd tot een
louter individueel gebeuren, maar zij verkrijgen
integendeel juist daardoor een maatschappelijke
betekenis die aanspraak kan maken op integriteit. Zo
leuert de contrafactische categorie der
rechtssubjectiviteit niet alleen een beschermend statuut
aan het indiuidu, maar betrekt het dat indiuidu juist
daardoor en tegelijkertijd in de integriteit uan een
maatschappijbeeld dat geacht moet worden aan het
~:2 ~'Fi~Fï'ER ó
hand.elen en beslissen uan elk indiuidu ten grondslag te
liggen. (Foqué 8a 't Hart 1990:141)
Thus in particular the category of legal subjectiuity is
counterfactual: it does not describe the factuality of
each indiuidual as a human being, but it enables us to
reconstruct the actions and decisions of actual
individuals as if their actions and decisions were the
product of a free, autonomous and always identioal
actor. As a result these actions and decisions are not
reduced to merely índiuidual euents but by that very
assumption they acquire a social meaning which can
lay claim to integrity. Thus the counterfactual category
of legal subjectivity not only offers a protecting statute
to the indiuidual, but by its uery existence also includes
the indiuidual in the integrity of an image of sceiety
that is considered to be fundamental to the actions and
decisions of each indiuidual.
In the neat section, it will be shown that the idea of
counterfactual reconstruction can be called in to ezplain peculiar
discourse characteristics in decisions, such as nominal anaphors.
5.5.2 Counterfactuality and coherence in decisions
5.5.2.1 Factual premises in processing discourse
The basic idea behind the applicability of the notion of
counterfactuality is the following: if legal actions, such as
decisions, are looked upon as a counterfactual reconstruction of
factual reality, involving an artificial mise en scène,
disindividuation and objectivation of individual and subjective
facts, then it is plausible to look upon peculiar discourse
characteristics as symbols or as the (re)confirmation of the
counterfactual nature of these legal actions.
As I will show, not only nominal anaphors can be seen as symbols
of counterfactual reconstruction. In fact, other discourse
phenomena can and will be explained in a similar fashion, such
as the strange sentence structure of decisions, the use of archaic
words or phrases, the use of legal terms and the unusual way in
which propositions are related to each other.
If we reinterpret this symbol-function from a processing view on
discourse, peculiar discourse characteristics of decisíons can be
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functionally characterised as signals, countering or disturbing
normal processing of discourse. If we assume that 'normal'
discourse processing implies the construction of a coherent
representation on the basis of factual processing premises - this
term will be elaborated upon below - artificial discourse
characteristics can be seen as signals indicating that the default
factual premises underlying the processing of discourse do not
hold in the discourse setting concerned.
The plausibility of factual premises underlying the processing of
discourse is accounted for by the fact that discourse processing is
necessarily embedded in and crucially dependent on 'factual', i.e.,
semantic and encyclopaedic knowledge. It will be argued that the
following factual processing premises, which are necessary
preconditions for establishing coherence, are inapplicable in legal
discourse. The premises - the scope of which partly overlap each
other - concern referential, narratiue and relational coherence
respectively.
(i) Factual premise underlying referential coherence
Whether discourse referents refer to real or fictitious
individuals or objects, discourse addressees cannot but
make discourae referentially coherent on the basis of
their experience with factual individuals or objects.
(ii) Factual premise underlying narratiue coherence
Whether narratives in discourse are real or fictitious,
discourse addressees cannot but make a coherent
representation of these narratives on the basis of their
everyday experience with factual events and stories.
(iii) Factual premise underlying relational coherence
Discourse addressees cannot but link propositions in
discourse coherently on the basis of their semantic
knowledge of factual reality and their pragmatic
knowledge of strategies writers use in discourse.
244 cHAPTER 5
5.5.2.2 Counterfactual referential coherence
The following characteristics of the nominal anaphors in the
decisions can be interpreted as signals overrulling the first
processing premise and obatructing normal referential coherence
in decisions.
(i) First, it is shown in section 5.3.4 that the majority of
NAs cannot be explained 6y identificational
considerations (60.8~0; n-113). The use of nominal
anaphors when~where pronouna would be the most
natural referential continuation of discourse, runs
counter to the normal processing of referents during
reading. It indicates that the normal perception of
referential coherence, determined by the notion of
accessibility, does not apply in the case of these decisions.
(ii) A second characteristic, analogous to the first, is the high
number of 'autonomous' anaphors. In section 5.2.4 we
signalled the low number of anaphors requiring a link
with another referent (such as possessives) or requiring
an antecedent in order to be able to access a discourse
referent (such as demonstratives or pronouns). This
implies that most anaphors in fact enable the reader to
access the intended referent without relying on another
referent or an antecedent.19 The use of such expressions
when dependent expressions would be natural, again
obstructs normal referential processing (see also section
5.5.3).
(iii) Third, there is the high proportion of legal-role
indications amongst the NAs (68.3~; n-127), as is
mentioned in table (6); in the category of unexplained
NAs (n-61), the proportion of legal-role indications is
even higher (77~0; n-47). During processing, legal-role
indications avoid the simple linking of the referents with
factual individuals. They signal the transformation from
individuals to objectivated legal subjects and express the
fact that legal relevance and validity only apply to legal
roles, not to accidental individuals.
(iv) Another peculiar referential phenomenon, noted in
section 5.4.2, is the absence of determiners, which
provides definite descriptions with interpretative aspects
NOMINAL ANAPHORS IN DECISIONS 245
of proper names, i.e., their vocative function and
uniqueness. As such, legal-role indications are used as if
they were proper names.
(v) Finally, dispensing with pronouns makes it possible to
auoid the indication of grammaticalgender, reflecting the
sex of individuals, which is irrelevant for the
interpretation of legal subjects.~
Summarising, these characteristics of NAs obstruct the normal
referential processing as well as a factual interpretation of
referents. They do not affect the identificational value or the
accessibility status of the underlying discourse referent. Instead,
they symbolise institutional aspects of decisions and
qualificational aspects of legal discourae referents imposed by the
institution of the law. As such, they fit in naturally with the
qualificational functions mentioned in section 5.4. By taking into
account the institutional setting and function of decisions, the
qualificational functionality of NAs can be anchored and
corroborated: not just text-internal variables (such as role change
and direct discourse) account for qualificational functions of NAs,
but text-external aspects, stemming from the institution in which
decisions occur.
5.5.2.3 Counterfactual narrative coherence
Decisions may well be conceived of as narratives, as a type of
discourse in which events are narrated. Especially the
argumentative part of decisions can easily be read as the story of
what preceded the process. This is intuitively most acceptable in
decision 6, the only decision in which the considerans-part has
the format of normal sentences, as is shown in (11). It is
plausible to assume that the sequence of the sentences in (11) is
meant to evoke a narrative ordering of situations in time.
(11) Bij onze beschikking van ... werd dagstelling verleend en
partijen werden opgeroepen bij gerechtsbrieven van 14
mei 1982.
Partijen werden gehoord in hun middelen en conclusies ...
Partijen zijn gehuwd op 23 september 1958 en hebben ...
Het is ter zitting gebleken dat de verstandhouding tussen
de echtgenoten ernstig verstoord is. (606)
CHAP'lER ~
By our decree oj ... a date was set and parties were summoned by legal
cover of May 14th, 19ffi. Parties were heard in their means and their
conclusions. Parties were married on September 23~, 1958. It became
clear at the session that the relationahip between the married couple is
seriously disturbed.
In all other decisions, the considerans-parthas the typical format
of ouerwegend.e-clauses, as is seen in (26) and (27):
(26) De rechtbank van ... Gezien de voorgelegde stukken
waaronder ...; Gehoord ... de heer rechter J. Z. in zijn
verslag; verzcekers voorncemd...; de heer J. S., eerste
subatituut-procureur des Konings in zijn conclusie;
Overwegende dat het verzoek ertoe strekt de verklaring
van afwezigheid te horen uitspreken van J.A. ...;
Overwegende dat het verzoek ontvankelijk is;
Overwegende dat alvorens over de grond uitspraak te
doen een getuigenverhoor dient bevolen overeenkomstig
artikel 116 B.W.; (101-103)
The casrt oj ... Having seen the documents pre~nted, among which ...;
Having heard Mr judge J.Z. in his report;petitioners mentioned bejore;
Mr J.S., first deputy attorney-general ojthe king in hia conclusion;
Considering that the petition aims at expressing the declaration oj
absence oj JA.; Considering that the petition is admitted; Considering
that óejore deciding upon the grounds oj the case an examination oj the
witnesses has to 6e ordered in accordance with article 116 oj civil law;
(27) Overwegende dat de partijen samengehuwd zijn, maar
feitelijk gescheiden leven; Dat zij drie kinderen hebben,
allen minderjarig en onder de hoede van AVH ...; Dat
tussen hen in art. 223 B.W. bedoelde maatregelen zijn
getroffen bij de beschikking a quo ...; Overwegende dat de
rechtsmiddelen beloop en omvang van de machtiging
betreffen...
Considering that the parties are married, but are in jact living apart;
that they have three children, all oj them minors and in the custody of
AVH ...; that with respect to them measures haue been taken, meant in
art. 223 B.W. by a decree a quo . ..; Considering that the legal remedies
concern the course and the extent oj the authorisation ...
However, taking into account the counterfactual nature of legal
actions, these 'narrative' sections in decisions can by no means be
regarded as narrative. The purpose of these sections is to prove
that the decision can be characterised as a legally valid action.
Not the description, the exposition or the narration of the facts is
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at issue here, but the establishment of a number of relevant
juridical facts. Each fragment in the considerans-part refers to a
procedure step, a condition or a circumstance which is necessary
for the validity of the legal action of the decision. The
combination of the fragments is not meant to be a coherent story
of what preceded the process, but only mark the necessary and
relevant juridical elements in the light of the decision which is
taken in the dictum.
In line with this counternarrative interpretation of the
considerans-part of decisions, the unusual and archaic
ouerwegende-format can be said to function as a signal countering
factual, narrative processing.
5.5.2.4 Counterfactual relational coherence
It is plausible to assume that the coherent processing of discourse
implies the establishment of coherent links between the segments
of the iext. However diverse the literature on relational
structures in discourse may be, an underlying assumption about
the ontology of coherence relations is that they are grounded in
knowledge structures addressees have acquired in experiencing
relations between events, objects and processes in reality (e.g. the
relation between cause and consequence) or in experiencing
strategies people exhibit in using language (e.g. the relation
between claim and argument). These two kinds of factually
acquired knowledge are the source for the recognition of semantic
and pragmatic coherence relations in discourse, two types of
relations which are widely accepted in discourse-relation
proposals (e.g. Sanders et al. to appear).
Such a'factual' justification of relational coherence does not apply
to decisions, because in them coherent processing of relations
between segments is not based on the perception of coherent
world knowledge relations. 1'his can be illustrated by (28), in
which two kinds of relationships occur which are frequently found
in the decisions, i.e., an addition-like and a reason-like
relationship:
(28) Overwegende dat het verzoek ertoe strekt de verklaring
van afwezigheid te horen uitspreken van J.A ...;
Overwegende dat het verzoek ontvankelijk is;
Overwegende dat alvorens over de grond uitspraak te
~~ó (;HAPTER b
doen een getuigenverhoor dient bevolen overeenkomstig
artikel 116 B.W.;
OM DEZE REDENEN,
DE RECHTBANK, Machtigt verzcekers om te bewijzen
door middel van getuigen: "Dat hun broer en oom, JA., ...
sinds het jaar 1960 verdwenen is zonder enig apoor of
nieuws achter te laten"; Gelast mevrouw C.V.D.H ... met
het afnemen van voorzegde getuigenverhoren. Zegt dat
deze getuigenverhoren zullen gehouden worden op
tegenspraak van de heer procureur des Konings te D.;
Zegt dat deze getuigenverhoren zullen gehouden worden
in de raadkamer dezer rechtbank. (103)
Considering that the petition aims at expressing the declarntion oj
absence oj JA.; Considering that the petition is admitted; Considering
that bejore deciding upon the grounds oj the case an examination oj the
witnesses has to be ordered in accordance with article 116 ojciuil law.
FOR THESE REA.SONS
THE COURT, authorises petitioners to proue by means oj witnesses:
"that their órother and uncle, JA., has disappeared since the year 1960
without leauing any tmce or news; orders Mra C.V.D.H. ... lo e.zamine the,
witnesses mentioned aboue. Says that these examinations oj the witnesses
wil[ be held ajter jull argument on the aide oj the public pro~aecutor at D.
Says that these examinations oj the witnesaes will be held in the council
clwmber oj this court.
Of course, the relationship between considerans-part and dictum
in (28) can be labelled as reason, and the relationship between
considerations and decisions among themselves can be labelled as
addition, but these labels would highly underdetermine the
relations expressed. Readers cannot rely upon any factual
knowledge or experience justifying the addition- or the reason-
relation. Instead, relational coherence in (28) relies upon explicit
legal expectations, which are based upon knowledge about the
legal system and about the function of decisions (see also Kurzon
1984:32). These expectations not only concern the nature, the
selection and the validity of considerations and decisions but also
the fact that decisions obligatorily contain two parts, i.e., (i) a
legal decision taken on the basis of (ii) legal considerations. The
archaism and illegal word order accompanying the link between
the considerans-part and the dictum symbolises that no factual
reason-relation is involved, but a relationship justified by legal,
i.e., artificial and counterfactual sources of coherence.
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5.5.3 Decisions and the cooperative principle
Decisions are not only marked by the counterfactual nature of the
law. The institutional setting of the law also imposes a special
relationship between discourse participants, which is symbolised
or signalled in discourse characteristics as well.
If discourse participants communicate with each other, they
normally accept that they try to achieve a common purpose in a
collaborative eíiort. Grice calls this the cooperative principle:
Make your conuersational contribution such as is
required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the
aceepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in
which you are engaged. (Grice 1975:45)
On the basis of this principle, Grice distinguishes four categories,
quantity, quality, relation and manner, in terms of which he
formulates so-called conversational maxims. The following
maxims have important implications for the format of referential
expressions in discourse:
Do not make your contribution more informatiue than
is required. (Quantity)
Auoid obscurity of expression, auoid ambiguity, be
brief. (Manner)
On the basis of these maxims, discourse participants choose the
referential expression which is minimally necessary for the
addressee to identify the intended referent. The assumption
behind this choice is that the addressee behaves cooperatively
and does everything to interpret the text in general and
referential expressions in particular the way the writerlspeaker
wants.
Different proposals concerning referential expressions in
discourse can be said to be based upon the notion of cooperation
and the conversational principles resulting from it. Levinson 1987
formulates a number of structural and pragmatic restrictions on
co-referential relations in terms of implicatures. According to
Levinson, the use of nominal anaphors wherelwhen pronouns
would suffice implies a non-co-referential reading on the basis of
the quantity-manner implicature:
The use of a marked fi~rm, a lexical NP where a
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pronoun might have been used, or a pronoun where a
aero might have occurred, will Q~M-implicate a non-co-
referential interpretation. (I,euinson 1987:410)
Furthermore, cooperation is the explanatory principle behind the
identificational strategies discourse participants demonstrate in
the identification task described and analysed in Clark 8z Wilkes-
Gibbs 1986. Discourse participants had to describe and order
complex figures. In analysing these deacription tasks, Clark R~
Wilkes-Gibbs develop a collaborative view on reference in
discourse. They show that speaker and hearer are both
responsible for the identification of referents. The referential
behaviour of discourse participants is claimed to be based upon
the principle of mutual responsibility, which is stated as follows:
The speaker or writer tries to make sure, roughly by the
initiation of each new contribution, that the addressees
should have been able to understand his meaning in
the last utterance to a criterion suffccient for current
Purposes. (1986:35)21
In fact, all accessibility-driven proposals on reference are based
upon the communicative principle of cooperation: adapting the
format of referring expressions to the degree of accessibility of the
referent is based upon an economical, scarce use of referential
expressions and hence requires a cooperative behaviour of the
addressee. He is supposed to be satisfied with incomplete referent
indications and to rely upon contextual and situational cues in
solving reference.
Given the communicative setting of the law, discourse
participants of decisions do not consider themselves bound by an
attitude of cooperation or mutual responsibility. Readers of
decisions are not necessarily deliberately involved in the
communication process of which the decision is a part. For
example, process parties can be subpoenaed. In such setting,
readers do not try to understand cooperatively what is considered
and decided. Rather, they try to interpret the decision counter-
cooperatiuely in the way which for them is the most favourable.
The counsellors for the defence and the prosecution are supposed
to act solely in favour of their clients. A cooperative attitude
would be unprofitable for their purposes.
Under these non-cooperative communicative conditions, writers
do not want to risk any referential ambiguity or obscurity and
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distrust systematically all kinds of non-explicit referential
expressions, such as pronouns. This naturally leads to the high
number of (over-)explicit anaphors, their main advantage being
that they can refer autonomously. As such, they do not require
the mediation of other referential expressions in order to be
referentially unambiguous, and they allow each segment to be
read as an independent statement, which is consistent with the
type of relational coherence referred to above.
This writer's attitude can explain the fact that nominal anaphors
are used even if they are structurally highly implausible and
even ungrammatical, as in (29) and (30), the normal variants of
which are (29a) and (30a) respectively:
(29) Uit de door de raadsman van eiseres voorgelegde stukken
en verstrekte uitleg blijkt dat eiseres de woning met
oprit, tuin en stal te S., Bstraat 3 voor een periode van
drie jaar met ingang van 1 januari 1983 aan verweerders
heeft verhuurd mits een maandelijkse huurprijs groot
5.000 frank. (508-511)
As is clear from the documents and the ezplana.tion of the counsellor of
plaintiJj; for a period of three years starting January 1st, 1983, plaintiff
let the house with drive, garden and stable in S., 3 B.street, to defendant
jor the monthly rent of 5.000 francs.
(29a) Uit de door haar raadsman voorgelegde stukken en
verstrekte uitleg blijkt dat eiseres ...
As is clear jnom the documents and the explanation of her counsellor,
plaintijf ...
(30) Partijen zijn nochtans over volgende punten akkoord:
afzonderlijke woonst der part~ien... (215-216)
Parties, howeuer, agree on the joldowing points: separated houae for the
parties ... '
(30a) Partijen zijn nochtans over volgende punten akkoord:
hun afzonderlijke woonst ...
Parties, howeuer, agree on the jollowíng points: their aeparated house ...
Finally, the tendency to use autonomous expressions not only
characterises the anaphors in the decisions. Also non-anaphoric
referential expressions mostly have an extremely self-supporting
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or autonomous format. A striking characteristic of most of the
indefinite and definite non-anaphoric NPs in the decisions is their
right-branching format, as is illustrated in (31) and (3):
(31) Op 21 juni 1984 heeft eiseres ter griffie een uerzcekschrift
neergelegd strekkend.e tot het nemen uan drin8ende
voorlopige maatregelen;
On 21st June 1984 plainti`f Ftled a petttion ~or urgent prouisional
measurea;
(3) ...beschikking verleend in zake: Meurouw AM., laborante,
thans werkloos, geboren te S., wonende te S., Pstraat, nr.
21, thans uerbl~jvende b{j haar ouders te S., Vstraat, 43,
bijgestaan doorhaarraadsman,Meester B.V., advocaat te
S., er kantoorhoudende... (201)
...has decreed jor the jollowing case: Mrs A.M., lab assistant, currently
unemployed, born at S., living at S. 21 Pstreet, currently residing with
her parents at S, 43 Vstreet, assisted by her counaellor, B.V., J.D.,
barrister at S., with his oj~ce at ...
The referential effect of these right-branching NPs is that they
identify the referent extensively and unambiguously within the
frame of that NP (see for further details Maes 1991a)~
5.6 Conclusion
The starting point of this chapter was the observation of an
unusual variation between pronominal and nominal anaphors in
decisions. The following three expectations, which were assumed
to be able to explain this peculiarity have been investigated:
(i) decisions simply contain a high number of discowse
characteristics causing referential problems and hence
favouring nominal anaphors (see section 5.3);
(ii) nominal anaphors fulfill non-identificational, semantic or
pragmatic functions (see section 5.4);
(iii) nominal anaphors symbolise functions of the law in
general or of legal actions and legal texts within the legal
institution in particular (see section 5.5).
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Section 5.3 showed that nominal anaphors play their expected
role when referents have a low degree of accessibility, due to
discourse variables decreasing the accessibility of the referent,
such as non-protagonist status, discourse boundaries, distance to
the antecedent or competing candidates: pronouns occur hardly or
not at all with such variables. On the other hand, we made clear
that only a small number of nominal anaphors can be explained
by these identificational considerations: a great number of NAs
remained, referring to highly accessible discourse referents. Thus,
unlike normal discourse, identificational needs do not explain the
majority of nominal anaphors.
Section 5.4 showed that two qualificational factors, role change
and direct-discourse perspective, are able to account for two
subsections of the remaining NAs. Thus, non-structural,
qualificational factors are responsible for a systematic and
considerable subset of NAs (39.8ok), and not for some incidental
NA-occurrences, as is the case in other corpus-based atudies on
reference, as e.g. in Fox (1984:117-136 and 233-237).
Section 5.5 made clear that the qualificational functionality of
NAs - and of other discourse characteristics - can be enriched and
corroborated by taking into account basic characteristics of the
institutional setting in which decisions are embedded.
Of course, the analysis in this chapter does not weaken the
accessibility view on referential expressions, but it points the way
to an important amendment, which is consistent with previous
chapters: if the default identificational value of referential
expressions, in this case nominal anaphors, is neutralised, in this
case by the high-accessibility status of the intended referent,
other, qualificational functions of referential expressions can be
exploited systematically.
It is argued that the exploitation of the qualificational function of
nominal anaphors is determined by the institutional nature of
decisions: in section 5.5 nominal anaphors are explained by
functional aspects of the law and by basic communicative
conditions of legal discourse. As we said, the qualificational
variables explaining NAs in section 5.4 also fit in naturally with
the legal nature of decisions. Although in section 5.4 I argued for
the relevance of these variables with arguments independent of
the legal context, it cannot be denied that role change and the
direct-discourse suggestion of performatives are highly relevant
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in the institutional setting of the law.
The institutional analysis of NAs in this chapter can be
corroborated by the two following facts: (i) the analysis applies to
other discourse characteristics in decisions too, such as the use of
archaic worcis and phrases and the peculiar way in which
decisions are constructed as a cluster of clauses within one and
the same sentence-format. (ii) Other analyses of legal discourse
also take the view that legal function and institutional setting
impose peculiar discourse characteristics on legal texts (e.g.
Westman 1984; Vargas 1984).
Finally, my analysis brings in massive evidence for the relevance
of the text-type variable in analysing referential eapressions. In
other studies on reference (e.g. Fox 1984:293; Kirsner 1979:369),
and in previous chapters, the relative importance of the type of
text in the analysis of referential expreasions ia shown. But this
chapter shows that text type, incorporating external conditions
imposed on texts, has absolute priority in determining referential
behaviour. This of course dces not destroy the accessibility-view
either. It only reveals the fact that acceasibility is dependent
upon basic conditions, imposed by the communicative setting in
which a particular text functions. For decisions, I argued that two
text-type conditions, reflecting their institutional function, apply,
i.e., the absence of factual processing premises and the absence of
a cooperative behaviour of discourse participants.
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Notes to chapter 5
1. This chapter is a slightly revised version of Maes 1991b.
2. The corpus contains the following decisions: uerklaring van
afwezigheid 'declaration of absence', echtscheiding 'divorce' (4
decisions), naamsuerandering 'change of name', achterstallige
huur ~'arrears of rent', aanstelling uan een deskundige
'appointment of an expert'.
3. This percentage assumes that each anaphor represents only one
word. For two reasons, this percentage is inaccurate. Firstly,
anaphors can include more than one word. Secondly, I only took
into account 'overt' anaphors, i.e., anaphors which are realised
linguistically. It is clear, however, that anaphors can take the
form of empty elements.
4. One of my own corpora, the collection of 30 opinion texts coming
from newspapers and magazines (17700 words), contains 709
anaphors (4 ~ of the number of words) only referring to one
discourse referent, i.e., the most topical referent.
5. In view of the peculiar character of the Dutch examples, the
English translations will be more or less restricted to glosses.
6. Each example taken from the corpus is accompanied by its
identification number in the corpus.
7. In the analysis, I restrict myself to anaphors referring to
human referents. Accordingly, 28 anaphors referring to non-
human referenta are not taken into account. The pronominal-
nominal distribution in these non-human anaphors is
comparable with the distribution in the total number of
anaphors, i.e., 24 nominal, 4 pronominal.
8. For a characterisation of referential and non-referential or
syntactic pronouns, I refer to Bosch (1983:49), see also aection
2.2.1.1.
9. There is only one exceptional referential pronoun which does
not share the characteristics (ii) and (iii):
(a) (Wij) vertrouwen de hoede over het kind Juri Smet toe
aan verweerder, met de verplichting om het tijdens de
week van de maandagmorgen tot de vrijdagochtend
onder te brengen bij het echtpaar VDL-D. (417-418)
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We entrust the child J.S. to the care oj dejendant, with the
obligation to put it in the care oj the married couple DVDL-D
on weekdays jrom Monday morning till Friday morning.
10. Of course, in replacing NAs by pronouns, only one nominal
anaphor at a time has been replaced. Further, NAs cannot
always be replaced without minimal changes to the syntactic
environment. See for example the change of a lexical
postmodifier into a pronominal pre-modifier in (à):
(a) Voor zover uerweerder niet vrijwillig overgaat tot
betaling, machtigen (wij) eiseres om het
onderhoudsgeld rechtstreeks vooraf te nemen op {alle
inkomsten van uerweerder I al zijn inkomsten}.
Ijdejendant does not pay voluntarily, (we) authorise plaintijf
to take the allouxince directly out oj Ithe dejendant's I his)
inrnme in aduance.
11. The distribution of the partiea in the different decisions is as
fol lows:
verzoelrers 'petitioners' (2 decisions)
eiseres - verweerd~er 'plaintiff - defendant' (3 decisions)
eiseres - uerweerders 'plaintiff - defendants' (1 decision)
geïntimeerde (m.) - appellante (ur.) 'respondent - appellant' (1
decision)
aanleggers - verweerder 'plaintiffs in appeal - defendant' (1
decision).
12. An analysis of binomials in legal diacourse is found in
Gustafsson 1984.
13. Since the decisive criterion for the occurrence of role change is
the lexical choice of the anaphor, it is clear that pronominal
anaphors are not taken into account. All pronouns are taken
simply to continue the role indicated by the antecedent.
14. The examples are adaptations of examplea of Mc Cray 1980 and
Evans 1980.
15. Apart from indicating direct diacourse, nominal anaphors in the
environment of performative verba can be looked upon as
indicating the importance or prominence of the information
conveyed. Indicating importance is a function which is assigned
to nominal anaphors in Mc Cray 1980. She calls in pragmatic or
semantic dominance to explain sentences in which nominal
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anaphors are acceptable despite their structural impossibility.
Sentences like (a) and (b) are considered to be acceptable
because the clauses containing the nominal anaphors constitute
the semantic peak of the sentence, i.e., "the most climactic,
important, or dominant part of the sentence" (Mc Cray
1980:333):
(a) He; gave her a diamond ring because Walter; lóves
Sally.
(b) He; hasn't contacted me yet, but John; is back.
The same explanation is applicable to the acceptability
differences in the following sentences, well known in research
on co-reference:
(c) ~`In John's; apartment, he; smokes pot.
(d) In John's; apartment near the railroad tracks in the
Pamrapo district of Bayonne, N.J., he; smokes pot.
(Lakoff 1976)
Similar observations about the relation between nominal
anaphors and importance of information can be found in Lakoff
1976, Reinhart 1983 and Mittwoch 1983.
16. A referential peculiarity, occurring in three decisions, proving
the dependence of decisions on other legal texts, is illustrated in
(a):
(a) Overwegende dat het verzcek ertoe strekt te horen
zeggen dat de akte van geboorte opgesteld door de
ambtenaar van de burgerlijke stand van de stad St.-
N. op 28 oktober 1983 zal worden aangevuld met de
voornaam van het kind. (303)
Considering that the petition is meant to achieve verbal
reassurance that the birth certificate dinwn up by the
registrar oj the city of St.-N. on October 28th, 1983 will be
extended by the ~rst name oj the child.
(a) occurs in the considerans-part of decision 3. In (a) a
discourse referent is introduced by a definite description het
kind 'the child', which ia unable to identify the referent
unambiguously. A justification for this referential incoherence
can be found in phrase (b) preceding fragment (a) in decision 3:
(b) Gezien de voorgelegde stukken, waaronder het
hieraangehecht verzoekschrift, (300)
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Hauing seen the documents presented, among which the
attached petition,
This clause linka the deciaion to previous procedure documents,
i.e., the petition, where the identification of the referent can be
found.
17. Taylor defines Hegel's notion of Aufhebung as "the dialectical
transition in which a lower stage is both annulled and preserued
in a higher oné' (Taylor 1979:49).
The same dialectical interpretation is expressed in Foqué 1987:
Narratiuiteit en leersteUigheid, casus en leerstuk, kunnen
zodoende opgeuat worden als de twee polen uan de
hermeneutische rechtspraxis, die elkaar nooit uitsluiten,
maar in de dialectische uerhouding elkaar in de praxis
van het oordelen bij voortduur "aufheben", dat wil zeggen
elkaar niet géisoleerd tot respectieuelijk uerhaal of dogma
laten. (Foqué 1987:79-80)
Narrativity and dogma, case and doctrine arn thus be
regarded as the two poles of hermeneutic legal practice.
They neuer exclude each other, but they constantly
'áufheben" each other in the praxis of decision making,
i.e., they do not leaue each other in isolation as narration
or a dogma respectively.
18. The idea of tranaformation can be found in Broekman (1979:98-
9):
Datgene, waar de tekst ouer gaat en vooral een
beschrijuing uan suggereert te geuen, bevindt zich
geenszins buiten die tekst. Elke onbeuoornordeelde blik in
een dossier ter terechtzitting, ter voorbereiding uan een
contract of tot juridische regeling van economische of
andere belangen zal duidelijk doen worden, hoe hier
eenduidige betekenissen door middel van een juridisch
transformatieproces tot stand komen. De jurist leeft uan
die trnnsformatie, al meent hij hardnekkig, dat de
levensfeitelijke en de juridisch-feitelijke werkelijkheid
gelijkuormig zijn.
That which the discourse is about and of which especially
it pretends to give a description, is by no means situated
outside that text. Any unprejudiced glance at a court file,
to draw up a contract or to reach a legal settlement of
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economic or other interests, will show how unambiguous
meanings are arriued at here by means of a legal
transformation process. The lawyer's liuelihood is based on
this transformation, although he obstincttely holds on to
the idea that actual reality and legal reality are congruent
with each other.
19. I am aware that the notion of autonomous anaphor is in fact
contradictory.
20. Of course, legal-role indications can, but need not be used in a
'feminine' version.
21. This principle is similar to the so-called principle of optimal
design in Clark, Schreuder 8a Buttrick (1983:246):
The speaker designs his utterance in such a way that he
has good reason to believe that the addressees can readily
and uniquely compute what he meant on the basis of the
utterance along with the rest of their oommon ground
22. Hiltunen (1984:121) observea a similar right-branching format
in the sentence structure of legal texts. The explanation he
gives is applicable to our right-branching NPs too:
The explanation as to why the right-branching should be
the most frequent uariant was assumed to be perceptual,




6.1 The scope of the study
If one surveys the attention of linguists for referential
expressions in natural language, a study on nominal anaphors
can raise divergent expectations about its objectives and about
the empirical demarcation of the subject matter. In investigating
nominal anaphors in this study, I concentrated on the contextual
efiect of the use of nominal anaphors, on the interpretative
system underlying nominal anaphors in discourse and - more
generally - on the contribution of the use of nominal anaphors to
the coherence of discourse.
With respect to both the empirical scope and the theoretical
objectives of this study, this means that I did not focus on the
study of structural, intra-sentential restrictions on nominal
anaphors following the line of research on co-reference practised
mainly by syntacticians. The fact is that the use of nominal
anaphors is highly dependent on non-structural determinants and
that NAs predominantly occur inter-sententially, which means
that the framework for the study of intra-sentential phenomena
of co-reference can never be sufficient for our purposes.
In order to deal with NAs, this study subscribes to a both
promising and delicate framework of discourse semantics, which
focusses on the development of proposals on linguistic phenomena
in which the effect of the context and considerations aíiecting the
processing of language take a central place.
Taking into account the context and the processing of discourse
does not imply, however, that this study entails either the
resolution of nominal anaphors in natural language, if this means
that it provides a full-fledged procedure including all relevant
determinants in the processing of nominal anaphors, or a fully
developed 'implementable' algorithm for the resolution of nominal
anaphors in a natural language understanding system. In fact,
the proposals on the interpretation of nominal anaphors in this
study have to be regarded as a systematised product-oriented
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description of interpretations of nominal anaphors in discourse.
They are not meant either to elucidate or to prove how exactly
the processing of NAs 'really' comes about, or how exactly the
processing of NAs can be simulated in an expert module of an
NLU-system (for a similar position, see Spooren 1989:157).
In view of the 'real' or 'simulated' processing of nominal anaphors
in natural language, one crucial question has not been dealt with
in this study, which is the question of why and when a reader
decides to take a definite nominal NP in discourse as a trigger
accessing an 'old' DREF, instead of a new one. In other words,
why and when is it that readers decide whether a definite
nominal NP is anaphorically related with an NP in previous
discourse? This question is especially pertinent in the case of
alternative definite NAs and 'antecedentless' NAs, which often
hinge heavily on knowledge associations which can hardly be
formalised in a processing procedure or resolution algorithm. Of
course, it is possible to list and systematise relevant discourse
conditions affecting the anaphoric nature of definite nominal NPs
in discourse (such as contextual nearness), linguistic features
(such as semantic relations between lexical items) and extra-
linguistic features (such as knowledge of and relations amongst
world referents or euents). However, this does not yet provide us
with a watertight processing procedure or resolution algorithm
which shows how these different information sources and triggers
interact in order to decide whether a definite nominal NP is an
anaphor or not.
Although this study takes as its point of departure a type of
knowledge (i.e., the anaphoric nature of nominal NPs in
discourse) the establishment of which still remains to be
accounted for theoretically, the kind of work which has been done
in this study constitutes the necessary and missing link between
the sentence-internal system underlying anaphoric expressions
and the full understanding of the processing of anaphoric
expressions in human communication.
6.2 A short survey of the results
In this study, two minimal formal criteria cross-classifying
nominal anaphors were taken to partition the field of nominal
anaphors, i.e., the formal relationship between antecedent and
anaphor, yielding literally repeated and alternative nominal
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anaphors and the nature of the determiner, yielding definite and
demonstrative nominal anaphors.
Chapter 2 resulted in a proposal for the interpretation of definite
alternative nominal anaphors based on implicit coherence
relations within the representation of the discourse referent
underlying the nominal anaphor. It is argued that an adequate
interpretation of definite alternative nominal anaphors is
dependent on the question whether they are adequate
actualisations of implicit coherence relations which, in turn, have
to be adequate specifications of the intentions underlying the
text. Furthermore, different types of alternative nominal
anaphors are distinguished based on their contribution to the
coherence of discourse.
Chapter 3 proposes an interpretative mechanism for
demonstrative nominal anaphors, based on the Modif'ccation of
Demonstratiue (MOD) proposal. According to the MOD-proposal, a
demonstrative determiner activates a non-default interpretation
of the NP concerned and so modifies the underlying discourse
referent representation. Four modificational types are
distinguished. It is argued that the availability of the defNA-
demNA variation is the major factor in determining the
interpretation of demonstrative nominal anaphors and that the
markedness of demonstrative nominal anaphors is non-
identificational by nature, in that it signals in the first place
semantic changes in the representation of discourse referents.
Chapter 4 claims that the variation between dezeNAs and dieNAs
is pragmatic by nature, and only affects the association of the
referent with coordination points of referential domains in the
text. In the Presence-Presupposition Proposal, the variation
between deze and die is ultimately made dependent on
interrelated global discourse conditions. In this proposal, localistic
as well as actor-oriented uses of demonstratives are shown to find
a natural explanation. As such, it does not make the
demonstrative variation dependent on the individual
identificational history of the referent involved, nor on the notion
of focality, but on general characteristics of the relationship
between referent, writer and reader in discourse.
Finally, chapter 5 offers an application case for the analysis of
identificational and qualificational functions of nominal anaphors
in one particular kind of discourse, i.e., judicial decisions. Falling
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outside the core of the NA-proposals in this study, chapter 5
proves that qualificational functions can account systematically
for the use of nominal anaphors and that the type of text can be
decisive in the functioning of referential expressions. Thereby, an
important amendment of the accessibility view on referential
expressions is revealed: if the identification of a referent is self-
evident, for example, by its high-accessibility status, other - in
this case qualificational - functions of referential expressions can
be exploited systematically.
6.3 Interpreting vs. processing NAs
6.3.1 Introduction
Although section 6.1 made a clear distinction between my
systematic analysis of NA-interpretations and an algorithmic NA-
processing procedure as the objective in studying referential
expressions, my analysis of NAs produced results which can be
translated in terms of reliable heuristics readers might use while
processing discourse. By way of conclusion, I will summarise
these results, reformulated as conditions and actions, which are
active in the processing of demNAs. It can be plausibly assumed
that the processing of NAs is guided by the following processing
heuristics (henceforth PHs).
6.3.2 The processing of defNAs
defPHl While processing a defNA, the reader depends on the
formal-lexical relationship between antecedent and
defNA as the initial determining trigger, providing
him with the following information:
defPHla when processing a literally repeated
defNA, the reader has to pass through
PH2-4
defPHlb when processing an alternatiue def1VA
(daNA), the reader has to pass through
PH5-6.
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literally repeated defNAs
defPH2 While processing a literally repeated defNA, the reader
by default assumes that the underlying DREF has a
low degree of accessibility.
defPH3 The reader assumes that the literally repeated defNA
is used to identify an identificationally problematic
DREF. He assumes that the corresponding pronominal
variant would not have done the referential job equally
well.
defPH4 The reader infers from the literally repeated defNA one
or more of the following search instructions:
defPH4a Look for a DREF which is a member of
competing candidates
defPH4b Look for a remote DREF
defPH4c Look for a DREF across a discourse
boundary
defPH4d Look for a DREF with non-protagonist
status
defPH4e Look for a DREF outside the current
scenario, point of view, frame...
alternative defNAs
defPH5 While processing a daNA, the reader by default
assumes that the underlying DREF is highly
accessible.
defPHó The reader assumes that the daNA is not just used to
identify an identificationally problematic DREF. He
assumes that the corresponding pronominal variant
would have done the referential job equally well.
defPH6a While processing a daNA 'minimally', the
reader by default infers an identify-
relation.
defPHób While processing a daNA 'maximally', the
reader can infer other coherence relations
(complex or simple, update or surplus)
obeying the pragmatic Conditions of
Centrality and Relevance.
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The processing heuristics of defNAs can be modelled as in figure
(1):














6.3.3 The processing of demNAs
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demPHl While processing a demNA, the reader by default
assumes that the underlying DREF is highly
accessible.
demPH2 The reader assumes that the demNA is the non-default
variant of the corresponding defNA-version, which is
the starting point of the processing heuristics PH4-6,
leading to semantic inferences.
demPH3 The reader assumes that the de:~~VA is thE variant of
the corresponding demNA-version, which is the
starting point of the processing heuristics PH7-9,
leading to pragmatic inferences.
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semantic processing
demPH4 While processing a demNA, the reader by default
assigns more than just an identify-rel ation.
demPHS In determining the semantic-modificational type of a
demNA, the reader hinges on the formal-lexical
relationship between antecedent and demNA as the
initial determining trigger, providing him with the
following information:
demPHSa When the demNA has a superordinate
relation with its antecedent, the reader by
default infers a classify-relation;
demPH5b When the demNA contains attributive
modijaer(s) not entailed in the antecedent,
the reader by default infers an attribute-
relation, relaxing the pragmatic Condition
of Centrality ancUor Relevance;
demPHSc When the demNA just (partially) repeats
its antecedent, the reader by default infers
a contextualise-relation.
demPHó Other contextual clues can add a supplementary
evaluate-relation to the semantic inferences of PHS.
pragmatic processing
demPH7 While processing a demNA, the reader depends
crucially on the following global discourse conditions
determining the pragmatic value of the demNA:
discourse purpose, discourse content and relational
mode.
demPH8 While processing a dezeNA, the reader assigns the
pragmatic value (DRD] and thus associates the
underlying DREF with one or more coordination points
of the Deictic Iteferential Domain [DRD]:
demPH8a The reader assigns the pragmatic value
[DRDp~tld], i.e., he infers an association
with one or more spatio-temporal
coordination points of DRD.
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The association of the referent with
[DRDpldd] enables the reader to make
pragmatic inferences affecting the spatio-
temporal location of the referent within
DRD.
andlor
demPH8b The reader assigns the pragmatic value
[DRDw], i.e., he infers an association with
the writer.
The association of the referent with
[DRDw] enables the reader to make
pragmatic inferences in which the writer
establishes the unequal relational mode
with the reader and expresses his own
perspective on and evaluation of the
referent involved.
demPH9 While processing a dieNA, the reader assigns the
pragmatic value [ORD] and thus associates the
underlying DREF with one or more coordination points
of the Other fteferential Domain [ORD]:
demPH9a The reader assigns the pragmatic value
[ORDpIt], i.e., he infers an association
with one or more spatio-temporal
coordination points of ORD.
The association of the referent with
[ORDpIt] enables the reader to make
pragmatic inferences affecting the spatio-
temporal location of the referent within a
particular referential domain distinct from
DR.D.
andlor
demPH9b The reader assigns the pragmatic value
[ORDr], i.e., he infers an association with
the reader. The association of the referent
with [ORDr] enables the reader to make
pragmatic inferences in which the writer
establishes the equal relational mode with
the reader and asks for the reader's
collaboration and approval with regard to
the referent.
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The processing heuristics of definite and demonstrative NAs
difier in at least one important respect from an implementable
resolution algorithm: they do not provide 'backtracking'
mechanisms, which are necessary to resolve exceptional NA-
cases, which do not obey the default descriptive characteristics of
NAs mentioned in the previous chapters. For example, although
most of the definite alternative NAs access highly accessible
referents, there are undoubtedly exceptional NA-cases which
successfully access referents with a low degree of accessibility, for
example, on the basis of general encyclopaedic knowledge. For
these cases, defPHS is not applicable.
Furthermore, a remark should be made with respect to the
procedural order of the heuristics presented. In figure (1) the left
or the right path of the procedure applies depending on the
formal type of the defNA. On the other hand, the processing of a
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demNA in figure (2) implies a simultaneous processing of the left
and the right path of the procedure.
A further remark concerns the role of the different PHs in the
processing of defNAs and demNAs. In fact, the different PHs can
be divided into two functional types. On the one hand, there are
components acting as input for the processing actions, such as
defPHl and demPH7. On the other hand, there are components
representing actions in the processing of NAs, such as defPH4 or
demPH5.
Finally, a last point should be made concerning the relationship
between the systematic analysis in this study and the processing
of NAs. Although sufficient proof has been given that the
heuristics presented above are based on empirical characteristica
of NAs in discourse, this, however, does not yet provide us with a
verified description of the way in which these characteristics
'work' during processing. The fact is that the 'provability' of the
processing value of the analytical characteristics of NAs is
problematic. Moreover, it is difficult to determine how fruitful it
is to develop experimental evidence corroborating the
psycholinguistic validity of the interpretation proposals in this
study. An important difference with standard experimental work
on reference in discourse is that the interpretation proposals in
this study do not entail predictions with respect to
'identificational' processing questions such as which discourse
referent is accessed by the reader? or when and how does the
reader access this referent? but with respect to 'qualificational'
questions such as how does the reader 'enrich' or 'modify' the
representation of discourse referents. It is not clear yet how such
qualificational characteristics can be validated by experimental
evidence.
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Samenvatting
In tekstwetenschappelijk onderzoek is het laatste decennium een
levende belangstelling te constateren voor het functioneren van
referentiële uitdrukkingen in teksten. Binnen het cognitief- en
proces-georiënteerd referentie-onderzoek is een visie op
referentiële uitdrukkingen ontstaan die op algemene acceptatie
kan rekenen. In die visie worden referentiële uitdrukkingen
opgevat als middelen die toegang verschafien tot representaties
van tekstreferenten. De vorm van een referentiële uitdrukking is
in die visie afhankelijk van de beschikbaarheid van de
onderliggende referent in de representatie die een ontvanger op
dat moment van de tekst heeft opgebouwd. Deze visie is
congruent met vele referentie-voorstellen, zowel
psycholinguïstisch als tekstanalytisch georiënteerde.
Een belangrijk deel van het tekstgeoriënteerd referentie-
onderzoek is gewijd aan de relatie tussen pronominale en
nominale anaforen. De resultaten van dat onderzoek zijn in
overeenstemming met de beschikbaarheidsvisie: nominale
anaforen worden gebruikt als de beschikbaarheid van de referent
laag is en pronominale als de beschikbaarheid van de referent
hoog is.
Dit proefschrift vertrekt van de dichotomie van pronominale en
nominale anaforen en concentreert zich op de semantische en
pragmatische functies van nominale anaforen in teksten. Het doel
van het proefschrift is om een visie op nominale anaforen te
ontwikkelen die duidelijk maakt wat de bijdrage is van nominale
anaforen in de coherentie van teksten.
Centraal in het proefschrift staat de tweedeling tussen
identificationele en kwalificationele functies van nominale
anaforen. Een nominaal anafoor is identificationeel gemotiveerd
als een pronomen niet of niet in gelijke mate in staat zou zijn om
de bedoelde referentie tot stand te brengen. Nominale anaforen
hebben een kwalificationele functie als ze een informationele
meerwaarde hebben ten opzichte van een pronomen.
De opbouw van het proefschrift is gebaseerd op twee minimale,
formele classificatiecriteria voor nominale anaforen. Er is ten
eerste de formele relatie tussen antecedent en anafoor. Die levert
letterlijk herhaalde en alternatieve nominale anaforen op. Ten
tweede is er de aard van de determiner, resulterend in d~niete
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en demonstratieue nominale anaforen.
In hoofdstuk 1 wordt het kader geschetst waarbinnen nominale
anaforen worden onderzocht en beschreven. In hoofdstuk 2
worden definiete alternatieve nominale anaforen (daNAs)
geanalyseerd. De centrale vraag in dat hoofdstuk is welke
informatieve lading definiete nominale anaforen in teksten
kunnen en mogen bevatten. In het hoofdstuk wordt een voorstel
gedaan voor de interpretatie van daNAs op basis van impliciete
coherentierelaties in de representatie van een tekstreferent die
ten grondslag ligt aan een nominaal anafoor. Betoogd wordt dat
een adequate interpretatie van daNAs afhankelijk is van de
vraag of daNAs adequate realiseringen zijn van impliciete
tekstrelaties, die op hun beurt adequate instantiëringen moeten
zijn van de intentie die aan de tekst ten grondslag ligt. Verder
worden in dit hoofdstuk verschillende typen daNAs onderscheiden
op grond van hun bijdrage in de coherentie van de tekst.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt een interpretatief inechanisme voorgesteld
voor demonstratieve nominale anaforen, gebaseerd op het
Modification of Demonstratiue (MOD}voorstel. Volgens het MOD-
voorstel activeert een demonstrativum een non-default
interpretatie van de betrokken NP en zorgt het op die manier
voor de modificatie van de representatie van de onderliggende
tekstreferent. Vier modificationele typen worden in het hoofdstuk
onderscheiden. Essentieel in het voorstel is dat de
gemarkeerdheid van demonstratieve nominale anaforen niet
identificationeel van aard is, maar dat het demonstrativum in de
eerste plaats semantische veranderingen signaleert in de
representatie van de betrokken tekstreferent.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt betoogd dat de variatie tussen NPs met deze
ofdit en NPs met die of dat pragmatisch van aard is, en enkel de
associatie betreft van de betrokken referent met
coórdinatiepunten van referentiële domeinen in de tekst. In het
Presence-Presupposition (PP}voorstel wordt de variatie tussen
deze I dit en die I dat afhankelijk gemaakt van globale
tekstcondities. In dat voorstel vinden zowel localistische als actor-
~eoriënteerde gebruiksvormen van demonstratieven een
natuurlijke verklaring. Als dusdanig maakt dit voorstel de
variatie tussen de twee typen demonstratieven niet afhankelijk
van de identificationele geschiedenis van de betrokken referent in
de tekst, noch van de notie van focaliteit, maar van algemene
eigenschappen van de relatie tussen referent, schrijver en lezer in
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teksten.
Hoofdstuk 5 moet worden opgevat als een toepassing van de
analyse van identificationele en kwalificationele functies van
nominale anaforen in een speciaal soort teksten, i.e. vonnissen
van een lagere rechtbank. Het hoofdstuk toont aan dat het
gebruik van nominale anaforen op een systematische manier kan
worden verklaard door kwalificationele functies en dat het type
tekst bepalend is voor functies van referentiële uitdrukkingen.
Het hoofdstuk geeft aanleiding tot een belangrijke amendering
van de beschikbaarheidstheorie: als de identificatie van een
referent buiten kijf staat, dan kunnen andere, kwalificationele
functies van referentiële uitdrukkingen systematisch worden
geëxploiteerd.
In hoofdstuk 6, ten slotte, worden de resultaten uit de vorige
hoofdstukken vertaald in het licht van de verwerking van
nominale anaforen. Het uitgangspunt is dat de voorstellen de weg
wijzen naar psychologisch plausibele en empirisch ondersteunde
verwerkingsheuristieken voor nominale anaforen in teksten.
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